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One of the most debated topics in contemporary economic literature, as well as in
public opinion, concerns people’s well-being. Economists have always been concerned
about the pursuit of well-being, but lack of adequate instruments and the need for a
rigorous and quantitative approach asking for objective measures pushed the economic
theory to focus on income-based measures of well-being, mainly gross domestic product
(GDP). Hence, the economic analysis started neglecting an important share of human
well-being (Graham, 2005). If we consider our daily life experiences, we realize that
a large part of what is important for our well-being are goods that we can not buy.
People declare themselves isolated and lonely; the social environment in which they live
is unsafe and they fear to leave their homes; cities are polluted; people spend a lot of
their daily time stuck in traffic jam closed in their cars; trust in others and honesty are
declining; stress and nervous illnesses are widespread; it is more and more difficult to
find a place to enjoy social relationships (unless mediated by commercial activities, i.e.
big commercial centres, multi-cinema, etc.). All these aspects strongly concern people’s
well-being, but they are only partially accounted for by GDP.
Recent development of social sciences, and particularly of economics, allowed to add
further dimensions to the term well-being, its determinants and, above all, propose new
instruments to help accounting for it. This is why a growing number of economists,
recently, turned their attention to subjective well-being (SWB), that is to say individ-
ual’s evaluation of its own well-being. Because of this shift, we could correctly state
that economic theory is experiencing a revolution re-discovering happiness (or SWB)
as the main goal of human life.
1
1. INTRODUCTION
In this context, the words “happiness” and “subjective well-being” are considered
synonyms and are generally referred to as an evaluation of one’s own life regarded as a
whole. These kind of data revealed to be precious and reliable sources of information
concerning people’s well-being. Their reliability has been tested in many ways: data
about SWB have been found consistent with more objective measures of well-being
(heart rate, blood pressure, duration of Duchenne smile, neurological tests of brain
activity) (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2008a; Van Reekum et al., 2007), they show a
high correlation with other proxies of SWB (Schwarz and Strack, 1999; Wanous and
Hudy, 2001; Schimmack et al., 2009) and are consistent with evaluations about the
respondent’s happiness provided by friends, relatives or clinical experts (Schneider and
Schimmack, 2009; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Layard, 2005).
Furthermore, these data revealed to be widely available and easy to collect being
increasingly available also in Less Developed Countries. Not only, but many of the so-
called “happiness studies” showed that SWB data reveal interesting stories about our
societies. This is why media, politicians as well as the scientific community have been
paying increasing attention to the SWB of individuals. Recently, the French economic
commission directed by J. Stiglitz, A. Sen and J. P. Fitoussi (2009) published a report in
which it advices the development of indexes of well-being to supplement more common
income-based measures.
There are many fields in which happiness data have been employed. Some of these
are:
• evaluating the effect of macroeconomic policies: Di Tella et al. (2001, 2003, 2006)
assess the impact of inflation and unemployment on individual happiness. Kenny
(1999, 2005) assesses the effects of economic growth on happiness in developed
and developing contries. Alesina et al. (2004) study the relationship between
inequality and happiness in Europe and U.S.A.;
• assessing the impact of non-economic aspects (such as age, gender, marital and
employment status, income and education level, traits and cognitive dispositions)
on well-being (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Oswald, 1997 ; Darity and Goldsmith,
1996; Theodossiou, 1998; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998);
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• measuring the impact of specific policies on people: airport noise, environmental
pollution, commuting, parks and green spaces (Diener et al., 2009; Van Praag
and Baarsma, 2004;
• studying the relationship between political institutions and SWB (Frey and Stutzer,
2000, 2002, 2007);
• understanding the way individuals in developing economies assess their own wel-
fare and how their assessments differ from those based on traditional measures
(Graham et al., 2001, 2002, 2006; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001, 2002).
A further and growing area of interest in “happiness research studies” concerns
the explanation of one of the hottest paradoxes of modern societies: after the Second
World War industrialized countries experienced an unprecedented economic growth,
countries grew up richer and richer, every demographic and sanitary index improved,
many illnesses were defeated and schooling became widely available. Nonetheless more
and more people report to be less satisfied with their lives then previously. A shocking
research by Easterlin (1974) revealed that during last fifty years national well-being in
western countries, measured by gross domestic product (GDP), grew up steadily while
people’s SWB stagnated. This result is currently known as the “Easterlin paradox”
and it suggests a substantially stable pattern of SWB over time.
The debate on such evidence has been recently revived by Stevenson and Wolfers
(2008) who questioned the existence of the paradox stating that there is a positive
and significant relationship between subjetive well-being and income. Unfortunately,
this evidence fails to distinguish between the short and long-term relationship between
SWB and income (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009): in the short term SWB and income
are related but unrelated in the long run. In other words, the Easterlin paradox has
been re-formulated in terms of a lack of correlation between GDP and SWB in the long
run, rather than a stagnating SWB. That is to say that, in the long term, changes in
income doesn’t explain the international differences in well-being. Hence, what does
explain SWB trends?
The idea is that the average SWB in a country in the short term fluctuates around
a long run fixed level. The main explanations of such evidence focus on two different
mechanisms: adaptation and social comparisons. Adaptation theory holds that changes
in people’s living conditions (for example concerning their economic conditions) have
3
1. INTRODUCTION
a transitory effect on their well-being. However, neither rising prosperity nor severe
misfortune affect happiness permanently. In the long run people adapt to their baseline
level of well-being. The same holds for nations.
On the other hand, social comparison theory holds that what matters for an average
individual is her/his relative position with regard to a reference group, a selected group
of people with whom she/he compares. These people represent a benchmark for the
individual and the comparison is such that, in a given country, the relative gains and
losses of different individuals cancel each other out, resulting in no significant shifts,
upward or downward, for the well-being of a society as a whole. Adaptation and social
comparisons are well-established theories and, so far, they collected a compelling cross-
sectional evidence.
The strong version of these theories states that the international differences in SWB
levels must be attributed to fixed cultural differences in the meaning of happiness. In
other words, low-ranking countries have always been low and will remain so. There
is no space for policies to improve well-being. These theories have depressing implica-
tions with regards to the prospects for progress of humanity: no improvement in our
living conditions can permanently increase our well-being. At best we should be happy
because no individual or social severe misfortune can permanently depress it!
Recently, this framework has changed. An increasing availability of data showed
that SWB varies in the long run and it doesn’t vary in the same way in every country
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2008, Inglehart 2009). There are countries in which well-being
increased and others in which it decreased. For example, for what concerns developed
countries, well-being raised in many European countries and it reduced in USA.
The theories adopted so far to explain why SWB stagnates fail to explain this new
evidence. They can accept that their effects are not complete and, for example, that
they do not entirely offset the effect of economic growth, but they can not account for
cross-country differences in SWB trends: if the tendency to adapt ones self to changing
circumstances or to compare ones self to others is a distinctive trait of human nature,
then the trends of well-being in different countries cannot exhibit opposite signs.
Hence, what does explain SWB trends and its differences across countries?
Recently, the research suggested a promising answer to this question arguing that
individual’s sociability plays a major role in determining people’s well-being. But what
do we mean with sociability? Social science studies usually refer to it as relational
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goods, that is to say intrinsic non-market relationships among individuals, or, more
generally, to social capital (SC). I would like to stress that there is some terminological
variability in the rapidly growing economic literature on the topic and, although these
terms might mean different constructs, they are sometimes used interchangeably. SC
is a much debated topic about which many different defintions and descriptions have
been proposed. Generally, we can refer to SC as a set of social connections and shared
norms and values available in a society. Some studies from the “happiness economics”
research focused on the link between SC and SWB finding out a positive relationship.
In particular, it seems that the relational quality of people experience, that is to say
the quality of the relationships among people, has a predominant impact on their well-
being (Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Helliwell, 2006; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Becchetti,
Pelloni and Rossetti, 2008).
A former analysis by Bartolini, et al. (2008), using micro data from the US General
Social Survey for the past 30 years, shows that a large portion of the declining Amer-
ican happiness trend is explained by four forces acting in contrasting directions. The
first one is the increase in per capita income, which positively affects SWB. The other
three affect happiness in the opposite direction: American well-being is reduced by
three forces: 1) the increase in income of other fellow Americans. The reason is social
comparisons, which destroy approximately 2/3 of the positive impact that the increase
in ones family income has on the average American; 2) a similar impact is produced
by the erosion of relational goods. Many indicators suggest that the American society
experienced an increase in solitude, in comunicative difficulties, in apprehension, in
loneliness, in distrust, in familiar instability, in generational cleavages, in civic engage-
ment, in participation in social networks and a reduction in solidarity and honesty; 3)
the decrease in the confidence in institutions, a further component of SC, accounts for
a further reduction of American SWB.
The overall result of these four forces for American SWB is negative. That is to
say that observed variation in American happiness, between 1975 and 2004, is almost
entirely predicted by three negative impacts more than off-setting the positive impact
of the increasing income on SWB. These results explain almost all the variation in
American happiness, in the sense that the unexplained residual is small enough to
allow a limited role to other explanations for the decline in happiness.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The role of relational goods for happiness is quite large. Results suggest that if SC
had stayed constant at its 1975 level, American SWB would have increased. Hence, a
large part of the explanation for the reduction in American well-being is linked to the
fact that people became richer in material goods, but poorer in sociability.
Unfortunately, the analysis of the relationship between sociability and SWB is still
in its infancy. Much of it still relies on cross-sectional data and doesn’t account for
unmeasured individual characteristics. Because of the quality of data, it is hard to
test at the same time the role of different determinants, including SC, of SWB across
countries. A further problem is represented by the causality between SC and SWB.
Because of the nature of the two variables, it is hard to clearly state which is the
causality nexus between them, given the currently available “tool box”. Nonetheless,
recent analyses suggest that the link between at least some forms of social connections
and SWB is causal (Stiglitz et al., 2009; Becchetti et al., 2009). A further problem is
represented by the scarcity of information about the trends of SC. This topic has been
widely studied for USA, but we don’t know much about what happened to SC trends
in other countries (Adam, 2008; Morales, 2004).
In the light of the above observations, present research is intended to concur to the
explanation of what determines long term changes in well-being across countries. The
hypothesis I want to test is whether SC is a major predictor of well-being. My aim is
to contribute to the debate on the role of SC in explaining international SWB trends
overcoming some of the limitations of the literature on SC in “happiness economics”.
Solving this puzzle is fundamental for understanding on which goals we should
focus our policy efforts to raise well-being. Indeed, being persuaded that economic
growth was the most plausible way to improve human condition, we built a whole
economic, social and cultural order focused on material well-being. Though, it is now
clear that changes in income don’t affect the long term changes in well-being across
countries (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). Hence, if changes in income don’t explain
international differences in well-being, where else should we focus our attention?
This question calls for an urgent re-definition of the economic policy agenda. Sub-
jective evaluations of well-being proved to be a reliable and powerful instrument to
account for people’s well-being. Now, it is time to discover what is important for it.
Whether sociability should be confirmed as an important explanatory factor, economic
policies should take in account their effects on SC if their final goal is the improvement
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in well-being. Specific policies could be enacted to preserve or enhance SC and the
way many existing institutions are working should be reconsidered in the light of the
new role of SC. On the other side, we now know also that, thanks to the “happiness
economics”, it is possible to monitor and to evaluate the outcomes of our policies in a
very efficient way. Of course, these are only hypothesis and there is still a lot of work
to do before thinking about such implications, but these are the new frontiers that this
literature is unvealing and to which I wish to contribute.
Using micro and macro data from different data-sets, present analysis tries to answer
above-mentioned questions in four steps by: 1. checking whether the determinants of
SWB change across countries; 2. testing whether international trends of SC and SWB
are consistent; 3. analysing the role of SC as a predictor of SWB trend on a micro-level
analysis and 4. checking whether SC variations predict long-term SWB changes in
nations.
This work is structured as following: the next chapter is titled “Determinants of
subjective well-being in high and low income countries: do happiness equa-
tions differ across countries?” and deals with the first above-mentioned aspect.
Different theories have been advanced to explain what really makes people happy or
satisfied with their life, but they are mainly focused on developed countries. This is
mainly due to the fact that for richer countries there are longer and reliable data-sets
allowing such researches. Nonetheless, data on individual perceptions became more
and more available also for Less Developed Countries. Recently, this debate has been
revived by Layard (2009) who, criticizing Deaton’s conclusion that only income matters
to happiness, contend the assumption of a unique “happiness equation”. Such topic has
been longly debated in literature and still there is not an agreed conclusion although
the vast majority of the studies suggest that people have similar preferences.
One of the best data-sets to deal with this question is the World Values Survey
(WVS)1 that now collects informations on individual perceptions for a great number of
countries from all over the world. This makes WVS a precious instrument to perform
a cross-country comparison on the determinants of well-being. In particular, I will
test whether the determinants of well-being proposed so far in the literature have the




positional and relational goods and SC play a different role for SWB in rich and poor
countries.
Answering this question is very important for at least two reasons: 1) studying
international differences in SWB implicitly assumes that people have similar happiness
equations across countries, but on this point economic literature still didn’t find any
agreement; 2) testing the role of different determinants of SWB in low income countries
can have notable effects on these economies. For example, it may allow a better evalu-
ation of the effects of development policies and, above all, it can be useful to identify
new and more socially and environmentally sustainable development policies.
The third chapter, titled “Social capital and subjective well-being trends:
comparing 11 western European countries”, deals with the evidence that the
trend of SWB in western countries is different from the American one. During last
decades, western European countries experienced either a growing or stable SWB trend
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). At the same time, the declining trend of American well-
being has been found consistent with the declining trend of the American SC (Putnam,
2000 and Bartolini et al., 2009). Hence, my question is: “how is SC performing in
western European countries?” My aim is, first, to test whether SC erosion is a general
trend of modern societies or if it is rather a characteristic feature of the American one.
In answering this question I also contribute to the literature on SC defining the trends
of 4 groups of proxies of SC. In fact, information on the trends of SC for other non-
USA countries are scarce and fragmentary and only few authors payed attention to it.
Secondly, I test whether SC trends are consistent with SWB trends. I adopt micro data
on eleven western European countries from WVS between 1981 and 2000. Using four
different sets of proxies of SC, I find evidence of a probable relationship between SC
and happiness: the sign of the variation across time of the two trends is compatible in
ten out of eleven countries. This result supports the hypothesis that the cross-countries
differences in SC trends play a major role in explaining the international differences in
SWB trends.
The analysis on the determinants of SWB and, in particular, on the role of SC
to explain the overall variation of SWB is the subject of the fourth chapter. It is
titled “Predicting the life satisfaction of Germans: the role of sociability,
comparisons and adaptation” and it presents an analysis on Germany using micro-
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data from the German Socio-Economic Panel1. In particular, I aim at quantifying the
importance of income growth, adaptation, social comparison and SC for SWB trends.
The GSOEP is one of the main sources of evidence on the relevance of adaptation
and social comparisons (e.g. Ferrer-I-Carbonell, 2005; Vendrik and Wojtiers, 2007;
Layard et al. 2009; see also Clark et al. 2008, and references therein). Moreover, the
GSOEP is rich in SC data and indeed it has been used to show the importance of this
data for well-being (Becchetti et al. 2008; Becchetti et al. 2009). It is, therefore, an
ideal database for providing a test of the predictive potential of the four main forces
that affect the trend of SWB.
A further important aspect of the GSOEP is its panel nature allowing to control for
individual fixed effects and for adaptation, two aspects that cross-sectional data prevent
to account for. In this way, my analysis overcomes some of the constraints imposed by
cross-sectional data on the analysis of the relationship between SC and SWB and reveals
that German SWB trend, during last fifteen years, is largely predicted by changing in
income, SC, adaptation and social comparisons.
The next-to-last chapter, titled “Sociability predicts happiness in nations:
some world-wide evidence”, extends previous micro findings on the role of SC for
SWB to a macro dimension. My aim is to test whether the predicting power of SC
holds also in a macro framework.
In doing so, I document that the trends of SC are a strong predictor of the long-term
trends of SWB in the set of all developed and developing countries provided with long
run time series about SC. Data are drawn from WVS and refer to the period from 1981
to 2007. SC is proxied by individual membership in groups or associations that accounts
for participation in social networks and civic engagement. I adopt the same bivariate
methodology employed to study the relationship between SWB and income (Stevenson
and Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). Results are impressive: the same
methodology bringing to the conclusion that in the long run SWB is unrelated with
income, documents that well-being is strongly related with SC in developed countries,
developing countries and all countries together. Moreover, I provide several robustness
checks of Easterlin and Angelescu’s analysis, confirming their results.






Well-Being in High and Low
Income Countries: do happiness
equations differ across countries?
2.1 Introduction
Recent developments of social sciences suggest that in many western countries the eco-
nomic development of last fifty years had disappointing effects on individuals’ well-being
(Easterlin, 1974). What is currently known as the “Easterlin paradox” shows that after
the Second World War western countries, and in particular United States, experienced
a steady GDP growth suggesting an improvement of well-being. Unfortunately, at the
same time, the perceived well-being of individuals (the subjective well-being) stagnated.
This point is well summarized by the chart in fig. 2.1.
The chart shows the evolution in time of GDP and subjective well-being (SWB) in
USA along the last fifty years. Between 1946 and 1956 the two lines have been increasing
at the same rate, but starting from the early ’60s something started going wrong and
the two curves started departing from each other: the GDP has been increasing, while
the percentage of people declaring to be very happy stayed constant or, even, reduced.
Currently, the Easterlin paradox has been redefined in the light of a more striking
evidence suggesting that in the long run economic and happiness growth are unrelated
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Figure 2.1: Income and happiness in the USA
Source: R. Layard, Happiness: has social science a clue?, Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures
2002/3, London School of Economics, 3, 4, 5 March 2003, p. 16
(Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). Such evidence is striking, in particular in the light
of the benefits brought about by economic growth: healthier and longer lives, useful
technologies, possibilities of travels and easier and faster contacts among people across
the world. Nonetheless, the increasing body of literature on the topic suggests that
something went wrong and what was expected to increase SWB turned out to be, at
best, uncorrelated with it (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Di Tella and MacCulloch,
2008; Easterlin, 2001a; Frey and Stutzer, 2002b). Therefore, a new question arises:
what is important for individuals’ well-being?
Given the cross-country nature of the question posed by the Easterlin paradox,
data coming from different countries are the main enquiring tool used so far (Easterlin
and Angelescu, 2009; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Alesina et al., 2004; Blanchflower
and Oswald, 2004; Blanchflower, 2008; Graham, 2005a; Graham and Pettinato, 2001).
Unfortunately, this aspect is, at the same time, a vulnerable point for this body of
research: all these studies assume the cross-country, cultures and economic conditions
comparability of the proxies of SWB and of its determinants. Assuming that people
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around the world know what makes them happy, there are no obvious reasons to assume
that the determinants of SWB may be the same (Clark et al., 2005).
Present work aims at contributing to this literature focusing on the determinants
of SWB in low and high income countries. It, first, investigates the determinants of
SWB controlling for the role of absolute income, positional and relational goods and
social capital. In so doing, it considers at the same time the role of those variables
that so far proved to be promising in explaining the Easterlin paradox (Helliwell, 2001,
2006; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Di Tella et al., 2003;
Easterlin, 2001a; Clark et al., 2008; van Praag et al., 2003). Subsequently, it assesses
whether the structure of the happiness equation has the same form in poor and rich
countries. This topic has been recently scrutinized by Blanchflower (2008); Di Tella
and MacCulloch (2007); Kapteyn and Wansbeek (2008). Helliwell (2008) suggests that
basically people around the world consider the same aspects as important for their
well-being and argues that the international differences in SWB depend on different
life circumstances, in particular on the availability of social capital. Observing two
groups of people in 105 countries, Helliwell et al. (2009) study the impact of multiple
factors on SWB distinguishing between people having enough money for adequate food
or not. Their main findings are: 1. the importance of income is slightly lower for
poorer people; 2. female report higher well-being in the richer group; benefits for well-
being from marriage are less and negative consequences of separations, divorce and
widowhood are greater for the poorer group; 4. the poorer are also much less likely to
report having family or friends they can count on in times of troubles (Helliwell et al.,
2009).
Recently, this topic has been revived by Layard et al. (2009) who, critizing the
evidence provided by Deaton (2008) suggesting a strong relationship between average
life satisfaction and log average incomes, assess that countries, whether rich or poor,
doesn’t work the same way.
Present research settles in this debate exploring the determinants of SWB in dif-
ferent economic settings checking for any differences between low and high income
countries.
A similar research is available thanks to the growing quantity of cross-section data
about happiness coming from the “World Values Survey”, a large database with more
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than 250000 observations coming from 82 countries from all over the world and repre-
senting more than 85% of world’s population1.
This chapter is articulated in six sections: the following section is dedicated to a
review of the main theories proposed to explain the income - happiness paradox showing
the framework in which present research is situated. The third section deals with the
reliability of SWB proxies and points out the main methodological aspects that we
have to keep in mind when working with subjective data and, particularly, in LICs.
The subsequent two sections first present data adopted and then show results from an
OLS regression considering happiness as dependent variable and adopting proxies of
positional and relational goods, social capital, wealth and socio-economic conditions as
indipendent variables. In the last section, some final notes will conclude this work.
2.2 Theoretical approaches
Several theories, coming from different disciplinary frameworks, have been proposed in
order to explain the happiness paradox. Set-point theory is one of the main psycholog-
ical theories proposed so-far. it suggests that an increase in income may produce only
temporary changes in well-being: after a while it will revert to its previous level (Bruni
L., 2006). Hence, in the long-run, this theory predicts a constant SWB, while in the
short run any external shock is going to be reabsorbed and SWB is going to get back
to its long run level. This mechanism is possible since its underlying hypothesis is that
happiness depends on individual personality traits: people are “genetically” disposed
to certain levels of happiness (Pugno M., 2005). This aspect implies that nothing can
be done in order to make people happier. At the same time, this theory has been
criticized since further research suggests that personality traits explain only a part of
the whole variance of SWB and adaptation to the previous well-being level occurs only
slowly and incompletely.
In order to better articulate set-point theory, it is sometimes presented jointly with
the so-called adaptation theory proposed by Tibor Scitovsky (Bruni L., 2006). This au-
thor explains the adaptation mechanism distinguishing between creative and comfort-
able goods stating that happiness rises when people experiences new goods. However,




brings to boredom: in this way happiness goes back to its previous level (Bianchi M.,
2004). From Scitovsky’s point of view, happiness can only be increased by creative-
ness which allows to experience novelty and is opposed to boredom. This theory is
exciting but in general enjoying novelty will ask for even new experiences in order to
avoid boredom and this process doesn’t seem indefinitely available even when, like in
Scitovsky’s idea, creativeness is expressed through immaterial, intellectual activities.
The integration between set-point and adaptation theories allows to explain short-term
variations in happiness and its long-term steadiness suggesting that there is no space
for public policy in order to ameliorate SWB since it depends essentially on individual
characteristics.
Similarly to Scitovsky, Easterlin tries to explain the paradox focusing on the oppo-
sition between aspirations and achievements: an improvement in material conditions
cause people asking for continuous and even more intense pleasures in order to keep
the same satisfaction level (Bruni L., 2006). For that reason, this theory is sometimes
indicated as satisfaction treadmill theory. The engine of such continuous overcoming
of present conditions is based on the difference between what people can achieve and
their aspirations: when I obtain a particular good (for example a car) my well-being
increases, but, after a while, my aspirations about that good and related ones adapt to
the new present conditions and I will look forward in order to satisfy my new demand
(in this example a newer, safer, more powerful car). In this case, even if my objec-
tive well-being improves, my SWB stays constant because of this process of continuous
aspirations changing (Bruni L., 2002).
All theories presented here are based on the idea of rationality failure in which no
external factor is able to exert a permanent influence on happiness, but no explanation
of why rationality fails is proposed. Furthermore they suggest that individual interest
in money should decline over time because of its negative impact on happiness, but this
is not the case for our societies. Finally there is a growing agreement on the idea that
SWB strongly depends on domains other than income and material concerns which are
less exposed to the “treadmill” mechanism (Easterlin R., 2004).
2.2.1 The positional goods approach
One of the main economic theory advanced to explain the paradox is based on the idea
of positional goods: our well-being depends significantly on our level of consumption
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relative to the consumption of people with whom we usually interact (Bartolini S.,
2007). These kind of goods are socially scarce in the sense that if these were available
for all people then they would lose their value. From this point of view, the absolute level
of well-being loses importance: my individual well-being may stay constant because the
level of consumption of people in my reference group increased more than mine. A key
aspect of this theory is that the choices of others affect my personal well-being just
like a negative externality. Such theory originates from the pioneering works of Veblen
and Duesenberry and has been further developed by Robert Frank1 (who speaks about
relative income) and Fred Hirsch2 who introduces the concept of positional goods. From
Frank’s point of view, individual happiness depends on relative income, that is to say
the difference between the income level of a subject i and those of people close to him (in
a hypothetical society with only two people, subject j ); summarizing: H = f(Yi − Yj)
where H represents individual well-being and Y is the income of the two subjects (Bruni
L., 2002). In this framework even when income levels grow up, happiness remains
unchanged if the difference between the two incomes stays constant. An interesting
implication is that even if subject i ’s absolute income increases, its SWB may decrease
if subject j ’s absolute income growth is higher. Hirsch (1991) further develops this
approach arguing that if people is interested in their relative position in society, then
there is a growing incentive to compete in order to overcome the others in the social
ladder. This positional competition1 asks for an increasing effort and a continuous
absorption of resources useful to face others rivalry. In this continuous run people need
more and more goods which are not useful per se, but are only instruments to overcome
others and to show the relative position of their owner. Such a process will include a
growing number of goods coming from spheres other than simply economics and will
involve a continuous waste of resources.
This theory offers a good explanation to different social phenoma such as the in-
creasing demand for goods and the continuous research for higher income. An impor-
tant characteristic of this model is that it implies a coordination failure rather than a
hypothesis of limited rationality of subjects typical of the previously reviewed models
(Bartolini S., 2007). In fact, if people would be aware of the results of their choices,
1Frank R., Luxury Fever, Free Press, New York, 1999




probably they would not enacted them. Finally, a key feature of this theory is that
it assumes an idea of society characterized by competition, rivalry and envy in which
time has a growing importance: the quest for even higher positions in the social ladder,
causing a higher rivalry, make time a scarce good (Hirsch F., 1991). Hence, people will
tend to optimise it reducing all those time consuming activities that are not useful for
their competition. In particular, time dedicated to social relationships will be sacri-
fied since genuine human relationships need an active commitment by both involved
subjects, while social ladder climbing is time consuming. This blasting of sociality
will have two consequences: from the first point of view, reducing sociality will induce
a further consumption of marketable goods to replace the scarce and time-expensive
human relationships; from the second point of view, the scarcity of social relationships
will induce an under-investment in relational goods. Uhlaner (1989) defines relational
goods those goods that “can only be possessed by mutual agreement that they exist,
after appropriate joint actions have been taken by a person and non-arbitrary others”2.
“Relational goods cannot be produced, consumed, or acquired by a single individual,
because they depend on the interaction with others and are enjoyed only if shared with
others”3.
2.2.2 The relational goods approach
Currently, a number of scientists from different disciplines, in particular from economics,
are paying attention to the importance of these goods for human well-being because of
their growing scarcity.
Relational goods are human relationships in which the relationship itself is the
grounding aspect. They have been alternatively defined as local public goods, relation-
specific, obtained by “encounters” in which “identity”, “attitude” and “motivations”
of people involved are essential elements of the production of the relational good and
of its value. (Bruni L., 2002). Consequently, relational goods are also fragile since they
are exposed to unobserved behaviours of two different subjects sharing reciprocity.
2Uhlaner C.J., Relational goods and participation: incorporating sociability into a theory of rational
action, Public Choice, 1989, vol. 62, p. 254
3Bruni L., Stanca L., Watching alone: Relational goods, television and happiness, Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, vol. 65 (3-4), p. 4
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SWB (F) depends positively on the level of income (Y) and of relational goods (R)
available to people and deliberately ignores other important aspect of well-being (e.g.
health): F = f(Y,R). Such expression highlights that it is important to focus on
income and its growth since it directly affects happiness. This is true unless income
indirectly hurts relational goods and, consequently, SWB. In fact, the engagement to
increase income can produce negative effects on the quality and quantity of relationships
so that the overall effect of an increase in income on happiness may be negative. In
this way, relational goods offer an alternative explanation to the Easterlin paradox in
which the quest for higher income is the engine of a progressive usury of relational
goods which are fundamental for SWB (Pugno M., 2005).
An interesting feature of this theory is that it does not assume a negative nature of
human beings (Bartolini S., 2007). At the same time it shows mechanisms of rationality
failure: why do people choose to pursue higher income and to waste social relationships?
The first explanation can be proposed analyzing Scitovsky’s theory about comfort and
creativity goods: in this framework relational goods belong to the set of creativity
goods. The problem is that inmodern economies creativity goods are scarcely accessible
or very expensive and for this reason people tend to invest more in comfort goods which
are cheaper and appear to be good substitutes for creativity ones. A further explanation
related to Scitovsky’s theory focuses on the idea of “addiction”: comfort goods cause
dependency and people is induced to consume more comfort goods in order to keep
their pleasure constant. Another justification is based on the idea of “fragility” of
relational goods: since they do not depend solely on subjective will, but on a biunique
relationship, they are considered more risky than other economic goods and people will
be reluctant to textitinvest in them (Bruni L., 2006). Finally, the under-investment
in relational goods could be explained in terms of “positional competition” eroding
sociality.
Positional and relational theories offer two possible interpretations of the Easterlin
paradox that are particularly convincing. First of all they are quite related and it seems
that there could be an interaction between them. Hence, their implications fit quite
well particular aspects of contemporaneous society such as the quest for higher income,
an even scarcer leisure time, the erosion of social relationships and the growing number
of marketable goods and of their relevance in society.
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These theories are currently focusing mainly on rich countries, while fewer is known
about poorer ones. Nonetheless there are reasons to expect that positional competition
and relational goods play an important role also in poorer economies (Bruni L., 2006).
For that reason analyzing the effects of these goods in poor countries could shed further
light on SWB helping to better understand what people really desire.
2.2.3 Negative externalities growth models
Bartolini et al.(2002; 2003a; 2003b) tryed to solve the happiness paradox proposing an
economic growth model which is compatible with the evidence provided by Easterlin.
The starting point of this theory is that SWB is largely influenced by particular goods
(named free goods) which are not produced by the market. On the contrary, they
are freely provided by the social and natural environment. Examples of free goods
are the natural inputs provided by the environment and freely employed in productive
processes: water, sun, land, air are some possible examples. Hence, free goods are
identified as those goods which are renewable or unrestrictedly available to everybody.
Among these goods, we comprise also social elements such as social shared values; social
norms silently ruling the behaviour of people in a group; trust, honesty and, generally,
all those elements which are freely produced by social relationships and usually called
SC.
Much of the literature on SC highlights the role played by trust and social networks
in ameliorating exchanges and cooperation among different agents and in reducing
transaction costs. Societies with high endowments of SC need less investments in
intermediate goods to protect from possible opportunistic behaviours. Similarly, in
such societies it is easier to trust in others even if you do not know your counterpart.
In this way new exchanges and relationships are fostered.
From this point of view negative externalities growth (NEG) model is based on the
idea that economic growth produces negative externalities reducing the ability of the
environment to provide such important goods. People react to the reduction in SC
raising their defensive expenditures asking for replacing goods that are no more freely
offered by the environment, but provided by the market. Hence, negative externalities
force individuals to look at private goods rather than free goods to avoid a reduction in
their SWB. In this sense negative externalities foster economic growth: asking for ex-
pensive goods provided by the market, individuals indirectly support economic growth.
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Therefore, a higher economic growth engender new negative externalities eroding
free goods. Hence, economic growth is feeded by a self-augmentative process. But why
does the growth process produce negative externalities? Related literature basically
identifies the spread of capitalistic values as the cause of such phenomena: market
economy is based on competition and individual success causing a strong propensity to
materialism. These circumstances push people towards a higher isolation encouraging
the erosion of social ties and the declining of shared values and social norms. As a
result, people react to such a reduction under-investing in trust, honesty, reciprocity
and looking more and more at their economic substitutes.
Concluding, the NEG approach suggests an economic growth process that is feeded
by the reaction of individuals to negative externalities produced by the economic pro-
cess as well. Hence, on one side market goods are essential for replacing wasted free
goods, while on the other people develop an excessive proneness to market goods. Con-
sequently, individuals raise their amount of hours worked in order to increase their
income and enlarge the number of private goods they can buy. The outcome is well
known: SC decreases, free goods are substituted by private goods and GDP increases.
2.3 Methodological issues and expected results
A similar research using SWB data poses different methodological questions that need
to be previously addressed.
Usually researchers are sceptical about using subjective data because they may be
biased by different aspects (Helliwell, 2006):
• lack of precise definition of the question asked;
• different or changing norms;
• personality aspects and their difficult observability;
• idiosyncratic or unobserved events;
• different cultures;
• lack of natural scaling to allow cross-person comparison of terms like “happiness”
or “satisfaction”;
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• accuracy in reporting: responses can be biased by the phrasing or the placement
of questions in the survey.
When speaking about less developed countries, national representative surveys are
rare and often with flaws. Another problem is accounting for error in reporting income,
a problem that is further aggravated by policy shocks, such as devaluations and high
levels of inflation. Political and social conditions of respondent’s nation/region may
further bias its answers. Finally, accuracy in reporting may be a more stringent problem
in such contexts (Graham C., 2005).
In general, these objections suggest the impossibility of comparing subjective data
and their unreliability because they may be influenced by different aspects that can
not be controlled by researchers. Nonetheless, these data have been longly and widely
tested and adopted by psychologists and other social scientists who have been ana-
lyzing the sources of human satisfaction in detail for decades asking people how they
feel (Powdthavee, 2007). Moreover, subjective data have been found coherent with a
number of other “more objective” measures of well-being. For example psychology lit-
erature reports a well-defined correlation between happiness data and various physical
measures (e.g. duration of Duchenne smile; heart rate; blood pressure); Alternatively,
subjective data correlate substantially with what is assessed about the person’s happi-
ness by friends and family, by spouses or by clinical experts (Powdthavee, 2007).
Previous economic studies found that using such data in their aggregate allow to
avoid many bias related to individual aspects (Di tella et al., 2001). Infact, consid-
ering large samples across countries and over time reveals consistent patterns in the
determinants of happiness, while errors result uncorrelated with the observed variables
and do not systematically bias the results. Furthermore, in order to avoid the scaling
problem, econometric studies have usually adopted ordered logit or probit equations
and further tests showed that there are no significant differences among these methods
and the traditional OLS. Another aspect of the resulting equations is that they usu-
ally yield “lower R-squares than economists are used to, reflecting the extent to which
emotions and other components of true well-being are driving the results, as opposed
to the variables we are able to measure such as income, education and marital and
employment status”1
1Graham C., The Economics of Happiness. Insights on globalization from a novel approach, World
Economics, vol. 6, n. 3, 2005, p. 45
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Despite the probems that can arise when using such data, we have also to consider
the advantages that can originate from these studies. Respondents’ assessments of
their own welfare can highlight factors that are not adequately captured by income
measures, including real and perceived insecurity of rewards and incentives systems
adapting to structural changes, the state of essential public services (educations, health,
crime prevention), and norms of fairness and justice. Aspects such as poverty and
inequality can be characterized by broader dimensions and dynamic elements that are
not captured by such traditional income-based measures as poverty headcounts (e.g
missing short term movements in and out of poverty) and Gini coefficients (which are
static, aggregate and do not reflect distributional shifts) (Graham C., 2005).
Furthermore, whether on one side we should be careful in using such data and
in drawing results, on the other, this research can reveal new aspects about human
behaviour helping to improve our policy agendas for both developing and developed
countries. “Growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty reduction.
Other key factors [...] are essential to sustaining the development gains that globaliza-
tion helps bring about.”2.
2.4 Data
The World Values Survey1 (WVS) is a wide compilation of surveys collected in more
than 80 countries representing more than 80% of the world’s population. WVS collects
informations on sociocultural and political change observed on a randomly selected
sample of 300 to 4,000 individuals per country (Becchetti L. et al., 2006). In particular
the WVS provides informations on “individual beliefs about politics, the economy,
religious, social and ethical topics, personal finances, familial and social relationships,
happiness and life satisfaction”2. These data have been collected in four waves (1980 -
82; 1990 - 91; 1995 - 97 and 1999 - 2001) for a total of 267,870 observations. Anyway,
the sample available for present study is smaller since particular informations (such as
2Graham C., The Economics of Happiness. Insights on globalization from a novel approach, World
Economics, vol. 6, n. 3, 2005, p. 52
1http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
2Bruni L. and Stanca L., Watching alone: relational goods, television and happiness, Journal of
Economic Behaviour and Organization, 2008, vol. 65 (3-4), p. 6
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relational time and informations on voluntary activities) have not always been observed.
Summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are reported in tab.2.1.
Data on countries in the WVS have been divided in two groups reflecting the dis-
tinction proposed by the World Bank in low income countries (LICs) and high income
countries (HICs).3 Countries belong to the first group if their gross national income
(GNI) per capita is $ 875 or less ; vice versa countries with a GNI pro capita of $ 10,726
or more belong to the group of high income countries4. Groups are defined on the basis
of the 2006 World Bank list of economies.
In order to study the effects of positional and relational goods and of SC on hap-
piness in LICs and allow a comparison with HICs, I assume that individual happiness
(Hap) depends on material well-being (Wealth), the consumption of positional (Pos)
and relational (Rel) goods, the endowment of SC (SocK) and a set of socio-economic
conditions (Sec). Formally, for each group of countries I estimate the following rela-
tionship:
Hapi = α+ β1 ·Wealthi + β2 · Posi + β3 ·Reli + β4 · SocKi + β5 · Seci + µi (2.1)
where the index i stands for the different individuals.
Happiness is measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 4 and is based on answers to
the following question: “All considered you would say that you are : 1. very happy; 2.
pretty happy; 3. not too happy; 4. not at all happy?”. Comparisons of happiness scores
between low and high income countries are reported in tab.2.2.
Althought the number of observations is quite different between the two groups,
these results show that people in poor countries seem on average less happy than people
in rich countries: cumulative percentage of people with low average level of happiness in
LICs is 20.6% while in HICs it is 10.98%. On the contrary, people declaring themselves
pretty or very happy is 79.4% in LICs and 89.02% in HICs. Despite these figures, it is
3The World Bank, www.worldbank.org
4LICs include Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania, Vietnam, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, India,
and Bangladesh. HICs include Austria, United States, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Norway,
New Zealand, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Korea, Rep., Japan, Italy, Ireland, Iceland, Greece, United
Kingdom, Germany, France, Finland, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, Australia, Slovenia, Singapore,
Saudi Arabia, Puerto Rico, Malta, and Israel
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
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Table 2.2: Happiness levels in LICs and HICs.
interesting to notice that the percentage of people declaring themselves very happy is
higher in the first group of countries (32.51%) rather than in the second one (29.52%).
It is also interesting to observe happiness trends within each group of countries for
different income levels. In this case “income is measured by self-reported quintiles in
the national distribution of income”1. Using this measure of income allows compar-
isons across countries and individuals (Bruni L., Stanca L., 2006). Informations about
happiness and income quintile in the two groups of countries are summed up in tab.
2.3.
The first table refers to LICs and shows that 17.42% of people in the first income
quintile declares themselves as very happy, while this percentage fall to 5.24% for peo-
ple in the fifth income quintile. Similarly, the happiest people are situated between the
second and the third quintile. The same trend arise looking at percentages of people
declaring themselves pretty happy.
On the contrary, consistently with what we could expect, percentages of people declar-
ing themselves non at all happy decline when going from the first to the fifth quintile.
This aspect seems to suggest that in LICs unhappiness reduces with income, while this
is not true about higher levels of happiness.
Considering HICs, table2.3 b shows an interesting pattern too. In fact, while per-
centages of people with low levels of happiness reduce with higher incomes, people
declaring themselves pretty or very happy do not considerably vary among different
levels of income. Finally, similarly to what we have seen about LICs, also in HICs the
happiest people are situated between the second and the third quintile.
1Bruni L. and Stanca L., Watching alone: relational goods, television and happiness, Journal of
Economic Behaviour and Organization, 2008, vol. 65 (3-4), p. 7.
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Table 2.3: Happiness levels per income quintile in a) LICs and b) HICs
Individual wealth is proxied by the absolute level of income. This variable is based
on individual self-assessment of received income1.
In order to consider the effects of positional goods on happiness I include two groups
of variables: relative income (or income quintile) suggested above and social class. WVS
allows to distinguish among four different self-assessed classes: upper, middle-upper,
middle-lower and lower class. Dummy variables for each of these categories have been
included holding the lower class as the omitted variable.
Aspects about relational goods are observed through two different set of variables
aimed at observing two different characteristics of these goods: the identity of people
involved and the authenticity of the relationship. The first aspect is given by the time
spent by the respondent with specific groups of people and is based on answers to the
question: “For each activity,would you say you do them every week or nearly every
1The absolute income level is expressed as belonging to a determined range of values expressed in
local currency. When these data miss for an entire country, they have been replaced with data from
World Development Indicators. In this way each respondent has been assigned with the mean income
value of the corresponding income range. Successively, each income measure has been deflated and
translated in 2000 purchasing power parity expressed in US dollars. Finally, income measures have
been turned in logarithm.
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week; once or twice a month; only a few times a year; or not at all? Spend time with:
parents or other relatives; friends; colleagues from work; people at church, mosque
or synagogue; peole at sport, culture, and communal organization.” Answers to this
question range on a 1 to 4 point scale going from not at all to every week.
Genuiness of the relationship is observed through the participation to specific voluntary
organizations. Namely: church, sport, art, union, political, charitable, professional and
environmental organizations. Each option is expressed as a dummy variable.
SC is represented by three different variables: trust, freedom of choice and control,
and honesty. The first one is obtained through answers to the question “Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people?” and is represented by a dummy variable.
Perceived freedom of choice and control considers the degree of individual self-
determination and is measured on a 10 point scale ranging from “none at all” to “a
great deal”.
Honesty is based on respondent’s judgement about the justifiability of cheating on
taxes and is measured on a 10 point scale ranging from “never justifiable” to “always
justifiable”.
Finally, in order to consider specific individual and social aspects a set of control
factors including age, gender, education, employment and marital status is included.
In particular age is considered linearly and with its square; a dummy on male is intro-
duced; education is introduced through four different dummy for each education level:
illiterate, low, mid and high education corresponding to different years of school at-
tendance. Illiterate is the omitted variable. Unemployment of respondent is accounted
with a dummy variable, while marital status is controlled through four different dum-
mies: married, divorced, widowed and single.
Whether such a large number of proxies measure the same underlying phenomenon
or not can be addressed by means of correlation analysis. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 in the
Appendix report correlation matrices for Low and High Income Countries, respectively.
The light grey shadowed coefficients show a correlation ranging between 30% and 40%.
The dark grey shadowed coefficients relate to correlation coefficients higher than 40%.
Starting from this last category for which the correlation is quite high, tab.2.11 shows
that spending time with people from religious environment is positively correlated with
performing voluntary organization in religious institutions (+47%). Although the high
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correlation, the two proxies clearly refer to two different aspects of relational goods:
while the first refers more to the quantity, the second one reflects the quality of the
relationship focusing on the intrinsic motivations behind it. People participating in
voluntary sport organizations are also more likely to participate in artistic voluntary
organizations. In this case the correlation coefficients is about 43%. The two aspects
clearly refer to different dimensions of relational goods, but still the high correlation
among them suggest to be prudent in commenting results from the regression model.
The correlation analysis further suggests that belonging to the lower class and being
in the first income quintile are quite correlated (+42%). This kind of result is not
surprising and the fact that belonging to the lower class is taken as omitted variable
(i.e. it is excluded from the model) should be enough to prevent possible collinearity
problems. Finally, as expected, age and age squared are correlated at 98%, nonetheless
the two variables are included to capture the non linear effect of age on happiness. For
what concern poor countries, the correlation analysis suggests that age is also slightly
correlated with being married (+31%): the older the individual, the higher is the
possibility for him/her to be married. Quite similarly, volunteering in labour unions
and in professional organizations correlate at 36%, while spending time with colleagues
from work is associated with spending time with people at sport (+30%).
If we consider the tab.2.12 in the Appendix, we notice that the picture for rich
countries is not significantly different from the one for poor ones. In this case, age, age
squared and being widowed are strongly correlated (98%, 40% and 44%, respectively).
Similar to the case of poor countries, spending time with people from religious environ-
ment and performing voluntary organization in religious institutions are very strongly
correlated (60%) suggesting the idea that people in both poor and rich countries, inde-
pendently from the kind of activity, tend to build clusters of relationships. Something
similar happens in the case of volunteering in sport associations and spending time
with people in sport environments (+37%). More significantly, the analysis highlights
that being happy is correlated with freedom of choice (33%). This is a peculiar aspects
arising for HICs that could be driven by different aspects. It will be interesting to look
deeper at this relationship after controlling for other relevant variables checking whether
there effectively is a difference between the two groups of countries. Volunteering in
professional associations in HICs is mainly linked with having a high level education
(36%) probably reflecting the differences among high and low educated workers in the
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job market. It’s interesting to realise that this effect didn’t appear in LICs. It is im-
possible to explain this phenomenon at this stage, but, speculatively, this could suggest
that having a different education level, strongly influence the kind of job that you can
have in rich countries. The different job would affect individual decision of belonging
to unions rather than professional associations. Finally, belonging to the lower class or
to the upper-middle class is correlated wth being in the first (+30%) and in the fifth
(+31%) quintile of the income distribution, respectively. Similarly to the LICs’ case,
I omit belonging to the lower class from the model using it as a reference category.
Unfortunately, the problem can not be solved for the upper-middle class suggesting to
be prudent in interpreting final results. Nonetheless, since the main aim of this research
is to assess whether or not the determinants of SWB differ across countries, the result
coming from the correlation analysis suggests that the two groups of countries show
similar patterns of relationships among variables.
2.5 Results
I report and discuss results from an OLS model relative to equation 2.1. It is well
documented, in fact, that the use of an OLS is equivalent to the use of an ordered logit
or probit model (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004) and it has a strong advantage:
the main aim of present work is to compare the determinants of well-being in two
different contexts and OLS allows a direct comparison between regressors from different
regressions1.
Being aware of the constraints and methodological problems previously reviewed I
try to measure correlations across variables rather than establishing the size and the
direction of the causal effects. Nonetheless, several papers show social interactions
being related with SWB (Helliwell, 2006; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Bartolini et al.,
2008; Becchetti L. et al., 2008). In particular, Becchetti et al. (2009) find a strong and
significant relationship between SC and SWB. Finally, in order to consider different
socio-economic aspects and any possible bias represented by specific countries, years
or survey waves, I include a set of socio-economic variables (Seci), country-specific and
1please, refer to tab.2.10 in the appendix for a comparison of the results from an OLS, ordered logit
and probit model
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time-fixed effects for survey waves in each regression. For shortness these last dummies
are not reported in the tables.
Table 2.4 shows the overall estimation results. The first aspect I have to care of is
the small dimension of the sample: 6450 observations in LICs and 3475 in HICs. This
constitutes an important constraint on our analysis since it reduces the significance
of results. Unfortunately, the sample considerably reduces because of the wide range
of variables that I’m considering at the same time. In particular, informations about
relational time are only available in the fourth wave, while voluntary activities aspects
are not available in the first wave and social class aspects are not available in the second
one. Hence, in order to overcome this problem I am successively going to consider subset
of variables to confirm or less the evidence coming from the overall regression.
2.5.1 Socio-economic aspects
Let’s start analyzing socio-economic variables which are quite coherent with what found
in previous empirical research. Male and age coefficients are negative and significant
in both groups of countries. Educational dummies show that moving from illiterate to
a low education level has a positive effect on well-being in both groups of countries.
This effect holds positive for middle level education in LICs and is not significant in
remaining cases. Results on marital status highlight an interesting and coherent pattern
as well. In fact being married positevely affects happiness in both HICs and LICs, but
in this last case the coefficients turn out to be not significant. Similarly, being divorced
or widowed with respect to single has a negative and strong coefficient in both groups
of countries, althought coefficients are not significant in HICs. Finally, unemployed has
a mixed effect. In order to look in more detail at these determinants, let’s consider
tab.2.5 that expressly focuses on socio-economic determinants1. In this case a bigger
sample is available: 22301 observations in LICs and 103932 in HICs. Overall, I confirm
previous results: a higher education increasingly improves SWB in both groups of
countries; the effects of gender and age are unchanged as well as coefficients of marital
status. In particular, being married positively affects happiness in both LICs and HICs
with stronger effects in rich countries. Finally being unemployed reveals negative and
significant coefficients with a 5 time stronger effect in HICs.
1This regression, similarly to all the others, contains socio-economic control variables, country-
specific and time-fixed effects dummies to control for any systematic variability.
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Table 2.4: Overall estimation results
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Table 2.5: OLS regressions with socio-economic variables
2.5.2 Wealth aspects
In this case I am considering the effects of absolute income on individual well-being.
Coefficients of absolute income in the two groups of countries are positive, but they
are not significant. Turning to tab.2.6 allows to look at these data more specifically.
Previous result is confirmed: absolute income coefficients are both positive and signif-
icant. As I could expect, a higher income has a stronger effect in LICs rather than in
HICs. This outcome is also consistent with previous findings from literature, even if,
to the best of my knowledge, there are only a few works based on the WVS considering
absolute income (Becchetti et al., 2006).
2.5.3 Positional goods and happiness
In order to test the hypothesis that positional goods play an important role in explaining
differences in SWB across countries, I consider two proxies of these goods:
1. relative income: based on the income class of the respondent and recoded in
quintiles.
2. social class: measured on self-assessment from the respondent. Three classes are
considered: upper, middle-upper and middle-lower, while the lower class is held
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Table 2.6: OLS regressions with proxies on wealth
as a reference.
Results about social class show that going from the lowest to the highest class in-
creasingly affects happiness in both developing and developed countries. In particular,
belonging to the upper class in LICs has almost a three time larger effect on well-being
than being in the middle-lower class. These results are statistically significant and seem
to suggest that happiness of people is considerably affected by the splitting of society
in social classes. Looking at the first column of tab.2.7, coefficients still suggest that
moving from the lowest social class to the highest has increasing positive effects on
well-being, with stronger effects in LICs. The second column of tab.2.7 shows results
for relative income that are not significant for HICs in tab.2.4. Coefficients are signifi-
cant and negative for low levels of relative income and positive for the two higher levels
in both groups of countries. Once more, coefficients reveal a stronger effect on SWB
in LICs. Finally, the third column of tab.2.7 reports data from a regression with both
groups of variables at the same time which basically confirm previous results: moving
from the lowest to the highest social class in both groups of countries has a positive
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very similar effect on well-being in rich and poor countries. Results on relative income
are confirmed as well. In particular, belonging to the highest quintile has a positive
effect in both groups of countries and stronger for LICs.
A first partial conclusion suggests that in both groups of countries happiness is
strongly influenced by positional aspects. In particular, SWB in LICs seems more
affected by positional concerns than in HICs.
2.5.4 Relational goods and happiness
The idea that interpersonal relationships are important in human happiness has been
widely tested so far. In this case, following Bruni and Stanca (2006) I test this hypoth-
esis using two different groups of proxies for relational goods reflecting two particular
aspects:
1. the identity of subjects involved in the relationship;
2. the authenticity of the relationship.
The first aspect is actually proxied by the time the respondent declares to spend with
specific groups of people; the second characteristic is considered through a set of dummy
variables about the participation in specific voluntary organization. Results presented
in tab.2.4 show that in LICs happiness is positively influenced by spending time with
colleagues from work or people from church, mosque etc. Considering coefficients about
participation in voluntary organizations, participating in charitable or political organi-
zations strongly and significantly affects SWB followed by participation in professional
organizations althought this time score is not significant.
Results in LICs are quite different compared with those in HICs. In fact time spent
with people from religious environments affects SWB more than in LICs followed by
time spent with people from recreational environments and colleagues. Another in-
teresting aspect is that time spent with relatives or friends shows positive coefficients,
while these proxies have negative and non significant coefficients in LICs. Unfortu-
nately, variables about participation in voluntary organizations have non significant
coefficients with the only exception of participation in politics that has a negative im-
pact on well-being. In order to allow an indicative comparison among the two groups of
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about participation in voluntary organizations. In this case I can notice that SWB
in HICs is positively affected by participation in religious and charitable organizations
followed by sport and artistic voluntary organizations, while participating in politi-
cal organizations has a negative (but non significant) coefficient. This profile is quite
in contrast with what emerges for LICs where the most important effect comes from
participating in politics, charitable and professional organizations.
In that case, the dimension of the coefficients is almost the same in the two groups
of countries, but the set of the determinants of well-being changes: happiness in LICs
seems more affected by participation in organizations useful to achieve other objectives,
that is to say those organizations in which the authenticity of the relationship is not
fundemental.
2.5.5 Social capital and happiness
Finally, I consider effects of SC on SWB. Variables considered are:
• honesty;
• freedom of choice and control;
• trust.
Results from tab.2.4 suggest that all these variables have a positive impact on SWB in
both rich and poor countries althought coefficient for trust in LICs is not significant. In
general, it seems that SC has a stronger effect on well-being in HICs. These results are
further observed in tab.2.9 showing that honesty has broadly a similar positive effects
on happiness in both groups of countries. Trust and freedom of choice and control have
both a positive effect in LICs: in both cases, a one unit increase in the independent
variable implies on average a 3.5% increase in happiness. In HICs freedom of choice and
trust have positive and larger coefficients than in LICs with effects ranging between
6.5% and 7%. This evidence suggests that SC aspects are more important in rich
rather than in poor countries probably reflecting different SC endowments. Hence, this
result is coherent with what emerges from other studies showing a steady SC decline
in developed countries(Blanchflower, Oswald, 2004; Bartolini, Bilancini, Pugno, 2007).
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Table 2.9: Social capital and happiness in LICs and HICs
2.6 Conclusions
The aim of this research was to find out the effects of positional and relational goods on
SWB in low income countries testing whether people in poor and rich countries have
similar preferences for SWB.
Present results are relevant for happiness economics since they enlarge our knowl-
edge focusing on low income countries and revealing similar preferences for well-being in
LICs and HICs. Nonetheless, I should be prudent in drawing conclusions since results
need further research.
My analysis suggests that socio-economic aspects such as age, gender, being unem-
ployed, education and marital status, generally have the same effects in both groups of
countries even if the magnitude may be different: for example the effect of being mar-
ried has a stronger effects in HICs, while having a higher education seems much more
important in poor rather than in rich countries. Income is confirmed as a significant
determinant of SWB in both groups of countries. In this case I have to stress that the
coefficient is higher for LICs probably showing that in this context a higher income
38
2.6 Conclusions
significantly improves the possibilities to satisfy more basic needs. Anyway, present
analysis shows that, by focusing only on income and related indicators as proxies of
well-being, I miss a significant part of the whole story. For that reason it is important to
complement more traditional measures of well-being with the new contributions coming
from happiness economics.
Moving towards positional, relational and SC aspects I find out an interesting and
intriguing pattern.
To start with, it seems that positional aspects matter also in low income countries since
being in the upper class positively affects happiness while the two lower classes show
smaller impacts on well-being. This result is confirmed also in the case of rich coun-
tries. Still from a comparative point of view, it is quite clear that positional aspects
have stronger impacts in LICs since coefficients in this case are sistematically larger
than in HICs.
Data on relative income are more straightforward: belonging to the first two income
quintiles negatively affects SWB in both LICs and HICs, while being among the two
highest income quintiles positively affects happiness. In this case the magnitude of co-
efficients is larger for the two extremes of the scale and smaller for the two intermediate
steps. In particular, coefficients about low income countries confirm that poor countries
are subjected to positional competition too. Anyway this result should be considered
only a starting point rather than a conclusion since the nature of this competition in
the two contexts has to be further investigated. For example, social class aspects sug-
gesting that being in the lowest classes negatively affects well-being in both groups of
countries may hide different aspects: following Inglehart’s idea people in more devel-
oped economies are experiencing a cultural shift from what he defines modernization
to post-modernization in which individual and social values are changing.1 This trans-
formation would imply that people in rich economies are experiencing negative effects
of positional competition. Hence, they are adjusting their preferences on the basis of
new arising social values. On the contrary, people in poor countries have only recently
entered the “modernization”2 phase and they still have not experienced negative effects
of positional competition. The difference in the two cases is that in the first case we
1R. Inglehart, La Societa` Postmoderna. Mutamento, ideologie e valori in 43 paesi, Editori Riuniti,
Roma, 1998
2R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, Modernization, cultural change, and democracy. The human devel-
opment sequence., Cambridge University Press, 2005
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are observing the last phases of a process which, on the contrary, is just starting in low
income countries.
Coefficients related to variables about relational goods generally show that these
goods are important in both groups of countries. In this case single components differ.
In fact it seems that in low income countries SWB is much more influenced by time
spent with colleagues from work and with people from religious environments while par-
ticipation in charity, political and professional voluntary organizations has the largest
effect on happiness. Differently, in rich countries people pays much more attention to
time spent with people from religious and recreational environments or with colleagues.
Considering voluntary organizations, happiness is more affected by religious and char-
itable organizations.
These aspects still reveal a different composition between countries. In fact, involve-
ment in political or professional voluntary organizations, that is to say activities imply-
ing a joint effort for a common cause, are significantly related to SWB in poor countries
rather than rich ones. Happiness in high income countries, instead, seems much more
influenced by participation in activities in which intrinsic motivation plays a prominent
role (Bruni and Stanca, 2006).
Finally, SC aspects have all positive impacts on happiness even if single coefficients
are higher for rich countries. In particular it seems that happiness in HICs is largely
influenced by the individual freedom of choice and control on one’s own life and by
trust in others. These aspects too pose an intriguing question. What can explain these
differences? A former hypothesis that I could suggest is related to the idea of scarcity.
That is to say that these strong preferences for SC aspects reflect the low endowments of
such capital in rich economies1. In this case, a good becoming scarcer acquire a higher
value and more desirability. On the contrary, low income countries are supposed to
have a larger relative endowment of SC. This could explain why people do not perceive
its relative scarcity and then their well-being is less influenced by SC aspects. In this
case the difference in SC endowments in the two contexts could be explained in terms
of positional competition eroding social relationships and, consequently, SC.
Concluding, this research tried to shed new light on particular aspects concerning
SWB in low income countries. Results show a complex pattern which asks for further
investigation as well as the small dimension of the sample resulting from regressions
1R. Putnam, Social Capital Measurement and Consequences, Isuma, vol. 2, n. 1, Spring 2001
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needs further commitments to enlarge and explore it. Hopefully, when a new wave of
surveys will be available, we will have the possibility to further test our hypothesis and
results. So far a tentative conclusion suggests that the patterns of the determinants
of SWB in rich and poor countries are similar. In other words, we can assume the
existence of a unique happiness equation.
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2. DETERMINANTS OF SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING IN HIGH AND
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES: DO HAPPINESS EQUATIONS DIFFER
ACROSS COUNTRIES?
46
3Social Capital and Subjective
Well-Being trends: comparing 11
western European countries
3.1 Introduction
Discovering whether social capital (SC) endowments in modern societies have been
subjected or not to a process of gradual erosion is one of the most debated topics in
recent economic literature. This new stream of research has been inaugurated by Put-
nam’s pioneering studies about SC trends in the United States. Considering numerous
proxies of SC, Putnam (2000) argues that during last thirty years USA experienced a
decline in social relationships and in its system of shared values and beliefs. From this
point, much of the literature on SC tries to find evidence to support or to contend this
statement. For a comprehensive review of such literature see Stall and Hooghe (2004).
Putnam’s finding has been carefully scrutinised by Paxton (1999), Robinson and Jack-
son (2001), Costa and Kahn (2003), and Bartolini, Bilancini and Pugno (2008), while
Ladd (1996) criticised this evidence. “On balance, social capital has been confirmed as
declining in the US, although not so dramatically as Putnam claimed.”1
All these studies are focused on the USA since similar research asks for a generous
data-base and the US General Social Survey (GSS) offers a long lasting temporal data-
1S. Bartolini, E. Bilancini, M. Pugno, Did the decline in social capital decrease American happiness?
A relational explanation of the happiness paradox, Universita` degli Studi di Siena - Quaderni del
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, n.540, Agosto 2008, Siena.
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series. Consequently, we don’t have much informations about what happened in other
countries in the same period. For that reason the first question I would like to give an
answer is: how is doing Europe? is SC declining? is such erosion a general trend of
western societies or is it a characteristic feature of the American one?
To my knowledge only a few authors payed attention to this aspect since only a few
data-sets are useful to establish a clear long-term pattern. In 2001 OECD1 dedicated
to this topic a publication in which, beyond others, dealt with the theme of trends in
five European countries: United Kingdom, Netherlands, Sweden, France and Germany.
The report assesses that in general SC declined, in particular in United Kingdom, while
remaining countries show a more mixed pattern.
Another general perspective is offered by Andrew Leigh (2003)2. Contributing to
an entry on “Trends in social capital” he identifies three common patterns of declining
trust, political participation and organizational activity across industrialized countries
in the period between 1980 and 1990. Among the five reviewed European countries
(Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden) only the Scandinavian one seems to
have a positive trend even if civic engagement is declining. Further studies have been
conducted by Norris (2002), Delhey and Newton (2005) but these studies focused on
particular indexes of SC or only on generalised trust and were based on old data from
the WVS. A deeper analysis was conducted by Morales (2004) on trends and levels of
associational participation in Europe. Looking at trends between 1980 and 2002 from
the WVS and the European social survey (ESS) she concludes that it is not possible
to state whether a clear increase or decrease in general levels of membership exists.
Anyway, her analysis is merely descriptive and, even if she focuses on a broad set of
countries, her conclusions don’t account for other aspects, such as socio-demographic
variables, that can affect SC trends. Finally, a more recent article by Frane Adam
(2008) observes trends of generalized trust and membership in voluntary organizations
using data from WVS in the period 1980 - 2000. The author finds evidence of a non
eroding SC in Europe even if he warns about signs of decline as well as improvement. He
1OECD, The Well-being of Nations. The role if human and social capital, Centre for Educational
Research and Innovation, Paris, 2001
2A. Leigh, Entry on “Trends in Social Capital”, prepared for Karen Christensen and David Levinson




states that decline in trust in individuals is quite visible, while associational involvement
shows a more complex but on average positive trend.
Adam’s work is, to my knowledge, the most up-to-date and complete research on
European trends of SC. Anyway, it suffers some limitations. First of all it is based on
mean variations between the starting and ending period. This is quite comprehensible
since the second aim of the author was to test the reliability of the WVS vis-a-vis other
data-bases (i.e. ESS), but in general this approach does not allow to check for other
factors; secondly the author adopts only some of the available proxies of SC, namely
generalized trust, membership in voluntary organizations and unpaid voluntary work;
finally, Adam focuses on a large number of European countries including transition
countries: this is an interesting point, but misses to account for different economic
realities (developed and transition countries) preventing a more detailed knowledge of
what happened to SC during last twenty years.
In order to overcome these limitations, my research considers four different set of
proxies of SC controlling for time and socio-demographic aspects in eleven different
western European countries. Data are drawn from the WVS, a data-set composed of
four waves between 1980 and 2000. In so doing, I am able to investigate trends on a
twenty years period.
The second question I would like to answer is whether SC trends can help to explain
subjective well-being (SWB) trends. In a pioneering work Easterlin (1974) discovered
that, using cross-section data, on average richer people are also happier than poorer
ones; but a life-cycle analysis on the same sample shows that during time income
grew up while happiness stayed constant. Such a puzzle is actually known as the
“Easterlin paradox”. Starting from this point an even more consistent part of the
economic literature flourished trying to solve the problem. Many different theories
coming from manifold scientific fields have been advanced so far, but until now they
failed to fully explain the paradox1. Recently, Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) revive the
debate challenging the existence of the paradox. Considering Europe and Japan they
argue that societies get happier as they become richer. That is to say that “money
can buy happiness”. Unfortunately, at the same time they state that “the failure of
1for a review of the main theories advanced so far please refer to section 2.2 in chapter 2.
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happiness to rise in the United States remains a puzzling outlier.”1. In this way the
Easterlin paradox remains unsolved and also its non existence is not demonstrated.
There is a need to further look into the “black box” of the American case. From
this point of view, some recent contributions by Helliwell (2003, 2006) propose SC as
an important aspect for SWB arguing that money can not explain the whole variation
in people well-being. To my knowledge, the paper tackling most succesfully with the
challenge settled by Helliwell is Bartolini, Bilancini and Pugno (2008)2 which argues
that SC, and in particular relational goods, is important for SWB. They do not deny the
importance of income for happiness, but using data from the American GSS between
1975 and 2004 they find out that U.S. SWB is largely explained by four forces acting
in different directions: 1) income growth; 2) decreasing relational goods; 3) decreasing
confidence in institutions; 4) social comparisons. These four groups of variables allow
to explain quite the whole variation in SWB. In other words, the three authors suggests
that American happiness did not grow up together with economic growth because the
positive effect of income growth was counterbalanced by the declining availability of
SC which negatively affects SWB. In this way they provide a convincing and powerful
explanation of the Easterlin paradox giving SC a new role: a higher income increases
happiness as long as it does not undermine SC. Whenever this hypothesis would be
corroborated by further research, policy agendas will have to consider also the effects
of economic policy on the preservation and the provision of social capital. Hence, SC
can become an important aspect of future development policies.
The theory proposed by Bartolini et al. (2008) can help to explain what happened
in U.S.A. A few example can probably be convincing. Estimates from the three authors
suggest that in presence of a stable endowment of SC, and in particular of relational
goods, American SWB would have been higher than the actual one. Similarly, if income
growth should compensate for the effect of the reduction of SC on happiness, keeping
this variable stable to its 1975 levels, then the growth rate of GDP should have been
more than 10%. Finally, they also estimate that the positive effect of income growth on
SWB has been counterbalanced by the increase of other’s people income (which offsets
1B. Stevenson and J. Wolfers, Economic growth and subjective well-being: reassessing the Easterlin
paradox, IZA DP n. 3654, August 2008, p. 16
2S. Bartolini, E. Bilancini, M. Pugno, Did the decline in social capital decrease American happiness?
A relational explanation of the happiness paradox, Universita` degli Studi di Siena - Quaderni del
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, n. 540, Agosto 2008, Siena.
50
3.2 Data and methodological aspects
2/3 of the effect of income growth) and by the decrease in relational goods and confi-
dence in institutions (which accounts for 5/6 of the total effect of social comparisons
on SWB).
Concluding, the contribution from Bartolini et al. (2008) seems to suggest that
differences in SC trends can help to explain differences in SWB trends. The aim of
present work is to provide further evidence to support this hypothesis looking at some
European countries.
Main results of my research are the following:
1. SC trends in the majority of the western European countries are different from
the American ones. Great Britain is the country with the worst trend, among the
investigated ones, for SC;
2. SWB trends in present sample of countries are generally positive with the only
exception of Great Britain;
3. SC and SWB trends for investigated European countries are compatible with a
relational explanation of the Easterlin paradox.
Present chapter is structured in four sections: the first section outlined my research
questions and motivations behind them; the second section points out data adopted for
my research and methodological aspects; the following section reports results from dif-
ferent regressions considering various proxies of SC as dependent variable and adopting
time dummies and socio-economic conditions as indipendent variables. The last section
summarizes the main results and conclusions.
3.2 Data and methodological aspects
The analysis of SC trends for different European countries asks for a generous data-set.
From this point of view, probably, the most comprehensive data-base is represented
by the World Values Survey (WVS)1. Data have been collected in four waves (1980
- 82; 1990 - 91; 1995 - 97 and 1999 - 2001) for a total of 267,870 observations for
about 20 years. Anyway, the sample available for present study is smaller since I focus
on the trend of SC indicators in a small subset of countries for which I have enough
1For more details on World Values Survey, please, refer to section 2.4 in chapter 2.
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observations during time. Furthermore, since my aim is to check whether different
economic systems have different performances comparing Western Europe and USA,
I also exclude all those countries that have been subjected to any recent institutional
shock1. Considered countries are: Italy, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, United
Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland.
Although SC has been longly a much debated topic, actually it still lacks a com-
monly agreed definition. This topic has been developed and applied in many different
social disciplines hence different definitions have been advanced so far. Some of the fa-
thers of this concept propose different definitions for it. For example, Pierre Bourdieu,
probably the first scientist introducing this term, defines social capital as “the aggregate
of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition
... which provides each of its members with the backing of collectively-owned capital.”2
Such a definition focuses on three important aspects of social capital: 1) the existence
of a network of individuals; 2) participation in this network and 3) social capital as a
public good. Nonetheless, Bourdieu misses to precisely identify social capital pointing
on its sources: “the network of relationships”. Differently, James Coleman proposes the
following definition: “social capital is the set of resources that inhere in family relations
and in community social organization and that are useful for the cognitive or social de-
velopment of a child or a young person.”3 In Coleman’s view the network aspect is
less emphasized while he stresses the importance of the group in which social relations
constitute useful capital resources. Such a concept can be related to the category of
“bonding” social capital in contrast with that one of “bridging” social capital.
Bonding refers typically to “relations among members of families and ethnic groups.
Bridging social capital refers to relations with distant friends, associates and col-
leagues.”4 These are two different forms of social capital that should be considered
mutual. In fact, while the first form gives particular groups of people “a sense of iden-
tity and common purpose, without bridgind ties that transcend various social divides
1Coutries excluded from the sample are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Luxembourg.
2quoted in S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller, Social capital: critical perspectives, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 5
3quoted in S. Baron, J. Field and T. Schuller, Social capital: critical perspectives, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 6
4OECD, The well-being of nations: the role of human and social capital, Paris, 2001, p. 42
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(e.g. religion, ethinicity, socio-economic status), bonding ties can become a basis for
the pursuit of narrow interests, and can actively exclude outsiders.”1 Such groups
can be characterized by strong and co-operative norms, but low trust and co-operation
with the rest of society becoming a barrier to social cohesion and personal development.
Taking this aspect to the extreme, strong group ties can bring to neglect wider “public”
interests promoting socially destructive “rent-seeking” activities (Olson, 1982).
Finally, Robert Putnam defines social capital the “features of social life - networks,
norms, and trust - that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue
shared objectives”2. In this way the author identifies crucial aspects of social capital
specifying their role in social relationships: they enable different people to co-operate
(even unconsciously) to reach common goals.
Nonetheless, given the empirical nature of present work, I opted for a more oper-
ating definition such as the one proposed by Bartolini et al. (2008) who define SC as
“the stock of both non-market relations and beliefs concerning institutions that affect
either utility or production functions.”3. In this way the authors do not focus solely on
particular aspects of SC - networks, norms and trust - but comprise all those aspects -
material and immaterial - that can contribute to develop mutual trust and co-operation.
In particular, they point to two main aspects of SC: 1) every non-market relationships
among individuals which allow people to communicate each other and to develop mu-
tual trust. They define this aspect relational SC; 2) the system of values or believes
that makes people act coherently. Moreover, the authors propose a further distinction
in intrinsically and extrinsically motivated relational SC depending on whether the
incentives to act come from within or outside the individual. They define intrinsic SC
(alternatively defined as relational goods) those components “that enter into people’s
utility function”4; by extrinsic SC they mean those components that do not “directly
enter into people’s utility functions but are instrumental to something else that may
be considered valuable”5.
1OECD, ibidem, p.42
2R. Putnam, Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993, p. 56
3S. Bartolini, E. Bilancini, M. Pugno, Did the decline in social capital decrease American happiness?
A relational explanation of the happiness paradox, Universita` degli Studi di Siena - Quaderni del
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, n. 540, Agosto 2008, Siena, p. 5
4S. Bartolini, E. Bilancini, M. Pugno, ibidem, pp. 5 - 6.
5S. Bartolini, E. Bilancini, M. Pugno, ibidem, pp. 5 - 6.
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This distinction allows to go deeper in the analysis of the category of relational
SC. In fact, quoting Deci’s work (1971), they focus on the non-instrumental nature
of intrinsic motivated activities. This peculiarity allows to focus on a broader point:
non-market relations are not always intrinsic; there can be extrinsic relational SC (or
purely extrinsic) as well as intrinsic one.1
membership in  putnamian groups
unpaid voluntary work in other groups
  Church 
  Armed forces
  Educational System
  Press 
  Labor Unions
  Police 
  Parliament 
  Civil services
  Major Companies













Unpaid voluntary work in putnamian groups
membership in  olsonian groups

































Unpaid voluntary work in olsonian groups
Table 3.1: Summarizing scheme of the different constituents of social capital
1please refer to tab.3.1 for a summarizing scheme.
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A further critical aspect about SC is how to measure it. Different proposals have
been advanced, but generally there are some agreed proxies of SC. For example, fol-
lowing Putnam (2000) main measures of SC centre around proxies of trust and levels
of engagement or interaction in social or group activities. When trying to measure SC
we should keep in mind particular aspects (OECD, 2001):
• we should pay attention to causal connections since sources, functions and out-
comes may be confused;
• SC is mainly characterized by tacit and relational aspects which are naturally
difficult to observe, to measure and to codify;
• usual variables of SC (trust, membership, voting, etc.) provide proxy measures
and should not be confused with the underlying concept.
According to the vast majority of the literature on SC (Paxton, 2004; Costa and
Kahn, 2003; Van Schaik, 2002), I observe the beliefs component through several reports
of confidence in institutions, namely armed forces, police, parliament, civil services,
press, ecclesiastic, judicial system, education system, labour unions and major compa-
nies. Answers to these questions range on a 1 to 4 point scale going from none at all to
a great deal. To measure non-market relations, I use trust in individuals (represented
by a dummy variable), membership and unpaid voluntary work in various groups and
organizations. Given the multiple nature of the last two proxies, I adopt the men-
tioned distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically motivated group participation
(Bartolini et al., 2008). Groups and organizations entering the first set are labelled
Putnam’s groups while those comprised in the second one are named Olson’s group
(Knack, 2003). This distinction is based on the works of the two authors: Olson1 em-
phasizes the tendency of associations to act as lobbies to get policies that protect the
interest of special groups at the expenses of the society as a whole.
Consequently, I include in Olson’s groups all those groups and organizations which
are extrinsically motivated since it is supposed they are experienced only for instru-
mental reasons. On the contrary, Putnam2 identifies in associations a source of general
1Olson M., The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation and social rigidities, Yale
UP: New Haven, 1982
2Putnam R.D., Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton NJ, Princeton
University Press, 1993.
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trust and of social ties leading to governmental and economic efficiency (Bartolini et
al., 2008).
In this paper putnamian groups are interpreted as intrinsic SC supposing they
are experienced only for the pleasure of being a member. Among Putnam’s group
I include social welfare service for elderly, church organizations, sport clubs, art and
literature clubs, fraternal groups and youth associations, human and animal rights,
peace movements and environmental groups. Among Olson’s groups I include fraternity
associations, unions, professional organizations and farm organizations, organization
concerned with health and consumer groups.
Finally, there are some groups that were left unclassified and labeled as other groups
because it is not clear whether they constitute intrinsic or extrinsic RSC, althought they
are part of RSC. In this latter group I included veterans associations, political parties
and “other groups”. Each option between these three groups of variables is expressed
as a dummy variable.
SWB is proxied by the variable happiness that is measured on a scale ranging from
1 to 4 and is based on answers to the following question: “All considered you would say
that you are: 1. very happy; 2. pretty happy; 3. not too happy; 4. not at all happy?”.
In order to study SC and SWB trends during the last 20 years for each of the
considered European countries, I follow two approaches1: I first regress the proxies of SC
and SWB on time dummy variables. In this way trends are based on mean values; than
I regress the same proxies on different groups of control variables (age, gender, familiar
status and education) to check whether such trends depend on peculiar individual and
social aspects. In particular, age is considered linearly and with its square; a dummy
on male is introduced; familiar status is controlled through three proxies: the number
of children, a variable ranging between zero and twenty, and two dummy variables for
single and married; finally, education includes a dummy for illiterate.




it = α+ β1 ·Di,w2 + β2 ·Di,w3 + β3 ·Di,w4 + γ1 ·Ageit + γ2 ·Age
2
it+
γ3 ·Malei + υ1 ·NChildit + υ2 · Singleit + υ3 ·Marriedit + δ1 · Illiterateit
(3.1)
1M. Aguiar and E. Hurst, Measuring trends in leisure: the allocation of time over five decades,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Papers n. 2, 2006
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where index j stands for the different proxies of SC and SWB, index t represents the
various waves and index i stands for each individual. In each equation three dummy
variables have been introduced to account for the four waves. Where possible I kept
the first wave as the reference period. When informations about the first waves where
not available, I adopted the second wave as reference period.
Since I have different indicators of SC and one proxy of SWB, my regression method-
ology varies following the specifities of each depending variable: in the case of general-
ized trust, participation in voluntary organizations and unpaid voluntary work, that are
expressed in the form of dummies, I adopted a logit model; when studying confidence
in institutions or happiness, which are ordered variables, I used an ordered logit model.
Tables from 3.2 to 3.12 in the appendix report summary statistics for each considered
country.
When dealing with these data we have to be careful because, although the WVS
is the most complete database on our topic, it has some deficiencies. In particular,
we have to keep in mind that observations about Italy, Ireland, Denmark, France, The
Netherlands and Belgium are missing in the third wave; similarly, data about Finland
are not collected in the first wave, while Norway is not observed in the fourth wave.
Finally, the third wave does not contain informations about trust in the United King-
dom and about confidence in the educational system in Sweden, Norway, Finland and
Germany. Overall, the pooled dataset contains 48340 observations.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Social capital trends in Europe
I report and discuss results from several regressions relative to equation 3.1. Results
about each regression are reported in the appendix from tab.3.13 to tab.3.23. Here I
discuss directly my conclusive results which are summerized in charts in the appendix.
A first interesting aspect emerging from my regressions is that SC trend in consid-
ered European countries is mainly positive. Hence, the picture about western Europe
appears different from the American one. There is only one country that seems more
similar to USA, the Great Britain. In this case the majority of the considered proxies
of SC is declining meaning that during last twenty years Great Britain experienced
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an erosion of SC. Charts from fig.3.1 to fig.3.7 show this result. On the x-axis I re-
ported the time from 1980 to 2000. Each point on the x-axis corresponds to a wave
in the WVS. On the y-axis I report coefficients of the time dummies originating from
regressions. The point on the x-axis corresponding to zero represents the reference
year, while other points in the charts defining trends corresponds to the coefficients of
the time dummies. Finally, each chart reports more than one line. Each line repre-
sents results from regressions with different sets of control variables, coherently with
the adopted model. Charts suggest that in Great Britain SC, and in particular mem-
bership in groups or organizations and trust in others, decreases strongly during all
the considered period. Similarly, every proxy of beliefs in institutions declines steadily
all along the last twenty years. This picture changes if we turn considering unpaid
voluntary work. Figures 3.1(c) and 3.2(c) and (d) suggest that all these proxies have
been increasing during last twenty years in stark contrast with the other proxies of
relational SC.
Overall, the evolution in time of British SC seems to be similar to the American
one for what concern trust, membership in groups and associations and trust in others,
while a more optimistic conclusions may be drawn considering unpaid voluntary work.
The picture is completely different if we consider remaining countries. First of all,
the strong contraddiction between membership and unpaid voluntary work observed
for Great Britain disappears: looking at charts from fig.3.8(c) to fig.3.14(c) we observe
that in all these cases the trends of the two proxies are concordant. Secondly, trends
about relational goods are generally positive. Here I will discuss only results for some
of the major countries of the sample. Considering membership in Putnam’s groups,
charts from fig.3.8(a) to fig.3.10(a) suggest that Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden
from 1980 to 2000 experienced a growing trend. Figure 3.11(a) and fig.3.12(a) show
that the same trend is positive also in France and in Denmark, even if in these two
cases relative growth rate reduces since 1990. Considering Norway, fig.3.13(a) suggests
a positive trend, but in this case available data do not allow to set a clear pattern.
I can only conclude that in this case the trend between 1980 and 1990 is positive.
Finally, the chart about Germany1 (fig.3.14(a)) points out that overall from 1980 to
2000 membership in Putnam’s groups is positive, but I have to remark that the trend
reverted since 1990.
1Observations about Germany before 1989 refer to West Germany.
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3.3 Results
Considering the other component of relational goods, that is to say trust in others,
the picture emerging from regressions is more homogeneous, since it grows up in every of
the mentioned countries. I have only to highlight two cases: 1) Italy, in which the overall
trend is positive although the growth rate of trust in other’s slightly reduces starting
from 1990; 2) France, which emerges as the only Continental European country, among
the investigated ones, with a decreasing trend of trust in others during last twenty
years (please, consider (b) charts from fig.3.8 to fig.3.14.
Let’s turn now to the second component of SC: beliefs in institutions. In this case
trends are more mixed among both variables and countries. In any case, some general
trends arise quite clearly indicating a worrying trend for confidence in some institutions:
in particular, it seems that during last twenty years European citizens have persistently
lost confidence in the judicial system, in religious institutions, in armed forces and in
police.
Overall, we can state that, althought some specificities and a mixed pattern regard-
ing confidence in institutions, results suggest that the evolution of SC during time in
the considered European countries is different from the American one. In this frame-
work, the experience of Great Britain appears as peculiar and, at least regarding the
majority of the considered proxies, more similar to the American one.
3.3.2 Social capital and subjective well-being in Europe
Previous results conveyed a framework in which western European countries appear
as very different from the USA. For quite every considered country, relational SC in-
creased from 1980 to 2000. Regressions about the trend of SWB in the same countries
confirm a similar pattern. In fact, SWB increases in every considered country with the
exception of Great Britain in which SWB is strongly decreasing between 1980 and 1995.
Unfortunately, data about the fourth wave are not available in this case (see fig.3.15 to
fig.3.19 in the appendix). Charts about remaining considered European countries show
an overall positive pattern, even if single trends may differ. For example, France, Nor-
way, Denmark and Netherlands have a steady growing trend (see fig.3.17(b), fig.3.18(a)
and (b), and fig.3.16(b)); trends for Germany and Italy are positive too, but the growth
rate reduces signifcantly between 1990 and 2000 (see fig.3.16(a) and fig.3.19 in the ap-
pendix); finally, Sweden’s trend has a U-shaped outline (see fig.3.17(a)), even if the net
result is positive.
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3. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING TRENDS:
COMPARING 11 WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
3.4 Conclusions
The aim of present study was to point out trends of SC in western European countries
finding evidence to support the thesis that SC trends can help to explain SWB trends.
In this way SC gains a new dimension: it can give further meaning to the widely used
term well-being. Whenever present thesis would be corroborated by further research,
SC would acquire a central role in the definition of our policy agenda. For example,
future economic policies should not only focus on ways to promote economic growth,
but should pay attention also to their effects on SC.
Using different regression techniques, following the nature of dependent variables, I
tried to assess the trends of four proxies of SC for each country in the period between
1980 and 2000. Following a broadly accepted approach in the literature, I adopted the
following variables: trust in individuals, membership in eighteen different voluntary
organizations, performing unpaid voluntary work in 18 organizations and confidence in
ten institutions. Results are quite innovative for at least two reasons: 1) contemporary
literature largely focused on trends in USA rather than in European countries. This is
mainly due to the fact that USA have large data-bases allowing such studies for longer
periods of time (for example the U.S. GSS); 2) following the debate on the Easterlin
paradox, my results suggest that we can not discard the hypothesis that the trend of
SC is important for the trend of SWB. From this point of view, it is important to stress
that I am not performing a causal analysis, but I am simply assessing SC and SWB
trends and notice that in 10 out of 11 countries signs of SC trends are concordant with
signs of SWB trends. Such finding implies also that the theoretical predictions of the
NEG model are largely met confirming the relevance of the model as explanatory tool.
Moreover, whether such evidence would be substantiated by future research, we could
say that U.S.A. do not represent a “puzzling outlier” since “income growth is desirable
as far as it is not associated with a deterioration of SC.”1 Nonetheless, the question
about whether SC trend can help to explain SWB trend is still an open question asking
for further and deeper research.
Summarizing, my findings are the following:
1S. Bartolini, E. Bilancini, M. Pugno, Did the decline in social capital decrease American happiness?
A relational explanation of the happiness paradox, Universita` degli Studi di Siena - Quaderni del
Dipartimento di Economia Politica, n. 540, Siena, Agosto 2008, p. 26.
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3.4 Conclusions
1. Trends for SC in the analysed European countries are mainly positive (in partic-
ular for relational goods);
2. Althought the trends of memebership and unpaid voluntary work in Great Britain
are contrasting, still this country appears as an exception in the European land-
scape with declining trends for the majority of the SC proxies;
3. All the considered countries seem affected by a general crisis of some particular
institutions;
4. Given the concordance between SC and SWB trends in 10 out of 11 cases, we can
not reject the hypothesis that SC can help to explain SWB.
Concluding, present research allows to remark a few aspects: the first one is that the
majority of the western European countries and USA are not exactly following the same
pattern. While both regions have experienced an institutional crisis during last twenty
years, relational social capital and subjective well-being in western Europe increased.
Nonetheless, we should take in mind that these figures need further investigation to
extend both the number of observed countries and the lenght of the considered period.
By now, present results suggesting a quite different pattern between USA and the
western European sample push future research in two main directions: 1) to enlarge
present research to discover trends relative to other countries; 2) to investigate the
causes of such a different performance. Which forces have pushed toward an increasing
erosion of social capital in USA? Is European social capital subjected to the same
erosive forces? 3) Do SC trends explain SWB trends in Europe?
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3. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING TRENDS:


















Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1324 2.879 0.632 1 4 1971 2.990 0.602 1 4 0 1975 2.952 0.693 1 4
1302 0.268 0.443 0 1 1932 0.353 0.478 0 1 0 1946 0.326 0.469 0 1
1348 0.127 0.333 0 1 2018 0.246 0.431 0 1 0 2000 0.314 0.464 0 1
1348 0.103 0.304 0 1 2018 0.123 0.328 0 1 0 2000 0.171 0.377 0 1
1348 0.084 0.277 0 1 2018 0.108 0.310 0 1 0 2000 0.108 0.310 0 1
1348 0.103 0.304 0 1 2018 0.184 0.388 0 1 0 2000 0.212 0.408 0 1
1348 0.062 0.240 0 1 2018 0.065 0.247 0 1 0 2000 0.074 0.262 0 1
1348 0.045 0.206 0 1 2018 0.060 0.237 0 1 0 2000 0.054 0.226 0 1
Church 1348 2.628 1.065 1 4 2016 2.724 0.991 1 4 0 1975 2.870 0.891 1 4
Armed forces 1348 2.542 0.954 1 4 2012 2.352 0.859 1 4 0 1948 2.524 0.825 1 4
Educational system 1348 2.568 0.872 1 4 2017 2.453 0.813 1 4 0 1966 2.596 0.816 1 4
Press 1348 2.131 0.814 1 4 2013 2.281 0.778 1 4 0 1954 2.271 0.754 1 4
Labour Unions 1348 2.020 0.858 1 4 2009 2.156 0.809 1 4 0 1927 2.090 0.804 1 4
Police 1348 2.708 0.879 1 4 2012 2.701 0.746 1 4 0 1968 2.767 0.748 1 4
Parliament 1348 2.082 0.847 1 4 2011 2.122 0.803 1 4 0 1944 2.222 0.780 1 4
Civil Services 1348 2.022 0.827 1 4 2013 2.002 0.801 1 4 0 1944 2.216 0.738 1 4
Major Companies 1348 2.073 0.880 1 4 2005 2.631 0.807 1 4 0 1879 2.444 0.779 1 4
Judicial system 1348 2.372 0.880 1 4 2012 2.153 0.821 1 4 0 1946 2.184 0.808 1 4
1348 39.553 16.872 17 86 2018 41.353 16.094 18 88 0 2000 45.284 16.888 18 92
1348 1848.942 1478.435 289 7396 2018 1968.936 1455.248 324 7744 0 2000 2335.641 1617.433 324 8464
1348 0.493 0.500 0 1 2018 0.478 0.500 0 1 0 2000 0.480 0.500 0 1
766 2.275 1.311 1 8 1983 1.317 1.337 0 6 0 1850 1.402 1.330 0 9
1348 0.355 0.479 0 1 2018 0.315 0.464 0 1 0 2000 0.309 0.462 0 1
1348 0.564 0.496 0 1 2018 0.581 0.493 0 1 0 2000 0.584 0.493 0 1
1348 0 0 0 0 2018 0 0 0 0 0 2000 0.065 0.247 0 1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups























































































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1163 3.33 0.57 1 4 1474 3.25 0.66 1 4 1091 0
1127 0.43 0.50 0 1 1440 0.44 0.50 0 1 1073 960 0.29 0.45 0 1
1167 0.32 0.47 0 1 1484 0.37 0.48 0 1 1093 1000 0.20 0.40 0 1
1167 0.27 0.44 0 1 1484 0.25 0.44 0 1 1093 1000 0.13 0.34 0 1
1167 0.12 0.32 0 1 1484 0.18 0.38 0 1 1093 1000 0.12 0.33 0 1
1167 0.13 0.34 0 1 1484 0.17 0.37 0 1 0 1000 0.31 0.46 0 1
1167 0.08 0.27 0 1 1484 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 1000 0.22 0.41 0 1
1167 0.01 0.12 0 1 1484 0.05 0.22 0 1 0 1000 0.03 0.16 0 1
Church 1155 2.52 0.91 1 4 1467 2.52 0.93 1 4 0 942 2.25 0.87 1 4
Armed forces 1152 3.14 0.77 1 4 1472 3.10 0.79 1 4 0 975 3.07 0.71 1 4
Educational system 1148 2.69 0.75 1 4 1472 2.58 0.79 1 4 0 980 2.73 0.72 1 4
Press 1150 2.19 0.72 1 4 1476 1.90 0.72 1 4 0 986 1.78 0.71 1 4
Labour Unions 1139 2.08 0.79 1 4 1456 2.11 0.82 1 4 0 899 2.07 0.77 1 4
Police 1155 3.21 0.75 1 4 1478 2.98 0.77 1 4 0 984 2.80 0.78 1 4
Parliament 1146 2.37 0.80 1 4 1467 2.43 0.82 1 4 0 956 2.25 0.76 1 4
Civil Services 1133 2.47 0.75 1 4 1452 2.46 0.76 1 4 0 903 2.41 0.71 1 4
Major Companies 1112 2.52 0.78 1 4 1433 2.46 0.78 1 4 0 871 2.31 0.73 1 4
Judicial system 1147 2.79 0.80 1 4 1465 2.60 0.81 1 4 0 971 2.42 0.84 1 4
1167 40.84 19.53 18 90 1475 46.85 18.43 18 90 1093 971 44.12 17.79 17 92
1167 2049.14 1860.43 324 8100 1475 2534.26 1845.16 324 8100 1093 971 2263.05 1759.52 289 8464
1167 0.48 0.50 0 1 1484 0.47 0.50 0 1 1093 1000 0.44 0.50 0 1
680 2.32 1.27 1 8 1476 1.73 1.48 0 6 1093 986 1.88 1.56 0 14
1167 0.30 0.46 0 1 1484 0.18 0.38 0 1 1093 1000 0.27 0.44 0 1
1167 0.58 0.49 0 1 1484 0.61 0.49 0 1 1093 1000 0.51 0.50 0 1
1167 0.00 0.00 0 0 1484 0.00 0.00 0 0 1093 1000 0.00 0.00 0 0
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1175 3.361 0.579 1 4 980 3.359 0.640 1 4 0 1008 3.381 0.577 1 4
1170 0.411 0.492 0 1 988 0.474 0.500 0 1 0 992 0.360 0.480 0 1
1217 0.389 0.488 0 1 1000 0.399 0.490 0 1 0 1012 0.448 0.497 0 1
1217 0.164 0.370 0 1 1000 0.170 0.376 0 1 0 1012 0.213 0.410 0 1
1217 0.127 0.333 0 1 1000 0.159 0.366 0 1 0 1012 0.202 0.401 0 1
1217 0.146 0.354 0 1 1000 0.206 0.405 0 1 0 1012 0.249 0.433 0 1
1217 0.090 0.286 0 1 1000 0.079 0.270 0 1 0 1012 0.105 0.306 0 1
1217 0.016 0.127 0 1 1000 0.062 0.241 0 1 0 1012 0.091 0.288 0 1
Church 1210 3.246 0.887 1 4 999 3.083 0.884 1 4 0 1003 2.754 0.907 1 4
Armed forces 1213 3.030 0.826 1 4 996 2.748 0.865 1 4 0 969 2.740 0.830 1 4
Educational system 1206 2.833 0.787 1 4 994 2.948 0.764 1 4 0 1002 3.220 0.669 1 4
Press 1205 2.433 0.775 1 4 998 2.266 0.783 1 4 0 989 2.308 0.782 1 4
Labour Unions 1202 2.313 0.817 1 4 994 2.385 0.815 1 4 0 952 2.470 0.825 1 4
Police 1211 3.201 0.749 1 4 997 3.187 0.751 1 4 0 1004 3.192 0.754 1 4
Parliament 1205 2.578 0.857 1 4 992 2.528 0.846 1 4 0 986 2.224 0.835 1 4
Civil Services 1205 2.606 0.811 1 4 994 2.640 0.796 1 4 0 974 2.697 0.792 1 4
Major Companies 1190 2.521 0.842 1 4 989 2.540 0.798 1 4 0 0
Judicial system 1201 2.675 0.829 1 4 994 2.491 0.834 1 4 0 992 2.620 0.840 1 4
1214 40.581 18.932 18 93 1000 44.619 17.440 18 89 0 986 47.058 17.122 18 90
1214 2004.937 1797.291 324 8649 1000 2294.711 1683.646 324 7921 0 986 2507.311 1734.106 324 8100
1217 0.439 0.496 0 1 1000 0.480 0.500 0 1 0 1012 0.459 0.499 0 1
597 3.466 1.861 1 8 999 2.313 2.138 0 6 0 1001 2.509 2.426 0 20
1217 0.412 0.492 0 1 1000 0.298 0.458 0 1 0 1012 0.254 0.435 0 1
1217 0.493 0.500 0 1 1000 0.615 0.487 0 1 0 1012 0.589 0.492 0 1


























Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups






























































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1179 3.11 0.55 1 4 995 3.16 0.57 1 4 0 1607 3.24 0.62 1 4
1117 0.25 0.43 0 1 939 0.23 0.42 0 1 0 1560 0.21 0.41 0 1
1200 0.13 0.34 0 1 1002.00 0.30 0.46 0 1 0 1615 0.29 0.46 0 1
1200 0.12 0.33 0 1 1002.00 0.12 0.33 0 1 0 1615 0.11 0.31 0 1
1200 0.08 0.27 0 1 1002.00 0.11 0.31 0 1 0 1615 0.11 0.31 0 1
1200 0.09 0.29 0 1 1002.00 0.18 0.39 0 1 0 1615 0.20 0.40 0 1
1200 0.08 0.28 0 1 1002.00 0.07 0.25 0 1 0 1615 0.04 0.20 0 1
1200 0.02 0.13 0 1 1002.00 0.08 0.27 0 1 0 1615 0.08 0.27 0 1
Church 1145 2.43 1.03 1 4 965.00 2.37 0.98 1 4 0 1564 2.27 1.01 1 4
Armed forces 1141 2.45 0.98 1 4 967.00 2.48 0.94 1 4 0 1564 2.64 0.93 1 4
Educational system 1147 2.56 0.76 1 4 968.00 2.69 0.79 1 4 0 1597 2.75 0.77 1 4
Press 1157 2.16 0.75 1 4 973.00 2.19 0.82 1 4 0 1601 2.14 0.80 1 4
Labour Unions 1113 2.24 0.82 1 4 945.00 2.06 0.84 1 4 0 1551 2.13 0.84 1 4
Police 1176 2.62 0.84 1 4 980.00 2.66 0.78 1 4 0 1598 2.70 0.83 1 4
Parliament 1031 2.48 0.80 1 4 902 2.36 0.82 1 4 0 1544 2.20 0.83 1 4
Civil Services 1131 2.45 0.75 1 4 947 2.38 0.80 1 4 0 1575 2.33 0.81 1 4
Major Companies 1041 2.36 0.79 1 4 902 2.67 0.75 1 4 0 1530 2.37 0.80 1 4
Judicial system 1171 2.55 0.78 1 4 968 2.54 0.78 1 4 0 1588 2.32 0.85 1 4
1200 40.36 17.91 17 89 1002 42.85 17.22 18 92 0 1615 45.12 16.94 18 93
1200 1949.76 1692.78 289 7921 1002 2132.65 1639.38 324 8464 0 1615 2323.09 1661.32 324 8649
1200 0.48 0.50 0 1 1002 0.47 0.50 0 1 0 1615 0.50 0.50 0 1
770 2.49 1.52 1 8 998 1.70 1.55 0 6 0 1615 1.75 1.54 0 7
1200 0.24 0.43 0 1 1002 0.21 0.41 0 1 0 1615 0.26 0.44 0 1
1200 0.62 0.49 0 1 1002 0.56 0.50 0 1 0 1615 0.52 0.50 0 1
1200 0.00 0.00 0 0 1002 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1615 0.18 0.39 0 1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups





























































Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max
1211 2.97 0.52 1 4 3201 3.01 0.56 1 4 2002 2.97 0.68 1 4 1995 2.97 0.67 1 4
1084 0.32 0.47 0 1 2893 0.33 0.47 0 1 1956 0.33 0.47 0 1 1937 0.38 0.48 0 1
1305 0.26 0.44 0 1 3437 0.52 0.50 0 1 2026 0.00 0.00 0 0 2036 0.38 0.48 0 1






Germany wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Olson's group
1305 0.13 0.33 0 1 3437 0.24 0.43 0 1 2026 0.00 0.00 0 0 2036 0.11 0.32 0 1
1305 0.14 0.34 0 1 3437 0.25 0.43 0 1 0 2036 0.14 0.35 0 1
1305 0.06 0.24 0 1 3437 0.11 0.31 0 1 0 2036 0.04 0.19 0 1
1305 0 04 0 19 0 1 3437 0 08 0 27 0 1 0 2036 0 04 0 19 0 1
Unpaid work in putnamian 
groups
Unpaid work in olsonian 
groups
Unpaid work in other groups
Other groups
. . . . . .
Church 1300 2.43 0.94 1 4 3434 2.36 0.94 1 4 1979 2.04 0.83 1 4 1911 2.14 0.93 1 4
Armed forces 1297 2.50 0.80 1 4 3433 2.06 0.82 1 4 1950 2.36 0.78 1 4 1910 2.48 0.73 1 4
Educational system 1300 2.41 0.70 1 4 3430 2.49 0.72 1 4 0 1975 2.80 0.62 1 4
Press 1299 2.19 0.68 1 4 3436 2.16 0.70 1 4 2005 1.94 0.67 1 4 1978 2.27 0.76 1 4
Labour Unions 1294 2.30 0.77 1 4 3428 2.19 0.78 1 4 1886 2.26 0.71 1 4 1866 2.28 0.75 1 4
P li 1297 2 80 0 74 1 4 3437 2 60 0 76 1 4 2012 2 63 0 70 1 4 2006 2 77 0 66 1 4









o ce . . . . . . . .
Parliament 1293 2.55 0.72 1 4 3432 2.42 0.76 1 4 1950 2.05 0.67 1 4 1933 2.24 0.75 1 4
Civil Services 1297 2.24 0.70 1 4 3429 2.18 0.71 1 4 1971 2.39 0.68 1 4 1947 2.28 0.69 1 4
Major Companies 1292 2.18 0.80 1 4 3424 2.33 0.79 1 4 1931 2.08 0.69 1 4 1851 2.29 0.79 1 4
Judicial system 1295 2.77 0.75 1 4 3434 2.60 0.79 1 4 1991 2.38 0.73 1 4 1966 2.58 0.74 1 4
1304 41.34 17.42 16 100 3437 45.03 17.57 18 90 2019 43.61 16.17 18 90 2034 48.86 17.77 18 92








2 . 57 . 5 7 .5 7 . . 5 . 7 . 7 5.
1305 0.47 0.50 0 1 3437 0.47 0.50 0 1 2026 0.46 0.50 0 1 2036 0.43 0.50 0 1
768 2.21 1.16 1 8 3431 1.47 1.29 0 6 2020 1.39 1.23 0 8 2033 1.56 1.29 0 11
1305 0.27 0.44 0 1 3437 0.19 0.39 0 1 2026 0.20 0.40 0 1 2036 0.21 0.41 0 1
1305 0.56 0.50 0 1 3437 0.58 0.49 0 1 2026 0.54 0.50 0 1 2036 0.56 0.50 0 1




































































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1195 3.31 0.53 1 4 1015 3.39 0.65 1 4 0 1002 3.40 0.60 1 4
1072 0.45 0.50 0 1 965 0.53 0.50 0 1 0 997 0.60 0.49 0 1
1221 0.49 0.50 0 1 1017 0.78 0.41 0 1 0 1003 0.89 0.32 0 1
1221 0.25 0.44 0 1 1017 0.40 0.49 0 1 0 1003 0.43 0.49 0 1
1221 0.14 0.35 0 1 1017 0.28 0.45 0 1 0 1003 0.26 0.44 0 1
1221 0.19 0.39 0 1 1017 0.30 0.46 0 1 0 1003 0.43 0.50 0 1
1221 0.07 0.26 0 1 1017 0.09 0.29 0 1 0 1003 0.11 0.32 0 1
1221 0.02 0.13 0 1 1017 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 1003 0.11 0.32 0 1
Church 1205 2.27 0.95 1 4 1014 2.14 0.89 1 4 0 993 2.14 0.82 1 4
Armed forces 1189 2.33 0.79 1 4 1012 2.13 0.78 1 4 0 993 2.31 0.70 1 4
Educational system 1190 2.83 0.67 1 4 1006 2.71 0.66 1 4 0 996 2.80 0.65 1 4
Press 1192 2.18 0.65 1 4 1012 2.22 0.75 1 4 0 997 2.58 0.66 1 4
Labour Unions 1173 2.32 0.74 1 4 994 2.45 0.76 1 4 0 966 2.56 0.68 1 4
Police 1196 2.82 0.69 1 4 1015 2.80 0.64 1 4 0 999 2.70 0.66 1 4
Parliament 1183 2.41 0.72 1 4 1008 2.49 0.68 1 4 0 993 2.54 0.67 1 4
Civil Services 1173 2.42 0.70 1 4 1004 2.42 0.65 1 4 0 989 2.32 0.62 1 4
Major Companies 1173 2.24 0.75 1 4 1000 2.41 0.70 1 4 0 0
Judicial system 1185 2.72 0.71 1 4 1011 2.67 0.73 1 4 0 986 2.45 0.72 1 4
1198 39.26 17.03 18 89 1017 43.16 16.49 18 89 0 1002 46.38 16.24 18 93
1198 1830.82 1558.72 324 7921 1017 2134.52 1585.83 324 7921 0 1002 2414.49 1691.06 324 8649
1221 0.42 0.49 0 1 1017 0.43 0.50 0 1 0 1003 0.49 0.50 0 1
759 2.60 1.46 1 8 998 1.54 1.42 0 6 0 1001 1.60 1.48 0 9
1221 0.21 0.41 0 1 1017 0.22 0.42 0 1 0 1003 0.27 0.44 0 1
1221 0.63 0.48 0 1 1017 0.57 0.50 0 1 0 1003 0.55 0.50 0 1
1221 0.00 0.00 0 0 1017 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 1003 0.01 0.10 0 1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups
































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1089 3.26 0.59 1 4 2701 3.31 0.64 1 4 0 1894 3.31 0.68 1 4
1001 0.29 0.45 0 1 2576 0.34 0.47 0 1 0 1824 0.29 0.45 0 1
1145 0.23 0.42 0 1 2792 0.44 0.50 0 1 0 1912 0.48 0.50 0 1




Belgium Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 4
Variable
happiness
1145 0.08 0.27 0 1 2792 0.24 0.43 0 1 0 1912 0.29 0.45 0 1
1145 0.15 0.36 0 1 2792 0.22 0.42 0 1 0 1912 0.26 0.44 0 1
1145 0.07 0.25 0 1 2792 0.11 0.31 0 1 0 1912 0.11 0.31 0 1
1145 0.01 0.12 0 1 2792 0.06 0.23 0 1 0 1912 0.12 0.32 0 1
Church 1046 2.72 0.99 1 4 2776 2.48 0.98 1 4 0 1871 2.31 0.98 1 4
Armed forces 1047 2.31 0.88 1 4 2768 2.14 0.86 1 4 0 1845 2.24 0.85 1 4
Unpaid work in other groups
Other groups
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups
Educational system 1075 2.95 0.72 1 4 2776 2.84 0.72 1 4 0 1885 2.92 0.71 1 4
Press 1074 2.22 0.75 1 4 2767 2.35 0.76 1 4 0 1892 2.24 0.79 1 4
Labour Unions 1022 2.12 0.83 1 4 2762 2.24 0.79 1 4 0 1825 2.22 0.83 1 4
Police 1079 2.65 0.78 1 4 2771 2.48 0.79 1 4 0 1891 2.51 0.78 1 4
Parliament 1010 2.24 0.79 1 4 2762 2.32 0.77 1 4 0 1824 2.23 0.82 1 4














. . . . . .
Major Companies 972 2.32 0.79 1 4 2736 2.46 0.78 1 4 0 0
Judicial system 1060 2.59 0.85 1 4 2761 2.39 0.80 1 4 0 1883 2.19 0.86 1 4
1145 43.12 19.22 15 87 2792 44.68 17.27 17 93 0 1905 46.39 17.55 15 98
1145 2228.55 1838.87 225 7569 2792 2294.08 1643.22 289 8649 0 1905 2460.11 1775.72 225 9604
1145 0.47 0.50 0 1 2792 0.49 0.50 0 1 0 1912 0.46 0.50 0 1




number of children . . . . . .
1145 0.22 0.41 0 1 2792 0.20 0.40 0 1 0 1912 0.23 0.42 0 1
1145 0.63 0.48 0 1 2792 0.59 0.49 0 1 0 1912 0.58 0.49 0 1

































































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1150 3.26 0.54 1 4 1022 3.36 0.62 1 4 0 1017 3.39 0.60 1 4
1059 0.53 0.50 0 1 992 0.58 0.49 0 1 0 986 0.67 0.47 0 1
1182 0.19 0.39 0 1 1030 0.52 0.50 0 1 0 1023 0.56 0.50 0 1
1182 0.50 0.50 0 1 1030 0.60 0.49 0 1 0 1023 0.61 0.49 0 1
1182 0.16 0.36 0 1 1030 0.23 0.42 0 1 0 1023 0.26 0.44 0 1
1182 0.06 0.24 0 1 1030 0.19 0.39 0 1 0 1023 0.25 0.44 0 1
1182 0.13 0.33 0 1 1030 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 1023 0.11 0.31 0 1
1182 0.02 0.14 0 1 1030 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 1023 0.12 0.32 0 1
Church 1166 2.41 0.89 1 4 1015 2.45 0.84 1 4 0 949 2.62 0.74 1 4
Armed forces 1170 2.31 0.85 1 4 1009 2.43 0.80 1 4 0 965 2.64 0.69 1 4
Educational system 1168 2.75 0.72 1 4 1014 2.99 0.64 1 4 0 994 2.83 0.60 1 4
Press 1171 2.19 0.71 1 4 1020 2.18 0.72 1 4 0 995 2.24 0.67 1 4
Labour Unions 1144 2.54 0.81 1 4 1004 2.40 0.82 1 4 0 953 2.45 0.73 1 4
Police 1173 3.12 0.72 1 4 1019 3.18 0.62 1 4 0 1011 3.16 0.60 1 4
Parliament 1167 2.27 0.79 1 4 1015 2.38 0.74 1 4 0 986 2.47 0.70 1 4
Civil Services 1161 2.45 0.74 1 4 1010 2.52 0.69 1 4 0 978 2.54 0.64 1 4
Major Companies 1115 2.24 0.74 1 4 978 2.32 0.72 1 4 0 0
Judicial system 1170 3.01 0.75 1 4 1011 3.00 0.69 1 4 0 980 2.92 0.67 1 4
1182 40.88 18.32 18 91 1030 43.99 17.80 18 90 0 1023 45.76 17.43 18 92
1182 2006.60 1714.56 324 8281 1030 2251.69 1765.44 324 8100 0 1023 2397.96 1768.26 324 8464
1182 0.49 0.50 0 1 1030 0.50 0.50 0 1 0 1023 0.49 0.50 0 1
762 2.32 1.23 1 8 1027 1.62 1.43 0 6 0 1023 1.66 1.38 0 10
1182 0.22 0.41 0 1 1030 0.20 0.40 0 1 0 1023 0.30 0.46 0 1
1182 0.53 0.50 0 1 1030 0.51 0.50 0 1 0 1023 0.53 0.50 0 1
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Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
1044 3.20 0.57 1 4 1233 3.22 0.58 1 4 1125 3.24 0.57 1 4 0
958 0.61 0.49 0 1 1156 0.65 0.48 0 1 1118 0.65 0.48 0 1 0
1051 0.28 0.45 0 1 1239 0.55 0.50 0 1 1127 0.00 0.00 0 0 0




Norway Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Variable
happiness
1051 0.21 0.40 0 1 1239 0.35 0.48 0 1 1127 0.00 0.00 0 0 0
1051 0.14 0.34 0 1 1239 0.27 0.44 0 1 0 0
1051 0.14 0.35 0 1 1239 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 0
1051 0.04 0.20 0 1 1239 0.11 0.31 0 1 0 0
Church 1047 2.57 0.86 1 4 1234 2.44 0.83 1 4 1119 2.56 0.77 1 4 0
Armed forces 1045 2.80 0.76 1 4 1234 2.71 0.72 1 4 1122 2.80 0.66 1 4 0
Unpaid work in other groups
Other groups
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups
Educational system 1044 2.96 0.64 1 4 1233 2.92 0.62 1 4 0 0
Press 1045 2.40 0.66 1 4 1229 2.42 0.65 1 4 1120 2.26 0.62 1 4 0
Labour Unions 1040 2.58 0.73 1 4 1221 2.60 0.72 1 4 1090 2.67 0.65 1 4 0
Police 1044 3.19 0.63 1 4 1235 3.06 0.60 1 4 1124 3.00 0.59 1 4 0
Parliament 1047 2.95 0.69 1 4 1235 2.62 0.71 1 4 1117 2.74 0.60 1 4 0














. . . . . .
Major Companies 1035 2.43 0.66 1 4 1224 2.53 0.64 1 4 1096 2.60 0.60 1 4 0
Judicial system 1045 3.11 0.69 1 4 1228 2.88 0.68 1 4 1121 2.76 0.66 1 4 0
1051 44.09 16.92 17 79 1239 44.31 16.35 19 80 1127 43.26 16.18 18 79 0
1051 2229.90 1582.86 289 6241 1239 2230.45 1568.39 361 6400 1127 2133.36 1529.12 324 6241 0
1051 0.53 0.50 0 1 1239 0.51 0.50 0 1 1127 0.49 0.50 0 1 0




number of children . . . . . .
1051 0.16 0.37 0 1 1239 0.19 0.39 0 1 1127 0.18 0.39 0 1 0
1051 0.68 0.47 0 1 1239 0.62 0.48 0 1 1127 0.54 0.50 0 1 0

































































































Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
935 3.2 0.5 1 4 1038 3.4 0.6 1 4 997 3.3 0.6 1 4 1012 3.3 0.6 1 4
876 0.6 0.5 0 1 944 0.7 0.5 0 1 957 0.6 0.5 0 1 974 0.7 0.5 0 1
954 0.3 0.4 0 1 1047 0.6 0.5 0 1 1009 0.0 0.0 0 0 1015 0.9 0.3 0 1
954 0.5 0.5 0 1 1047 0.6 0.5 0 1 1009 0.0 0.0 0 0 1015 0.7 0.5 0 1
954 0.2 0.4 0 1 1047 0.4 0.5 0 1 1009 0.0 0.0 0 0 1015 0.4 0.5 0 1
954 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 1047.00 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.00 1015.00 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
954 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 1047.00 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.00 1015.00 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
954 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 1047.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.00 1015.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Church 930 2.3 0.8 1 4 990 2.2 0.9 1 4 985 2.5 0.7 1 4 991 2.4 0.8 1 4
Armed forces 915 2.6 0.7 1 4 1012 2.5 0.8 1 4 988 2.5 0.7 1 4 992 2.4 0.7 1 4
Educational system 914 2.7 0.7 1 4 1014 2.8 0.7 1 4 0 1004 2.8 0.7 1 4
Press 929 2.2 0.7 1 4 1024 2.2 0.7 1 4 1001 2.2 0.7 1 4 1004 2.5 0.7 1 4
Labour Unions 886 2.5 0.8 1 4 981 2.3 0.8 1 4 952 2.4 0.7 1 4 986 2.4 0.7 1 4
Police 940 2.9 0.7 1 4 1027 2.8 0.7 1 4 998 2.9 0.6 1 4 1011 2.9 0.7 1 4
Parliament 901 2.4 0.7 1 4 1010 2.4 0.8 1 4 984 2.4 0.7 1 4 994 2.5 0.7 1 4
Civil Services 854 2.4 0.7 1 4 949 2.4 0.7 1 4 925 2.4 0.6 1 4 946 2.5 0.6 1 4
Major Companies 853 2.4 0.7 1 4 951 2.5 0.7 1 4 945 2.7 0.6 1 4 0
Judicial system 908 2.8 0.7 1 4 1019 2.6 0.8 1 4 990 2.7 0.7 1 4 995 2.6 0.7 1 4
954 45.1 16.6 18 90 993 42.6 15.7 18 82 1009 44.9 16.2 19 76 1015 44.2 15.9 18 75
954 2311.3 1593.5 324 8100 993 2063.4 1420.1 324 6724 1009 2278.7 1531.3 361 5776 1015 2205.2 1463.9 324 5625
954 0.5 0.5 0 1 1047 0.5 0.5 0 1 1009 0.5 0.5 0 1 1015 0.5 0.5 0 1
698 2.1 1.0 1 8 1044 1.5 1.3 0 6 999 1.6 1.3 0 7 1012 1.4 1.3 0 5
954 0.1 0.3 0 1 1047 0.2 0.4 0 1 1009 0.2 0.4 0 1 1015 0.2 0.4 0 1
954 0.6 0.5 0 1 1047 0.5 0.5 0 1 1009 0.5 0.5 0 1 1015 0.5 0.5 0 1
954 0.0 0.0 0 0 1047 0.0 0.0 0 0 1009 0.0 0.1 0 1 1015 0.0 0.1 0 1
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups
































































Obs Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0 568 3.09 0.59 1 4 975 3.15 0.57 1 4 1032 3.14 0.60 1 4
0 558 0.63 0.48 0 1 969 0.49 0.50 0 1 1015 0.57 0.49 0 1
0 588 0.55 0.50 0 1 987 0.00 0.00 0 0 1038 0.68 0.47 0 1
0 588 0.48 0.50 0 1 987 0.00 0.00 0 0 1038 0.42 0.49 0 1
0 588 0.26 0.44 0 1 987 0.00 0.00 0 0 1038 0.25 0.43 0 1
0 588 0.34 0.47 0 1 0 1038 0.31 0.46 0 1
0 588 0.18 0.38 0 1 0 1038 0.11 0.31 0 1
0 588 0.14 0.35 0 1 0 1038 0.09 0.28 0 1
Church 0 560 2.21 0.83 1 4 970 2.59 0.80 1 4 1019 2.59 0.81 1 4
Armed forces 0 565 2.62 0.80 1 4 978 3.04 0.72 1 4 1021 3.07 0.69 1 4
Educational system 0 571 2.91 0.63 1 4 0 1029 3.14 0.60 1 4
Press 0 569 2.32 0.67 1 4 976 2.19 0.70 1 4 1028 2.30 0.67 1 4
Labour Unions 0 543 2.24 0.72 1 4 942 2.49 0.75 1 4 1001 2.53 0.71 1 4
Police 0 574 2.83 0.64 1 4 978 3.08 0.66 1 4 1032 3.19 0.63 1 4
Parliament 0 570 2.23 0.75 1 4 968 2.20 0.69 1 4 1020 2.38 0.72 1 4
Civil Services 0 556 2.24 0.70 1 4 963 2.25 0.66 1 4 1007 2.35 0.68 1 4
Major Companies 0 535 2.34 0.68 1 4 957 2.46 0.68 1 4 1002 2.37 0.69 1 4
Judicial system 0 576 2.75 0.70 1 4 974 2.77 0.75 1 4 1023 2.74 0.69 1 4
0 588 41.19 13.93 18 89 986 42.14 16.67 16 85 1017 42.58 16.08 17 79
0 588 1890.16 1321.51 324 7921 986 2053.46 1556.91 256 7225 1017 2071.08 1468.33 289 6241
0 588 0.52 0.50 0 1 987 0.49 0.50 0 1 1038 0.48 0.50 0 1
0 580 1.85 1.41 0 6 982 1.56 1.58 0 8 971 1.74 1.88 0 20
0 588 0.12 0.32 0 1 987 0.21 0.40 0 1 1038 0.20 0.40 0 1
0 588 0.69 0.46 0 1 987 0.43 0.49 0 1 1038 0.43 0.50 0 1
0 588 0.00 0.00 0 0 987 0.00 0.00 0 0 1038 0.00 0.00 0 0
Unpaid work in putnamian groups
Unpaid work in olsonian groups
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Figure 3.1: Relational social capital trends for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. a) trust
in others; b) membership in Putnam’s groups; c) unpaid voluntary work in putnamian
groups
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Figure 3.2: Trends about membership and unpaid voluntary work in Olson’s and other
groups for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000. Membership in Olson’s (a) and other groups
(b); performing unpaid voluntary work in olsonian (c) and other (d) groups
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Figure 3.3: Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.
a Confidence in religious institutions; b Confidence in judicial system
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Figure 3.5: Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.
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Figure 3.6: Trends about confidence in institutions for Great Britain from 1980 to 2000.
a Confidence in police; b Confidence in armed forces
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Figure 3.8: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
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Figure 3.9: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
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Figure 3.10: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Sweden from 1980 to 2000
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Figure 3.11: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
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Figure 3.12: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
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Figure 3.13: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
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Figure 3.14: Trends about membership in Putnam’s groups (a), trust in others (b) and
unpaid putnamian voluntary work (c) for Germany from 1980 to 2000
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Figure 3.18: Subjective well-being trends for (a) Denmark and (b) Norway from 1980 to
2000
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Figure 3.19: Subjective well-being trends for Germany from 1980 to 2000
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4Predicting the life satisfaction of
Germans: the role of sociability,
comparisons and adaptation
4.1 Introduction
In this paper I offer the first attempt to quantify the extent to which the main correlates
of subjective well-being (SWB) predict its variations over time. There are three main
reasons for the considerable scientific as well as mediatic - visibility of the happiness
research. The first is that there is a large body of validation tests documenting the
reliability of SWB as an indicator of well-being1. The second is the extensive availability
of data and its relatively low acquisition cost. The third is that this data tell us
interesting stories.
Probably the most known one concerns the trends of SWB in western countries.
There are decades-long time series for these countries, which indicate that SWB has not
increased significantly and that, on the contrary, in some cases it has actually decreased
(see Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004, on the case of US).
This is an astonishing fact when seen in the context of the pronounced economic growth
which has characterized the post Second World War western world. Indeed, economic
1The happiness data pass a series of validation exercises showing that they are well correlated with
the assessment of ones person happiness by friends and family members, or physical manifestations of
well-being such as smiling or electroencephalogram measures of prefrontal brain activity, hearth and
blood pressure measures responses to stress, psychosomatic illnesses.
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theory assumes that the greater access to consumer goods brought about by growth
leads to an increase in well-being.
The analysis of the bivariate correlations between income and SWB confirms that
GDP and SWB are unrelated in the long-term (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). The
paradox can be further explored focusing the research on micro data. In particular,
four forces that can potentially influence the trend of SWB have been identified. The
first, and the most straightforward, is the growth of absolute income. On average,
individuals with higher incomes are more satisfied than individuals with lower incomes.
This relationship tends to weaken as income grows. Such a result confirms the basic
predictions of economic theory, including that of decreasing marginal utility of income.
The second force is adaptation. The theory of adaptation assumes that changes in
the economic conditions in the life of individuals tend to have a transitory effect on
their well-being. Adaptation offsets partially or completely the effects of an increase in
income.
The third force is social comparisons. Social comparison theory holds that what
matters for the average individual is his/her relative position with regards to a selected
group of people he/she respects and to whom he/she wants to resemble. These people,
forming the so called reference group, determine the income to which the average
individual compares his/her own.
Thus economic growth seems simultaneously to have both positive and negative con-
sequences on well-being. It has a positive effect, because it increases absolute income; a
negative one, because it generates a constant upward shift of income aspirations, fueled
by the increase in income of the reference groups and the continuous adaptation of
consumption standards.
Some papers have recently identified a fourth force social capital (SC) that has a
great importance for SWB. Helliwell (2006) has shown that social capital is positively
correlated to SWB. The notion of social capital is a composite concept that indicates
various kind of non-market relations among individuals and/or institutions. As docu-
mented by Bruni and Stanca (2008) and by Becchetti et al. (2008), the component of
social capital more remarkably related to SWB is the one concerning sociability i.e.
the relationships among individuals, also termed relational goods. In a related paper,
Becchetti et al. (2009) provide a causal analysis of the relationship between relational
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goods and SWB, showing that social capital have a strong and significant effect on
SWB.
All these papers suggest that SWB is strongly correlated with sociability, but do
not provide any analysis of the co-movements of social capital and SWB. Using micro
data from the US General Social Survey for the past 30 years, Bartolini et al. (2008)
show that a large portion of the declining happiness trend is predicted by the decline
in social capital. They also find that the increasing trend of income and the increasing
trend of reference income play a significant role in predicting the happiness trend.
In this chapter, I quantify the relative importance of these four forces in Germany for
the period 1996-2007. I use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) which is one
of the main sources of evidence on the relevance of adaptation and social comparisons
(e.g. Ferrer-I-Carbonell, 2005; Vendrik and Wojtiers, 2007; Layard et al. 2009; see
also Clark et al. 2008, and references therein). Moreover, the GSOEP is rich in social
capital data and indeed it has been used to show the importance of this data for well-
being (Becchetti et al. 2008; Becchetti et al. 2009). It is, therefore, an ideal database
for providing a test of the predictive potential of the four main forces that affect the
trend of SWB. The GSOEP is also able to overcome some of the limitations of the
cross-sectional data used by Bartolini, et al. (2008). In effect, the GSS is not a panel
and therefore i) it does not allow one to check for adaptation; ii) it does not allow
one to check for fixed effects; iii) it offers the possibility of a more limited analysis of
causality with respect to a panel. These limits can be surmounted by using panel data.
My results confirm that all these four forces might have played an important role
in the recent evolution of SWB in Germany. In particular, evidence suggests that
four fifths of the benefits of income growth (first force) might have been lost due to
comparisons and adaptation (second and third forces). In addition, sociability appears
to be the largest positive predictor of SWB between 1996 and 2007. Besides this, the
data suggest that aging of the population might have been the principal source of the
reduction in life satisfaction over the period considered. This result appears to crucially
hinge on the loss of satisfaction experienced beyond age 65.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes data, concepts and my
empirical strategy. Section 3 reports my main figures together with detailed comments
on the numbers of interest. Section 4 provides a series of robustness checks that cor-
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roborates our basic findings. Section 5 summarizes my results and provides some final
remarks on the scope of my findings.
4.2 Data and empirical strategy
Present study primarily aims at quantifying co-movements over time of SWB and some
of its important correlates. More precisely, my purpose is to quantify what part of the
change over time in SWB can be predicted by changes in each correlate. The objective
is to identify which correlates better predict the evolution of SWB.
Besides standard socio-economic correlates I consider three potential predictors of
SWB. The first correlate is reference income and is intended to capture the effects of
social comparisons. The second correlate is own past income and is intended to capture
the effects of income adaptation. The third correlate is a set of social capital indicators
at the individual level which are intended to capture the contribution of sociability to
the evolution of SWB. Below I provide a detailed definition of these constructs.
I employ the German Socio-Economic Panel dataset1 managed with the panelwhiz
tool2. In my baseline estimations, I consider the sub-sample of West and East Germans
between 1994 and 2007. This restriction is imposed by data availability more on this
below. I have chosen the GSOEP for three reasons. First, its longitudinal structure
allows me to investigate the role of income adaptation and to control for fixed unob-
servable characteristics at the individual level. Second, its long time span permits to go
beyond short run variations in SWB. Third, the GSOEP contains a sufficient number
of observations for social capital variables at the individual level, making it possible to
explore the role of sociability.
In order to test how changes across time of my independent variables predict the
change in time of SWB, I adopt the following two-steps empirical strategy, which has
been already applied in Di Tella and Mac Culloch (2009) and Bartolini et al. (2009).
First, I estimate a baseline equation quantifying partial correlations between SWB
1The data used in this publication were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study
(SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin.
2The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov
2007) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The
PanelWhiz generated DO file to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are
available upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew
and Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
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and its correlates. Second, I multiply the estimated coefficients that are statistically
significant for their variation over the period 1996-2007. In this way we obtain the
variation of SWB predicted by the variation over time of our significant regressors. This
is not a simple accounting technique since predictions are based on weighted averages
representative of the whole German population while the coefficients are estimated
without weights considering the sample from West and East Germany. In this way
I prevent statistical biases and, at the same time, I attain representativeness of the
German population. The fundamental implicit assumption of my strategy is that,
apart from level effects, all Germans respond to the same SWB equation at all points
in time during 1992-2007.
4.2.1 The data
The GSOEP is a longitudinal survey of households and persons in the Federal Republic
of Germany and it is run on a yearly basis by the DIW in Berlin1. The GSOEP focuses
on micro-data about demographic, economic, social and political variables. The survey
started in 1984 and initially it was designed for West Germany only, including about
6000 households. However, since June 1990 the sampling was extended to include about
2000 East German households.
For my baseline regression, I focus on the sub-samples constituted by residents in
West and East Germany for the period 1994-2007. I exclude sub-samples dedicated to
foreigners, immigrants, high income households, as well as refreshments. In other words,
I only consider the Germans participating to the initial samples relative to East and
West Germany. The reason is that the sub-samples that I discarded are constructed
with a large use of oversampling to allow the assessment of specific questions about
sub-populations. The potential risk of using these sub-samples is that of biases due to
sample selection. When I move to predicting the trend of SWB I take care of a correct
representation of the German population by using the whole sample and applying the
appropriate weights provided by in GSOEP.
Due to both sample constraints and data missing I end up using 59527 person-year
observations out of 222404 available. The years for which I actually have observations
for all variables of interest are 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2005, and 2007. This
1http://www.diw.de
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substantial loss of information is mostly due to the fact that indicators of sociability
are not recorded on a yearly basis.
Later on, I will repeat the analysis considering only the sub-sample constituted of
West Germans only for the period 1988-2007. Besides providing a meaningful robust-
ness check, such a repetition will allow me to investigate the differences between East
and West Germans.
4.2.2 Estimation of the SWB equation
I posit that an individual’s SWB is determined by the following function:
SWBi,t = v(Xi,t, yi,t, y¯i,t, yi,t−k, SCi,t) (4.1)
where the indices i and t denote, respectively, the individual and the year; moreover,
y is a variable representing i ’s income, is a variable representing the reference income
i compares herself with, X collects a set of social and demographic characteristics, and
SC stands for a set of social capital variables at the individual level. Note that i ’s
income appears twice as the one year index t is current income while the one with year
index t-k is the income on k years before t.
Of course, I do not observe SWBi,t directly but only a proxy of it, namely reported
SWB which I indicate with SWBRi,t. In particular, I rely on the following question of
reported SWB provided in the GSOEP: “And finally, we would like to ask you about
your satisfaction with your life in general. Please answer by using the following scale,
in which 0 means totally unhappy, and 10 means totally happy. How happy are you
at present with your life as a whole?”. As the answer takes discrete values from 0
to 10, I am in a typical case of latent dependent variable proxied by a multinomial
ordered variable. Because of such a latency and the longitudinal characteristic of the
dataset, best statistical practice would suggest the use of ordered probit augmented
with individual random effects and Mundlak’s corrections (see e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2005) or, in alternative, ordered logit with individual fixed effects. However, it is now
well documented that in similar cases the use of OLS with individual fixed effects is
equivalent to the use of these alternative techniques (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters,
2004). In the light of this I resort to the use of OLS with individual fixed effects to
estimate the following baseline equation:
SWBRi,t = α+ β1 ·X
d
i,t+ γ1 · ln(yi,t) + γ2 · ln(y¯i,t) + γ3 · ln(yi,t−k)+ δ ·SCi,t+ ei,t (4.2)
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In addition to the variables specified in eq. 4.1 I add a set of dummies to control for
the fixed effects of years, Lander, and former West Germany. This is reported in eq. 4.2
by adding the superscript d to X which means that I augmented X with the described
dummy variables. Other variables cosidered in X are: age, marital status, work status,
household size, presence of children, and years of education. The descriptive statistics
of these variables are reported in tab. 4.10 in the appendix.
Absolute income y is operationalized as the GSOEP variable “adjusted monthly
household net income”. “Adjusted” stands for the fact that income is real and converted
in euros of 2000. I preferred the use of household income instead of personal income
because I believe that household income better proxies the true access to economic
resources that individuals have.
4.2.3 Reference income
I operationalize reference income of individual i in year t as the average income of i ’s
reference group in year t. The reference group of individual i is constructed as the
sub-sample of Germans living in i ’s the same region (west or east), in the same year
and having about i ’s education and age. More precisely, three categories of education
are used according to years of education: less than 11, between 11 and 12, and 13 or
more. Similarly, three age brackets are considered: younger than 30, between 31 and
60, and 61 or older.
The combination of these characteristics generates 378 different reference groups.
The mean size of these groups is of 969 individuals, the median is 683 and the minunim
size is 70. I opted for having only three age categories in order to being able to condition
the reference group on the region and still have groups of non-negligible sizes. Indeed, I
believe that living in the same region in the same year is more relevant to comparisons
than being almost of the same age.
As convincingly argued by Falk and Knell (2003), reference groups are likely to be
endogenous. However, in my opinion one’s reference group is likely to change rather
slowly and in accordance with the change in one’s lifestyle. Thus, my definition of
reference group should work sufficiently well for my purposes.
Another issue is what measure of income should be used to calculate reference
income. We use household income as in Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), Vendrik and Wojtiers
(2007), and Layard et al. (2009). This amounts to assume that the likelihood of having
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characteristics similar to i ’s ones is greater for people in i ’s household than for the rest
of the population.
Of course, other definitions of reference group are possible. For instance, one could
further refine the reference group by also considering gender (Vendrik and Wojtiers,
2007; Ferrer-I-Carbonell, 2005, appendix). Alternatively, one can focus especially on
the community or region of residence (as in Diener et al., 1993; Stutzer, 2004; Luttmer,
2005), people’s cohort (McBride, 2001), or people’s state or country (Easterlin, 1995;
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). Finally, individuals might have more than one ref-
erence group (Kapteyn and Wansbeek, 1985; Vendrik and Hirata, 2007). Admittedly,
there is no simple way to establish what is the reference group of an individual.
D’Ambrosio and Frick (2008) propose an original definition of reference group which
allows to distinguish relativity effects based on social comparisons from those having
an information basis. Overall, they find that the SWB of an individual is negatively
affected by the comparison with permanently richer individuals, while the presence of
newly richer individuals plays the informational role described in Hirschmans tunnel
effect only for those individuals that experience an increasing income1.
Finally, Di Tella et al. (2007) propose, in alternative to usual measures of relative
income, the use of the Occupational Prestige Score (OPS) as a measure of social stand-
ing. The OPS is a coded ranking, often applied by sociologists, which is based on an
individual’s type of job. This measure is certainly interesting and deserves attention
but it reasonably captures many other aspects of the working and social life beyond
relative income. Since one of my objectives is to single out the net effect of income on
SWB the OPS does not seem fully appropriate.
4.2.4 Lagged income
I control for income adaptation by including one’s own past household income in the
SWB equation. Several specifications of this variable are possible and, in fact, I have
tried some. In line with what found by Layard et al. (2009), the specification of
past household income that seems more relevant to SWBRi,t is yi,t−3, that is, a three-
years-in-the-past income. Beyond Layard et al. (2009), other two papers attempt to
measure the role of past income on current SWB using the GSOEP, namely Di Tella
et al. (2007) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008). Di Tella et al. (2007) apply all lags
1For more on the tunnel effect see Hirschman (1973) or, more recently, Senik (2004).
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between 1 and 4; Di Tella and MacCulloch (2009) apply all lags between 1 and 7. While
the first paper offers, in addition, the analysis of adaptation to one’s social status (as
measured by the OPS), the second paper investigates the issue of income adaptation
when basic needs are satisfied exploring a broader sample of subjects (including also
the the World Gallup Poll and the Eurobarometer for 16 European countries). The
fundamental conclusion of both papers is that after about 5 years adaptation is almost
complete for certain social groups, while it is never complete for others. I will further
come back on these results when I will comment my findings.
My choice of using a three-years-in-the-past income to capture income adaptation
is not an ad hoc choice. To show this in section 4.4.1 I report estimations of eq. 4.2
where yi,t−k is alternatively specified with k equal to 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Again,
the choice of using household income instead of personal income follows the idea that
people’s access to resources is better proxied by the former.
4.2.5 Indicators of sociability
In this paper by sociability I mean non-instrumental non-market relationships among
individuals. There is a certain terminological variability in the rapidly growing eco-
nomic literature on sociability. The latter is indicated with the term social capital
(Helliwell, 2006; Helliwell and Putnam, 2004; Sabatini, 2009), relational goods (Uh-
laner 1989; Gui and Sugden, 2005; Bruni and Stanca, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2008),
social interactions. I will use this terms interchangeably. Although I recognize that
they might be used to mean different constructs I stress that this is not the case in the
present study.
I measure sociability with a number of indicators which are supposed to capture
voluntary social interactions. More precisely, I focus on the frequency of social activ-
ities such as attending religious events, attending cultural events, attending cinema,
pop concerts and similar, participating actively in sports, attending social gatherings,
helping out friends, performing volunteer work, and participating in local politics. The
GSOEP has a specific variable for each of these activities. In particular, respondents
are asked to say which of the following frequencies best fits their lifestyle: every day
(1); every week (2); every month (3); less frequently (4); never (5). Their descriptive
statistics are reported in tab. 4.10.
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For each of the eight indicators I construct a dummy variable which is set equal
to 1 if the respondent perform the mentioned activity at least once a month, and 0
otherwise. I have chosen the reported frequency “at least once a month” as a threshold
because it well captures the sample variation. This can be seen in tab. 4.1 which
illustrates the frequencies of social activities for the whole population of Germany in
the period considered. These figures are representative of the actual population as we
used the appropriate weights to calculate them.
Becchetti et al. (2008) and Becchetti et al. (2009) also investigate the relation-
ship between sociability and SWB using the GSOEP. In both papers five of the eight
indicators I used are employed to construct a Relational Time Index which is then
applied in a bunch of causality tests. More precisely, they exclude (i) attending cin-
ema, pop concerts, dance hall and related events, (ii) helping our friends or relatives,
and (iii) participating in local political activities. I ignore why such an exclusion but,
following their own argument that the included activities entails intrinsically motivated
social relationships, I can not exclude that also (i), (ii) and (iii) are good indicators of
sociability.
More in general, one might contend that the selected indicators do not capture only
a relational dimension but also other aspects of life that are reasonably relevant to
SWB. In fact, I think that this is the case and it is especially true for indicators such
as attending cultural, popular and religious events. Listening to good music or tuning
one’s body to music might well increase SWB by itself. I do not deny this case, but
presume that such activities have a relational part which qualifies them as beneficial to
SWB. Put it differently, going to a pop concert or to a dancing hall without having good
interactions with other individuals is not likely to provide a sensible increase in one’s
SWB, although the benefit from going can not be totally imputed to social relations.
4.3 Results
In this section I illustrate the baseline estimation of eq. 4.2 as well as the quantification
of co-movements of SWB and its correlates. Special attention will be given to those
correlates that are supposed to capture social comparisons, income adaptation, and
sociability. Therefore, the discussion will mostly be focused on figures related to them
and, for the sake of comparison, other important correlates such as absolute income,
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Weighted frequency distributions of sociability variables. Frequencies have been computed using
cross-sectional  sampling  weights  (GSOEP source  variable:  w1110507).  For  a  more  detailed
definition of each variable, please refer to Appendix A.
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
[-1] No Answer 1.673,19 0,46 0,46 [-1] No Answer 1.974,03 0,54 0,54
[1] Every day 13.245,93 3,65 4,11 [1] Every day 10.178,24 2,8 3,35
[2] Every week 17.774,41 4,9 9 [2] Every week 26.486,73 7,3 10,64
[3] Every month 43.464,11 11,97 20,98 [3] Every month 85.108,55 23,44 34,08
[4] Less Frequently 84.280,77 23,21 44,19 [4] Less Frequently 87.583,15 24,12 58,21
[5] Never 30.049,32 8,28 52,47 [5] Never 27.421,27 7,55 65,76
not observed 172.585,28 47,53 100 not observed 124.321,03 34,24 100
Total 363.073 100 Total 363.073 100
Freq. Percent Cum. Participate in sports Freq. Percent Cum.
[-1] No Answer 2.285,49 0,63 0,63 [-1] No Answer 3.226,42 0,89 0,89
[1] Every day 12.726,16 3,51 4,13 [1] Every day 53.677,99 14,78 15,67
[2] Every week 30.145,76 8,3 12,44 [2] Every week 27.850,02 7,67 23,34
[3] Every month 71.153,10 19,6 32,04 [3] Every month 34.421,52 9,48 32,82
[4] Less Frequently 83.926,06 23,12 55,15 [4] Less Frequently 94.412,28 26 58,83
[5] Never 26.472,51 7,29 62,44 [5] Never 25.163,74 6,93 65,76
not observed 136.363,93 37,56 100 not observed 124.321,03 34,24 100
Total 363.073 100 Total 363.073 100
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
[-1] No Answer 1.249,44 0,34 0,34 [-1] No Answer 1.849,72 0,51 0,51
[1] Every day 70.305,45 19,36 19,71 [1] Every day 20.766,50 5,72 6,23
[2] Every week 63.095,45 17,38 37,09 [2] Every week 51.622,22 14,22 20,45
[3] Every month 37.463,24 10,32 47,4 [3] Every month 77.657,99 21,39 41,84
[4] Less Frequently 5.528,37 1,52 48,93 [4] Less Frequently 25.745,52 7,09 48,93
not observed 185.431,04 51,07 100 not observed 185.431,04 51,07 100
Total 363.073 100 Total 363.073 100
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
[-1] No Answer 3.068,02 0,85 0,85 [-1] No Answer 3.334,45 0,92 0,92
[1] Every day 22.899,73 6,31 7,15 [1] Every day 12.585,66 3,47 4,38
[2] Every week 16.821,25 4,63 11,79 [2] Every week 3.804,68 1,05 5,43
[3] Every month 24.909,77 6,86 18,65 [3] Every month 12.253,39 3,37 8,81
[4] Less Frequently 125.660,27 34,61 53,26 [4] Less Frequently 154.204,49 42,47 51,28
[5] Never 45.392,93 12,5 65,76 [5] Never 52.569,29 14,48 65,76
not observed 124.321,03 34,24 100 not observed 124.321,03 34,24 100
Total 363.073 100 Total 363.073 100
Go to church or religious 
institutions
Go to cultural events 
(concerts, theater, 
lectures)
Go to the cinema, pop 
concerts, dance halls, 
disco, sporting events
Visit with friends, 
relatives, or neighbors
Help out friends, 
relatives, or neighbors
Volunteer work in clubs, 
associations, or social 
services
Participate in citizens' 
action groups, political 
parties, local 
government
Table 4.1: Sociability indicators, “How frequently do you do the following activities?”
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marital status and work status. Indeed, the estimates associated with correlates other
than these are in line with the SWB literature and do not deserve any special comment1.
The only exception is age to which I will devote the necessary space.
4.3.1 The SWB regression
I estimate eq. 4.2 using OLS with individual fixed effects under the baseline specification
described in the previous section. Table 4.2 reports the estimates.
A first relevant finding is that income seems to buy happiness, although not in
large amounts. The coefficients of reference income and lagged income are both highly
significant and consistent with the presence, respectively, of social comparisons and
hedonic adaptation. However, while the coefficient of absolute income is about 0.42,
the coefficients of reference income and lagged income sum up to about -0.35 (being
about -0.27 and -0.08, respectively). If taken seriously, this is by no means a small
effect as more than four fifths of the impact of absolute income seems to be offset by
reference and lagged income. Nevertheless, according to these numbers rising income
should raise life satisfaction. To understand the magnitude of this effect is sufficient
to look at the net effects of a a 500 euros rise in income, starting from 200 euros per
month. From 200 to 700 euros the gain in life satisfaction is 0.093; from 700 to 1200
the gain is 0.04; from 1200 to 1700 the gain is 0.026; from 1700 to 2200 the gain is
0.019; from 2200 to 2700 the gain is 0.015; from 2700 to 3200 the gain is 0.013; from
3200 to 3700 the gain is 0.011, and so forth.
Put it differently, the positional treadmill and the hedonic treadmill seems to be
in place, with the positional treadmill playing the most important role in depressing
German’s life satisfaction. However, these treadmills are not strong enough to wipe
out the whole positive effect of rising income. This is consistent with what found by
a series of papers exploring the potential role of the positional treadmill: Bartolini et
al. (2008) and Luttmer (2005) for the US, Blachflower and Oswald (2004) for both US
and UK, and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2005) for Germany.
My findings are tightly related to those obtained by Layard et al. (2009) who
estimate a SWB equation similar to mine using the GSOEP, although for West Germans
only and on a longer period. Similarly, they find that both past and reference income
1For a detailed discussion of standard demo-socio-economic controls see Clark and Oswald (1994),
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Frey and Stutzer (2002), and van Praag et al. (2003).
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Table 3. The baseline SWB regression
OLS regression with robust standard errors and fixed effects. The omitted categories are: employed, living in
East Germany, without children, and single. Year and Lander dummies included. First column shows the
coefficients from the regression (* means significant at 10%, ** means significant at 5%, *** means significant
at 1%.). The last column reports the p-value.
OLS with individual fixed effects, Years 1992-2007, East and West Germans






age squared -0.0003 [0.000]***
household size -0.1250 [0.000]***
1 child 0.1280 [0.002]***
2 children 0.1550 [0.004]***
3 or more children 0.3670 [0.000]***
years of education 0.0095 [0.233]
living with parents when 16 -0.0009 [0.983]
log of monthly household income 0.4210 [0.000]***
log of reference income -0.2720 [0.001]***
log of monthly household income 3 years before -0.0751 [0.000]***
at least monthly attending to religious events 0.0766 [0.000]***
at least monthly attending to cultural events 0.1280 [0.000]***
at least monthly attending to cinema, pop concerts and similar activities 0.0276 [0.183]
at least monthly actively participating in sports 0.0671 [0.000]***
at least monthly volunteering -0.0200 [0.290]
at least monthly participating in social gatherings 0.1900 [0.000]***
at least monthly helping out friends 0.0733 [0.000]***
at least monthly participating in local political activities -0.0160 [0.533]
unemployed -0.5540 [0.000]***
student 0.0214 [0.679]
not working for other reasons -0.0446 [0.147]
retired 0.0495 [0.240]
doing military or civil service -0.2430 [0.055]*
living in West Germany -0.1590 [0.779]
Year dummies yes .
Lander dummies yes .
constant 8.144 [0.000]***
Number of observations 59527
Overall R-square 0.03
F-stat 35.34 Prob < 0.000
Table 4.2: The baseline SWB regression
107
4. PREDICTING THE LIFE SATISFACTION OF GERMANS: THE
ROLE OF SOCIABILITY, COMPARISONS AND ADAPTATION
are negatively correlated with SWB, with reference income playing the major role.
One difference between the figures in Layard et al. (2009) and mine is that the former
show that benefits of income growth are fully offset by past and reference income. I
suspect that this different outcome is due the fact that they use a rough measure of
reference income, namely average national household income. However, if I look at a
reasonable confidence band of both mine estimates and theirs we can see that figures
tell a quite similar story: a large part of the benefits of income growth seems to be
offset by reference income.
Both papers by Di Tella et al. (2007) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) suggests
that, at least for certain social groups, income adaptation is complete after about five
years. This is partly in contrast with my findings and with those of Layard et al. (2009)
as I find only a secondary role for income adaptation. I suspect that the main drive
of this difference is the absence of a reference income variable which might have made
past income capture some reference income effects and, hence, become more relevant to
SWB. Indeed in the case of Di Tella et al. (2007) social standing is measured by means
of the OPS index, while in Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) social standing is totally
absent. Admittedly, beyond my suspects, I have no real clue on the source of such a
difference. In any case, since in both papers full adaptation occurs only for certain
social groups females, leftists and employees in Di Tella et al. (2007), home-owners in
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) on average full adaptation fails to happen, which is
consistent with my findings.
A second relevant finding is that sociability seems to matter a great deal. To be more
precise, a certain kind of sociability. Being involved in volunteering and local political
activities does not seem to go with higher SWB. On the contrary, attending to cultural
or religious events, participate in social gatherings, playing sports and helping friends
seem to have a sensible positive correlation with SWB. In particular, participation
in social gatherings seem to have the largest effect suggesting that voluntary social
interactions for their own sake are best for life satisfaction.
To have an idea of the potential impact of sociability on SWB we can do a few simple
calculations and comparisons. Consider two hypothetical individuals with identical
characteristics but for the fact that the first has all sociability indicators equal to zero
while second participates to social gatherings, helps friends, attends to both religious
and cultural event, and plays sports. The SWB of the second individuals is larger by a
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factor of 0.65 which is definitely a substantial amount. Suppose that both individuals
earn 1200 euro per moth. In order to generate the same difference in SWB by means
of a rise in monthly income the second individual should increase his income beyond
2200 euro per month and this without considering adaptation.
These findings are substantially in line with what found by Bruni and Stanca (2008)
using the World Value Survey, by Bartolini et al. (2008) using the U.S. General Social
Survey, by Powdthavee (2008) using the British Household Panel Survey, and by Bec-
chetti et al. (2008) and Becchetti et. al (2009) using the GSOEP. More precisely, all
these papers find a positive and significant correlation between sociability and SWB.
Of particular interest are the papers of Becchetti et al. (2008) and Becchetti et. al
(2009) which investigates the issue of the causal relationships between sociability and
SWB. The findings suggests that sociability causes SWB, although the presence of a
reverse causation can not be excluded.
As anticipated at the beginning of this section, the estimates associated with the
remaining regressors are in line with the SWB literature so that I do not provide
comments on them. The only exception is age which seems to have a concave negative
impact, suggesting that old age is associated with particularly low life satisfaction for
Germans. This is in contrast with the typical finding in the SWB literature suggesting
that the relationship between age and SWB is U-shaped1. Given the large amount of
evidence in favor of the U-shape hypothesis I do not believe that this study poses a
serious trouble to its general validity. In particular, there are papers where an SWB
equations is estimated using the GSOEP and where the U-shape is found. This is
the case of both van Praag et al. (2003) and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2005) where the age
variables as the logs of current age and current age squared. Moreover, there is Ferrer-
I-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who find the U-shape in a variety of different models
that use a specification of age variables similar to mine.
In the light of this, one may think that my finding of a negative and concave relation-
ship between age and SWB rests on something peculiar to this study. A natural guess
1See e.g Clark and Oswald (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald (2008) and references therein for a
full list of contributions supporting the U-shape hypothesis in economics. See instead Mroczek and
Spiro (2005) for a recent contribution in the psychological literature which also supports the U-shape
hypothesis. Interestingly enough Mroczek and Spiro (2005) find that the age of minimum SWB is
greater than the one typically found by economists of about twenty years (in the 60s instead of the
40s).
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in this regard is that the introduction of sociability indicators distorts the U-shape re-
lationship1. To test for this I run a new regression excluding sociability indicators. The
negative concave relationship, however, turned out to be robust to such an exclusion.
A possible alternative explanation is that the U-shape relationship is not the whole
story, at least for what concerns the GSOEP. This is indeed suggested by the analysis of
Becchetti et al. (2009) who, using dummies for age categories, find that the relationship
between age and SWB is U-shaped only up to mid 60s and after that becomes negative
and concave2. To test if I was capturing the old age concavity I run an additional
regression excluding people of age 65 or older. We found that the usual U-shape re-
appears. This convinced me that the negative and concave relationship estimated in
the baseline regression is mainly due to a strongly negative and concave relationship in
the very old age.
4.3.2 Prediction of SWB
Before proceeding with my analysis, it is useful to have an idea of the evolution of
SWB in the period considered. Figure 4.1 illustrates the path of SWB separately for
Eastern and Western Germans as well as for them jointly. As one can see SWB slightly
declines, if anything, for everybody between 1996 and 20073. Therefore, my prediction
should give an almost flat trend in order to be acceptable. Moreover, since I already
know that some positive and negative correlates of SWB moved upwards e.g. absolute
and reference income I should find that the flat trend is the outcome of contrasting
forces.
Using the estimates of eq.4.2 I attempt to predict the average variation of SWB
from 1996 to 2007 in Germany. I do this by calculating the implied variation in SWB
associated with each statistically significant regressor in eq.4.2, apart from Lander and
years dummies. More precisely, the implied SWB variation is obtained as the sum
over the products of the estimated coefficients, which resulted statistically significant,
1In this respect, Becchetti et al. (2008) do not provide any indication since they do not allow for
a non-linear relationship between age and SWB.
2See also Van Landeghem (2008) on this.
3This period is not long enough to tell us something about the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin and
Angelescu, 2009) but, since Germany grew considerably between 1996 and 2007, it nevertheless suggests
that the paradox may be there.
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Trends of average weighted satisfaction with life for the three sub-samples: westerners (1984  2007); easterners (1990 
 2007) and the two sub-samples together (1990  2007). Averages have been computed using cross-sectional sampling 
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Figure 4.1: The Trends of Subjective Well-Being in Germany
and the total variation of the regressors associated with such coefficients. Formally, I
predict the SWB variation as follows:
∆ ˆSWB = bˆ∆X˜ + cˆ1∆ln(y) + cˆ2∆ln(y¯) + cˆ3∆ln(y−3) + dˆ∆S˜C (4.3)
where bˆ, cˆ1, cˆ2, cˆ3 and dˆ are the estimated coefficients of eq.4.2 which resulted
statistically significant at least at the 10% level, while ∆X˜, ∆ln(y), ∆ln(y¯), ∆ln(y
−3),
and ∆S˜C collects the variations of regressors associated with such coefficients.
I emphasize that variations of regressors are calculated using the weights provided
in the GSOEP which allow to correct for special purpose stratifications and over-
samplings. This has two consequences. First, I can attempt to predict the variation of
SWB for the whole population of Germany, and not only for the sample of individuals
surveyed in the GSOEP. Second, my calculation is indeed a prediction and not just an
accounting technique. This latter point is reinforced by the fact that, while I estimated
eq.4.2 for the period 1992-2007, I calculate eq.4.3 only for the period 1996-2007. I do
this because before 1992 lagged income is observed only for West Germans while in
1993 and 1995 sociability indicators are not observed.
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Table 4.3 reports the predicted co-movements at the most disaggregated level. Be-
fore moving to more aggregated figures, a brief comment on the trends of significant
regressors is worth doing. Married and widowed individuals seem to have decreased
in number while separated ones have increased. This suggests that the number of sin-
gles has been systematically increasing during the period considered. Not surprisingly,
average age increased of about two years while fraction of household having children
decreased for all categories considered. Consistently with these trends, household size
decreased as well. These numbers depict an important change in the average household
in Germany: older, smaller, with less children, and more often constituted by a single
person. As expected, income growth has induced an increase in all income variables
i.e. absolute income, reference income, and past income. Again unsurprisingly, both
unemployment and military/civil service slightly decreased.
Turning to sociability indicators we see that most of them increased during 1996-
2007. This is especially true for participating actively in sports and attending to cultural
events which increased, respectively, of 10% and 4%. Also the remaining indicators show
an upward variation of about 1 or 2%. The only exception is participation to religious
activities which decreased of 3%.
Let’s now turn to the most relevant set of figures. Table 4.4 illustrates the predicted
co-movements when I aggregate the regressors in five categories: marital status, age,
income, sociability, and work status. Basically, these categories represents important
life domains which are supposed to sensibly affect life satisfaction1. Before commenting
on each category separately, I find important to remind the reader that small changes
in SWB are typically very relevant. Indeed, SWB is rather stable with a standard
deviation of just 1.84 in a scale which length is 11 (from 0 to 10). Therefore, even a
0.1% change in SWB, which amounts to an absolute change of about 0.007, is worth
serious attention.
A first important thing to note is that total predicted variation is 0.06, which is
very close to observed variation that is about 0.07. This is a remarkably good result,
not at all warranted. Indeed, Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) provide a good negative
example in this regard. They show that applying a similar technique, one can get
1Such an aggregation is hence thought to help giving meaning to the numbers, but I want to
emphasize that it is by no means the only meaningful way to aggregate SWB variations.
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First column shows the coefficients of the baseline SWB regression (* means significant at 10%, ** means signific-
ant at 5%, *** means significant at 1%.). Second and third columns report, respectively, mean values of regressors in
1996 and their standard errors. Fourth and fifth columns report, respectively, mean values of regressors in 2007 and
their standard errors. Sixth column reports the difference between average values of regressors in 2007 and average
values in 1996. Last column reports the change in predicted probability of reporting to be satisfied with own life
which is imputed to each regressor (it comes from the product of the values in column seven and the coefficients re-
ported in column one). Reported numbers are relative to coefficients that are significant at least at the 10% level.
Variables
1996 2007 predicted 
p-value Mean Mean
life satisfaction (observed) 6,885 1,842 6,816 1,855 -0,069
married 0,097 [0.024]** 0,560 0,496 0,521 0,500 -0,039 -0,0038
separated -0,332 [0.000]*** 0,018 0,132 0,021 0,143 0,003 -0,0010
divorced -0,001 [0.983] 0,071 0,258 0,094 0,292 0,023
widowed -0,211 [0.009]*** 0,105 0,306 0,087 0,282 -0,018 0,0037
age -0,021 [0.000]*** 47,183 18,035 49,025 18,034 1,842 -0,0389
age squared -0,0003 [0.000]*** 2551,5 1824,7 2728,7 1868,9 177,211 -0,0503
household size -0,125 [0.000]*** 2,590 1,285 2,439 1,236 -0,151 0,0189
1 child 0,128 [0.002]*** 0,169 0,375 0,150 0,357 -0,019 -0,0024
2 children 0,155 [0.004]*** 0,108 0,311 0,088 0,283 -0,020 -0,0031
3 or more children 0,367 [0.000]*** 0,035 0,185 0,025 0,156 -0,011 -0,0039
years of education 0,010 [0.233] 11,464 2,515 12,044 2,639 0,580
with parents at 16 -0,001 [0.983] 1,708 0,455 1,757 0,429 0,049
log monthly income 0,421 [0.000]*** 7,699 0,487 7,750 0,583 0,050 0,0212
log reference income -0,272 [0.001]*** 7,815 0,158 7,867 0,230 0,053 -0,0143
log income 3 years before -0,075 [0.000]*** 7,627 0,572 7,645 0,594 0,018 -0,0013
monthly at religious events 0,077 [0.000]*** 0,488 0,500 0,459 0,498 -0,029 -0,0022
monthly at culture events 0,128 [0.000]*** 0,659 0,474 0,691 0,462 0,031 0,0040
monthly at cinema 0,028 [0.183] 0,647 0,478 0,689 0,463 0,041
monthly playing sport 0,067 [0.000]*** 0,518 0,500 0,610 0,488 0,091 0,0061
monthly at social gathering 0,190 [0.000]*** 0,778 0,416 0,789 0,408 0,011 0,0022
monthly helping friends 0,073 [0.000]*** 0,411 0,492 0,437 0,496 0,025 0,0019
monthly volunteering -0,020 [0.290] 0,293 0,455 0,303 0,460 0,011
monthly political active -0,016 [0.533] 0,111 0,314 0,082 0,274 -0,029
unemployed -0,554 [0.000]*** 0,061 0,239 0,056 0,231 -0,004 0,0025
student 0,021 [0.679] 0,030 0,171 0,029 0,167 -0,001
non working -0,045 [0.147] 0,133 0,339 0,091 0,288 -0,041
retired 0,050 [0.240] 0,177 0,382 0,206 0,404 0,028
military/civil service -0,243 [0.055]* 0,003 0,054 0,001 0,030 -0,002 0,0005
west -0,159 [0.779] 0,813 0,390 0,815 0,388 0,003
Estimates of eq. (2)
    '96-'07
Coeff Std.Dev. Std.Dev. ?SWB
Table 4.3: Predicting the evolution of life satisfaction in Germany, disaggregated.
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Variables
all partial sums total
life satisfaction (observed) -0,069
married 0,097 -0,039 -0,0038
separated -0,332 0,003 -0,0010 Marital status
widowed -0,211 -0,018 0,0037 -0,001
age -0,021 1,842 -0,0389 Age
age squared -0,0003 177,211 -0,0503 -0,089
household size -0,125 -0,151 0,0189
1 child 0,128 -0,019 -0,0024 Household
2 children 0,155 -0,020 -0,0031 characteristics
3 or more children 0,367 -0,011 -0,0039 0,010
log monthly income 0,421 0,050 0,0212
log reference income -0,272 0,053 -0,0143 Income
log income 3 years before -0,075 0,018 -0,0013 0,006
monthly at religious events 0,077 -0,029 -0,0022
monthly at culture events 0,128 0,031 0,0040
monthly playing sport 0,067 0,091 0,0061
monthly at social gathering 0,190 0,011 0,0022 Sociability
monthly helping friends 0,073 0,025 0,0019 0,012
unemployed -0,554 -0,004 0,0025 Work status
military/civil service -0,243 -0,002 0,0005 0,003 -0,06
Significant 
Coefficients
    1996-2007
Predicted  SWB
Table 4.4: Predicting the evolution of life satisfaction in Germany, partial sums
predictions far away from observed values. Moreover, they show that adding regressors
with significant estimates can even worsen the prediction precision.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that substantial changes in marital status
predict a rather small change in SWB. This is the result of two contrasting facts: less
married people and more separate people against less widowed people. This is in sharp
contrast with what found in Bartolini et al. (2008) where marital status was shown
to predict a large decrease in the SWB of US citizens. One possible reason for this
difference is the different period considered Bartolini et al. (2008) look at 1975-2004
which may have seen a much stronger deterioration of traditional marriages and an
upsurge of separations and divorces. Another potential explanation is that in Germany
the family breakdown experienced in the US was less hard.
A second thing to note is that a mild change in work status predicts a small change
in SWB. Here, however, there is no contrast: both less unemployment and less mili-
tary/civil service predict a higher SWB.
Successively, we notice that the increase in age predicts a large negative change
in SWB. Given the negative concave relationship between age and SWB that I found
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estimating eq. 4.2 this is not surprising. However, I admit that this result is surprising,
at least in terms of its magnitude. Trying to make sense out of the numbers, we can
imagine that the growth of the number of very old people may be a first responsible
for the lack of growth in SWB in Germany. Needless to say, this claim needs to be
carefully scrutinized in I think an ad hoc study.
Turning our attention to income, we see that it predicts a small but not negligible
increase in SWB. This is consistent with the findings of Bartolini et al. (2008) for
the US and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2008) for the EU. In both cases income growth
predicts a growth in SWB, although not a large one. In other words, it seems that more
money goes with more SWB, although only moderately so and in the short/medium
run.
A further positive change in SWB is predicted by the change in household charac-
teristics. More precisely, the reduction in the number of children predicts a reduction
in SWB which is more than offset by the positive change predicted by the shrinking in
household size. This is consistent with what found in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004)
and Bartolini et al. (2008). My interpretation is that the reduction in household size
captures the fact that a given amount of household income commands more goods and
services per household member, while having less children captures a poorer relational
environment in the household.
Finally, sociability predicts an important increase in SWB. More precisely, it pro-
vides the largest predicted variation of SWB after that predicted by age, and the largest
positive. This suggests an important role for sociability. Again, this is consistent with
Bartolini et al. (2008) who finds that the US change in SWB between 1975 and 2004 is
better predicted when we include, among other regressors, social capital indicators. My
finding reinforces that of Bartolini et al. (2008) since the former is obtained controlling
for individual unobservable fixed effects and income adaptation.
Summing up, the slight decrease in SWB that has taken place in Germany between
1996 and 2007 is well predicted by the following contrasting trends: income growth
for a slight increase in SWB (moderate if household characteristics are interpreted as I
suggest), aging for a substantial decrease in SWB, an improvement of work status for
a slight increase in SWB that just offset the slight decrease predicted by the worsening
of marital status and, finally, better sociability for a moderate increase in SWB.
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4.4 Robustness checks
In this section I explore the robustness of my findigs by varying the specification of the
baseline eq. 4.2 and adjusting preditions accordingly.
4.4.1 Alternative specifications of adaptation
As anticipated in section 4.2.4, I re-estimated the specification eq.4.2 with different
year lags for the variable recording past household income. In particular, I re-estimate
eq.4.2 with k = 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The estimates are reported in tab. 4.5. In each
regression I include a different specification of lagged income. The numbers reported
in the top row of tab. 4.5 identify the regressions and also indicate the number of years
used to calculate lagged household income. For the sake of comparison, I report also
the estimation with k = 3.
Overall, previous results seem confirmed. Almost all coefficients of non-income
variables turn out to be extremely stable to this change in specification. One exception
is the coefficient associated with the sociability indicator “at least monthly attending to
cinema, pop concerts, etc” which, by increasing the lag of past income, becomes smaller
and eventually statistically insignificant. I think this is mainly due to the fact that with
a longer lag I lose observations on young people which are more likely to go and benefit
from such activities. Another exception is military/civil service. Again, I belive that
this is driven by the progressive exclusion of young people. Further investigation on
descriptives that I do not report here confirms these guesses.
Turning our attention to the coefficients of income variables, we notice that those
associated with absolute income and reference income show a remarkable robustness to
changes in the lag of past income. The coefficient of reference income is substantially
invariant while the coefficient of absolute income sightly decreases in the lentgh of the
lag, but differences are neither statistically nor economically significant.
The coefficients of lagged income show some variability but, with the exclusion
of the 1-year lag, all have the expected sign and roughly a similar magnitude. The
coefficient of lagged income obtained in the regression with 1-year lag of past income
is not statistically significant. However, its magnitude is in line with other estimates.
















OLS regression with robust standard errors and fixed effects. The omitted categories are: employed, living in East Germany, without children, and single. Year and Lander dummies included.  P-values in brackets (* means
significant at 10%, ** means significant at 5%, *** means significant at 1%.). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
    Variables C oe ff. P-value s Coe ff. P-value s Coeff. P-value s C oeff. P-values C oe ff. P-values C oe ff. P-value s Coeff. P-value s
married 0.0867** [0.028] 0.0978** [0.016] 0.0968** [0.024] 0.0989** [0.025] 0.0935** [0.038] 0.0752 [0.116] 0.0944* [0.051]
separated -0.333*** [0.000] -0.336*** [0.000] -0.332*** [0.000] -0.334*** [0.000] -0.328*** [0.000] -0.373*** [0.000] -0.337*** [0.000]
divorced 0.0410 [0.499] 0.0235 [0.704] -0.00142 [0.983] 0.000190 [0.998] 0.0230 [0.731] -0.0130 [0.856] -0.00196 [0.978]
widowed -0.190** [0.012] -0.157** [0.040] -0.211*** [0.009] -0.192** [0.019] -0.219*** [0.009] -0.292*** [0.001] -0.253*** [0.005]
age -0.0223*** [0.000] -0.0231*** [0.000] -0.0211*** [0.000] -0.0207*** [0.001] -0.0222*** [0.000] -0.0199*** [0.002] -0.0194*** [0.004]
age2 -0.000268*** [0.000] -0.000253*** [0.000] -0.000284*** [0.000] -0.000289*** [0.000] -0.000277*** [0.000] -0.000289*** [0.000] -0.000292*** [0.000]
household size -0.134*** [0.000] -0.133*** [0.000] -0.125*** [0.000] -0.124*** [0.000] -0.110*** [0.000] -0.111*** [0.000] -0.121*** [0.000]
1 child 0.144*** [0.000] 0.144*** [0.000] 0.128*** [0.002] 0.144*** [0.001] 0.114** [0.011] 0.122** [0.012] 0.126*** [0.009]
2 children 0.183*** [0.000] 0.180*** [0.000] 0.155*** [0.004] 0.176*** [0.001] 0.121** [0.031] 0.118** [0.049] 0.102* [0.090]
3 or more children 0.401*** [0.000] 0.384*** [0.000] 0.367*** [0.000] 0.381*** [0.000] 0.312*** [0.000] 0.317*** [0.000] 0.326*** [0.000]
years of education 0.00593 [0.450] 0.00737 [0.350] 0.00954 [0.233] 0.00962 [0.233] 0.00977 [0.246] 0.00597 [0.497] 0.00639 [0.470]
living with parents when 16 0.00864 [0.834] 0.0119 [0.772] -0.000920 [0.983] 0.0179 [0.677] -0.00287 [0.950] 0.00499 [0.919] -0.00487 [0.921]
log of monthly household income 0.442*** [0.000] 0.435*** [0.000] 0.421*** [0.000] 0.405*** [0.000] 0.380*** [0.000] 0.365*** [0.000] 0.382*** [0.000]
log of reference income -0.217*** [0.005] -0.227*** [0.003] -0.272*** [0.001] -0.243*** [0.002] -0.226*** [0.006] -0.235*** [0.007] -0.211** [0.016]
log of monthly household income 1 year before -0.0350 [0.171]
log of monthly household income 2 year before -0.0434** [0.031]
log of monthly household income 3 year before -0.0751*** [0.000]
log of monthly household income 4 year before -0.0578*** [0.003]
log of monthly household income 5 year before -0.0727*** [0.000]
log of monthly household income 6 year before -0.0761*** [0.000]
log of monthly household income 7 year before -0.0424** [0.034]
at  least  monthly attending to religious events 0.0924*** [0.000] 0.0964*** [0.000] 0.0766*** [0.000] 0.0697*** [0.001] 0.0718*** [0.001] 0.0733*** [0.001] 0.0697*** [0.003]
at  least  monthly attending to cultural events 0.125*** [0.000] 0.125*** [0.000] 0.128*** [0.000] 0.129*** [0.000] 0.132*** [0.000] 0.140*** [0.000] 0.137*** [0.000]
at  least  monthly attending to cinema, pop concerts, etc 0.0352* [0.075] 0.0354* [0.074] 0.0276 [0.183] 0.0265 [0.203] 0.0240 [0.268] 0.0123 [0.587] 0.00747 [0.744]
at  least  monthly act ively part icipat ing in sports 0.0767*** [0.000] 0.0766*** [0.000] 0.0671*** [0.000] 0.0716*** [0.000] 0.0771*** [0.000] 0.0780*** [0.000] 0.0861*** [0.000]
at  least  monthly volunteering 0.179*** [0.000] 0.183*** [0.000] 0.190*** [0.000] 0.186*** [0.000] 0.191*** [0.000] 0.183*** [0.000] 0.193*** [0.000]
at  least  monthly part icipat ing in social gatherings 0.0628*** [0.000] 0.0628*** [0.000] 0.0733*** [0.000] 0.0747*** [0.000] 0.0757*** [0.000] 0.0830*** [0.000] 0.0889*** [0.000]
at  least  monthly helping out friends -0.0111 [0.542] -0.00624 [0.733] -0.0200 [0.290] -0.0125 [0.513] -0.0135 [0.499] -0.00492 [0.812] -0.00828 [0.693]
at  least  monthly part icipat ing in local polit ical act ivitie -0.0264 [0.281] -0.0269 [0.276] -0.0160 [0.533] -0.0164 [0.525] -0.0202 [0.451] -0.0224 [0.421] -0.0257 [0.359]
unemployed -0.586*** [0.000] -0.593*** [0.000] -0.554*** [0.000] -0.566*** [0.000] -0.547*** [0.000] -0.548*** [0.000] -0.560*** [0.000]
student 0.0315 [0.523] 0.0438 [0.378] 0.0214 [0.679] 0.0170 [0.743] 0.0283 [0.606] 0.0304 [0.594] 0.0722 [0.212]
not  working for other reasons -0.0362 [0.224] -0.0427 [0.155] -0.0446 [0.147] -0.0405 [0.190] -0.0435 [0.171] -0.0404 [0.218] -0.0459 [0.166]
ret ired 0.0567 [0.165] 0.0442 [0.279] 0.0495 [0.240] 0.0507 [0.230] 0.0273 [0.531] 0.0159 [0.726] 0.0207 [0.649]
doing military or civil service -0.219* [0.064] -0.243** [0.027] -0.243* [0.055] -0.219* [0.083] -0.248* [0.068] -0.149 [0.333] -0.164 [0.286]
living in West  Germany -0.190 [0.737] -0.194 [0.731] -0.159 [0.779] -0.192 [0.735] -0.198 [0.730] -0.149 [0.795] -0.372 [0.560]
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Lander dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
constant 7.265*** [0.000] 7.404*** [0.000] 8.144*** [0.000] 7.871*** [0.000] 8.114*** [0.000] 8.241*** [0.000] 7.914*** [0.000]
number of observations 64999 64054 59527 58560 54338 50221 49412
R2 overall 0.0317 0.0325 0.0273 0.0260 0.0251 0.0258 0.0261
F 37.49 36.58 35.34 34.56 32.33 30.01 29.62
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4.4.2 West Germans between 1988 and 2007
In section 4.3 I clarified that in order to consider a time period longer than 1996-2007
one has to restrict the analysis to the West Germany sample only. In this sub-section
I illustrate the repetition of my analysis under such a restriction while extending the
time period to 1988-2007.
One limitation of focusing on this longer period is that I have to drop the sociability
indicator about religious activities. This is because it is firstly observed in 1991. Nev-
ertheless, estimates for Westerns turn out to be rather similar to those of the baseline
regression, hence supporting my hypothesis. Table 4.6 reports these figures. Sociability
indicators have coefficients that are remarkably similar to those estimated for eq. 4.2.
The only difference is that also participating to popular events has a statistically sig-
nificant coefficient, with magnitude similar to that of participating to cultural events.
If anything, this reinforces the relevance of sociability indicators.
The only remaining differences which are worth mention come from work status,
and income variables. Unemployment is still the most important among work status
variables, but now, in place of civil/military service, results suggest that being retired
or not working are important. For what concerns income, I observe a smaller size of
coefficients (in absolute value). In particular, reference income is sensibly smaller with
the result that the overall contribution of income growth to SWB might be greater
than what observed in my baseline estimation. Indeed, the sum of the coefficients of
reference income and past income is only about one half of the coefficient of absolute
income, while in my baseline regression they sum up to about four fifths of absolute
income.
Since I changed both sample and time period, calculating again predicted changes
of SWB is a good robustness check for my previous findings. I report this check in tab.
4.7. In the period considered the SWB of Westerns decreased substantially more almost
twice as much than Germany’s average SWB during 1996-2007. Of this decrease, my
estimates predict about half. This is a good enough prediction, especially in the light
of the fact that I miss the indicator for religious activities that, as shown in my baseline
predictions, has been decreasing.
Turning our attention to marital status, age, and household characteristics, we see
that, depite some differences, our results are substantially in line with what seen for
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OLS regression with robust standard errors and fixed effects. The omitted categories are: 
employed, living in East Germany, without children, and single. Year and Lander dummies 
included. First column shows the coefficients from the regression (* means significant at 10%, 
** means significant at 5%, *** means significant at 1%.). The last column reports the p-value.
OLS with individual fixed effects, Years 1988-2007, West Germans






age squared -0.0001 [0.059]*
household size -0.123 [0.000]***
1 child 0.132 [0.001]***
2 children 0.170 [0.001]***
3 or more children 0.379 [0.000]***
years of education 0.000 [0.980]
living with parents when 16 -0.002 [0.962]
log of monthly household income 0.393 [0.000]***
log of reference income -0.149 [0.063]*
log of monthly household income 3 years before -0.033 [0.067]*
at least monthly attending to cultural events 0.103 [0.000]***
at least monthly attending to cinema, pop concerts and similar activities 0.063 [0.001]***
at least monthly actively participating in sports 0.068 [0.000]***
at least monthly volunteering -0.005 [0.767]
at least monthly participating in social gatherings 0.221 [0.000]***
at least monthly helping out friends 0.071 [0.000]***
at least monthly participating in local political activities -0.018 [0.475]
unemployed -0.571 [0.000]***
student 0.065 [0.163]
not working for other reasons -0.075 [0.006]***
retired 0.015 [0.717]
doing military or civil service 6.559 [0.000]***
Year dummies yes .
Lander dummies yes .
constant 6.490 [0.000]
Number of observations 80337
Overall R-square 0.029
F-stat 44.410 Prob < 0.000
Table 4.6: The SWB regression for Westerns only
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    Variables
all partial sums total
life satisfaction (observed) -0,130
married 0,127 -0,033 -0,0042
separated -0,460 0,002 -0,0011 Marital status
widowed -0,337 0,001 -0,0002 -0,005
age -0,022 4,964 -0,1102 Age
age squared -0,0001 451,431 -0,0479 -0,158
household size -0,123 -0,333 0,0410
1 child 0,132 -0,061 -0,0080 Household
2 children 0,170 0,004 0,0007 characteristics
3 or more children 0,379 -0,001 -0,0004 0,033
log monthly income 0,393 0,039 0,0153
log reference income -0,149 0,090 -0,0133 Income
log income 3 years before -0,033 0,147 -0,0049 -0,003
monthly at culture events 0,103 0,134 0,0138
monthly at cinema 0,063 0,118 0,0075
monthly playing sport 0,068 0,174 0,0119
monthly at social gathering 0,221 0,033 0,0074 Sociability
monthly helping friends 0,071 0,137 0,0097 0,051
unemployed -0,571 -0,001 0,0007
not working for other reasons -0,075 -0,087 0,0065 Work status
doing military or civil service -0,272 -0,006 0,0017 0,009 -0,073
Significant 
Coefficients
    1988-2007
Predicted  SWB
Table 4.7: Predicting the evolution of life satisfaction in West Germany, partial sums
the baseline predictions. An interesting difference is that the change in household
characteristics predict a larger increase in SWB. I believe this is due to the fact that
during the period considered Westerns experienced a more marked change in household
characteristics. A similar argument applies to the slightly more negative prediction due
to marital status.
Coming to income variables, the net prediction is negative. This is due to the fact
that reference income grew substantially more than absolute income. Further investi-
gation suggests that this is a result of a change in reference groups which progressively
become composed of high income households. This might explain the more marked
decline in SWB. Once more sociability indicators come out as the main predictor of a
positive change in SWB. In this case, however, the predicted change is much greater.
One reason is certainly the absence of the indicator of participation to religious activ-
ities. Another reason is that Westerns have been experiencing a more intense rise in
sociability than Easterns. At any rate, these figures suggest that West Germany have
been experiencing a constant and fruitful rise in sociability during the last twenty years.
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Finally, the prediction associated with work status does not appear to deserve any
special comment.
4.4.3 Lagged and average social capital
One potential issue in my baseline estimation of eq. 4.2 is that sociability indicators
may be endogenous to SWB. Indeed, there is now some supporting evidence that the
causal relationship between sociability and SWB might go both ways (Becchetti et. al,
2008).
I stress that such a potential endogeneity problem does not make my predictions
useless. The co-movements that I document are independent from a causal interpre-
tation. However, it would greatly extend the scope of my findings if I could provide
some evidence in favor of a causal relationship going from sociability to SWB. To this
aim I investigate an alternative specification of my baseline eq. 4.2 in which I replace
current individual-level sociability indicators with 1-year lag individual-level sociability
indicators. Formally, I estimate the eq. 4.4 in which the only difference with eq. 4.2 is
represented by the index of SCi,t−1 standing for a 1-year lag of the sociability proxies.
SWBRi,t = α+β1 ·X
d
i,t+γ1 · ln(yi,t)+γ2 · ln(y¯i,t)+γ3 · ln(yi,t−k)+δ ·SCi,t−1+ei,t (4.4)
Estimates are reported in tab. 4.8 and show a remarkably invariance with respect to
my baseline regression. The only relevant difference is that helping out friends becomes
insignificant while volunteering becomes both positive and significant. It appears that
volunteering affects SWB more persistently than just helping out friends. At any rate,
the overall picture that comes out of this check strongly supports the hypothesis that
sociability causes SWB.
A further issue is that sociability might be relevant to SWB not only at the indi-
vidual level, but also at the aggregate level. To investigate this I estimated a further
specification of eq. 4.2 where individual-level sociability indicators are replaced by
Land-level indicators, namely the Land averages of sociability indicators. In this case
I estimate the following equation:
SWBRi,t = α+ β1 ·X
d
i,t+ γ1 · ln(yi,t)+ γ2 · ln(y¯i,t)+ γ3 · ln(yi,t−k)+ δ · S¯Ci,t+ ei,t (4.5)
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
OLS regression with robust standard errors and fixed effects. The omitted categories are: employed, living in
East Germany, without children, and single.  Year and Lander dummies included. First column shows the
coefficients from the regression (* means significant at 10%, ** means significant at 5%, *** means significant
at 1%.). The last column reports the p-value.
OLS with individual fixed effects, Years 1996-2007, East + West Germans






age squared -0,0004 [0.000]***
household size -0,095 [0.000]***
1 child 0,077 [0.097]*
2 children 0,100 [0.084]*
3 or more children 0,149 [0.057]*
years of education 0,025 [0.005]***
living with parents when 16 -0,063 [0.174]
log of monthly household income 0,393 [0.000]***
log of reference income -0,116 [0.146]
log of monthly household income 3 years before -0,063 [0.003]***
last year at least monthly attending to religious events 0,044 [0.052]*
last year at least monthly attending to cultural events 0,042 [0.033]**
last year at least monthly attending to cinema, pop concerts, etc -0,001 [0.966]
last year at least monthly actively participating in sports 0,059 [0.002]***
last year at least monthly volunteering 0,043 [0.034]**
last year at least monthly participating in social gatherings 0,049 [0.014]**
last year at least monthly helping out friends 0,013 [0.419]
last year at least monthly participating in local political activities -0,031 [0.242]
unemployed -0,603 [0.000]***
student 0,089 [0.139]
not working for other reasons -0,038 [0.256]
retired 0,061 [0.199]
doing military or civil service -0,183 [0.138]
Year dummies yes .
Lander dummies yes .
constant 7,133 [0.000]***
Number of observations 53929,000
Overall R-square 0,022
F-stat 26,880 Prob < 0.000
Table 4.8: The SWB regression with one-year lagged indicators of sociability
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where S¯Ci,t stands for the Land averages of sociability proxies. Estimates are
reported in tab. 4.9. As we can see, Land averages work almost as well as individual
level indicators suggesting that spillovers and relational environment might be playing
an important role. The only exception is participating in sport activities, which seems
to be irrelevant at the aggregate level. In conclusion, I have to admit that estimates
don’t allow me to make a clear point on whether sociability is more relevant at the
individual or aggregate level.
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OLS regression with robust standard errors and fixed effects. The omitted categories are: employed, living in
East Germany, without children, and single.  Year and Lander dummies included. First column shows the
coefficients from the regression (* means significant at 10%, ** means significant at 5%, *** means significant
at 1%.). The last column reports the p-value.
OLS with individual fixed effects, Years 1996-2007, East + West Germans






age squared -0,0003 [0.000]***
household size -0,136 [0.000]***
1 child 0,122 [0.004]***
2 children 0,160 [0.002]***
3 or more children 0,393 [0.000]***
years of education 0,009 [0.264]
living with parents when 16 -0,011 [0.797]
log of monthly household income 0,426 [0.000]***
log of reference income -0,309 [0.000]***
log of monthly household income 3 years before -0,073 [0.000]***
average at least monthly attending to religious events 0,058 [0.024]**
average at least monthly attending to cultural events 0,101 [0.000]***
average at least monthly attending to cinema, pop concerts, etc -0,021 [0.466]
average at least monthly actively participating in sports 0,020 [0.438]
average at least monthly volunteering -0,043 [0.119]
average at least monthly participating in social gatherings 0,197 [0.000]***
average at least monthly helping out friends 0,076 [0.001]***
average at least monthly participating in local political activities -0,044 [0.272]
unemployed -0,549 [0.000]***
student 0,034 [0.509]
not working for other reasons -0,035 [0.250]
retired 0,046 [0.270]
doing military or civil service -0,187 [0.137]
Year dummies yes .
Lander dummies yes .
constant 8,423 [0.000]***
Number of observations 60692,0
Overall R-square 0,022
F-stat 33,890 Prob < 0.000




In this paper I quantified the extent to which the main correlates of SWB predict its
evolution in Germany over the period 1996-2007. In particular, I focused on four forces
that can potentially be responsible for the SWB trend: the growth of absolute income,
income adaptation, income comparisons, and sociability. I used GSOEP database since
it provides sociability indicators and, moreover, has a longitudinal structure that allows
me to control for unobservable individual fixed effects.
The SWB trend in Germany between 1996 and 2007 is slightly negative, even consid-
ering Westerns and Easterns separately. My findings are consistent with the hypothesis
that all four forces mentioned above have played an important role in such a decline. In
particular, this trend might have been the result of contrasting tendencies on different
life domains.
More precisely, my estimates suggest that income growth is beneficial, but only to
a limited extent. Indeed, four fifths of the benefits of income growth might have been
lost due to comparisons and adaptation. Since I consider a ten-year time span I can
not speak of long run correlation between growth and SWB (Stevenson and Wolfers,
2008; Angelescu and Easterlin, 2009). Nevertheless, my findings go in the direction of
supporting a positive role of income growth per se, although very limited.
Furthermore, sociability appears to be very relevant to SWB. Sociability indicators
turn out to be the largest positive predictor of SWB in Germany between 1996 and
2007. The moderate increase in social relations, or relational goods, have gone with a
substantial increase in SWB.
Finally, the data suggest that aging of the population might have been the principal
source of the reduction in life satisfaction over the period considered. This result
appears to crucially hinge on the loss of satisfaction experienced beyond age 65.
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Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics
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Appendix A.  Definition of variables
happy 10 if respondent declares to be completely satisfied  0 if respondent declares to be com-
pletely dissatisfied (GSOEP source variable: p1110107)
married 1 if respondent reports to be currently married (GSOEP source variable: d1110407)
separated 1 if respondent reports to be currently separated (GSOEP source variable: d1110407)
divorced 1 if respondent reports to be currently divorced (GSOEP source variable: d1110407)
widowed 1 if respondent reports to be currently widowed (GSOEP source variable: d1110407)
female 1 if subject is female (GSOEP source variable: d11102ll)
age number of years since born (GSOEP source variable: d1110107)
age2 age to the power of 2 (GSOEP source variable: d1110107)
household size number of reported household members (GSOEP source variable: d1110607)
1 child 1 if in the household there is one child (GSOEP source variable: d1110707)
2 children 1 if in the household there is two children (GSOEP source variable: d1110707)
3 or more children 1 if in the household there is three or more children (GSOEP source variable: d1110707)
years of education number of years the respondent declared to have attended school (GSOEP source variable:
d1110907)
living with parents at
16
1 if respondent declares to be living with own parents at 16 years old (GSOEP source vari-
able: xh61)
Absolute income natural logarithm of Adjusted Monthly Household Net Income (Euro 2000) as provided in
the GSOEP (variable name: ahinc07)
Relative income natural logarithm of average Adjusted Monthly Household Net Income (Euro 2000) for a
reference group as provided in the GSOEP (variable name: ahinc07)
Absolute income Lag3 Three years temporal lag of the natural logarithm of Adjusted Monthly Household Net In-
come (Euro 2000) as provided in the GSOEP (variable name: ahinc07)
monthly at church 1 if respondent reports to attend at least once a month church or religious institutions
(GSOEP source variable: xp0309)
monthly at culture
events
1 if respondent reports to attend at least once a month cultural events (GSOEP source vari-
able: xp0301)
monthly at cinema 1 if respondent reports to go at least once a month  to the cinema (GSOEP source variable:
xp0302)
monthly  sport activi-
ties
1 if respondent reports to participate at least once a month  to sport activities (GSOEP source
variable: xp0303)
monthly at social ga-
thering
1 if respondent reports to visit at least once a month  friends, relatives or neighbours
(GSOEP source variable: xp0305)
monthly helping
friends
1 if respondent reports to help  at least once a month  friends, relatives or neighbours
(GSOEP source variable: xp0306)
monthly volunteering 1 if respondent perform volunteer work at least once a month in clubs, associations or social
services(GSOEP source variable: xp0307)
monthly local political
participation
1 if respondent reports to participate at least once a month  in citizens' action groups, politic-
al parties, local government (GSOEP source variable: xp0308)
unemployed 1 if respondent declares to be unemployed (GSS source variable:lfs07)
student 1 if respondent declares to be student (GSS source variable:lfs07)
non working 1 if respondent declares to be non-working (GSS source variable:lfs07)
retired 1 if respondent declares to be retired (GSS source variable:lfs07)
military/civil service 1 if respondent declares to be in military of civil service (GSS source variable:lfs07)
west 1 if respondent declares to live in West Germany (GSOEP source variable: l1110207)
Table 4.11: Definition of variables
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It is now well documented that trends of subjective-well-being (SWB) show a substan-
tial heterogeneity across countries and need not to be stationary over the long term
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Inglehart, 2009). In particular, cosidering the last thirty
years and more we know that SWB increased in some countries and decreased in others,
varying at different paces.
What does predict such international differences? Income growth does not. Income
is related to SWB in cross-sectional data but not in long time series. Evidence based on
microdata show that individuals with higher income than others report, at any given
point in time, higher levels of happiness. Moreover, evidence from cross-country data
shows that countries with higher income report higher levels of happiness (Deaton,
2008; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009; Inglehart, 2009;
Frey and Stutzer, 2002). However, in long time series income growth and SWB turn
out to be unrelated (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009): on average people do not become
happier when a country’s income increases.
This contrast between the evidence from cross-sections and the evidence from long
time series is the essence of the so called Easterlin paradox. The paradox is certainly
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one fundamental reason for the scientific (and mediatic) popularity of the happiness
literature. However, time series deserve a special attention since they seem more likely
than cross-sections to provide an answer to “what people (. . .) want to know (. . .): How
far is general income growth (beyond income levels already achieved) likely to increase
average happiness? This is a question about time series relationships” (Layard et al.,
2009, p. 1).
The most comprehensive studies on the relationship between the time series of
SWB and income has been provided by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) and Easterlin
and Angelescu (2009). These two influential papers use the same approach based
on bivariate analysis, but they reach constrasting conclusions. Income and SWB are
positively and significantly related over time for Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), while
they are unrelated for Easterlin and Angelescu (2009). The reason for this difference
lies in the time span. Stevenson and Wolfers’ sample includes countries with long and
short time series. In particular, the positive and significant relation that they estimate
seems to be entirely generated by the inclusion of a small sample of transition countries
with short time series. Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) show that if these transition
countries are excluded from the sample - thus focusing the analysis on the long term -
the Easterlin paradox re-emerges.
If GDP growth does not predict the observed international differences in long term
trends of well-being, what does predict them? There is a number of potential can-
didates all of which would require a detailed analysis of long time series, e.g., social
tolerance, political freedom, religiosity, health (Inglehart, 2009; Deaton, 2008). Besides
these there is social capital (SC). Several papers have documented that SC is strongly
correlated with SWB (see the pioneering studies of Helliwell (2001, 2006); Helliwell and
Putnam (2004); see also Bruni and Stanca (2008); Becchetti et al. (2008)). Becchetti
et al. (2009) provided a causal analysis showing that SC has a strong effect on SWB.
Moreover, even the positive association between religiosity and SWB may be due to
SC, as suggested by Lim and Putnam (2009), which find that religious people are more
satisfied with their lives because they regularly attend religious service and build social
networks in their congregations.
It has also been recently shown that the long term evolution of SC is a powerful
predictor of SWB, in US and Germany. Bartolini et al. (2008), using micro data from
the US General Social Survey for the period 1975-2004, show that a large portion of the
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declining happiness trend in the US is predicted by the decline in SC. The predictive
potential of SC for SWB trends is confirmed by the analysis of micro data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (see chapter 4).
In this paper I extend the available evidence on the relationship between SWB and
SC by investigating their long term correlation. To this aim I use the same bivariate
technique which has been applied to analyze the relationship between SWB and GDP
growth (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). I find that the
trends of SC are strong predictors of the long term trends of SWB in the sample of all
sizeable developed and developing countries for which there exist long run time series
of SC. Thus, the same type of analysis that has drawn to the conclusion that SWB is
unrelated to income in the long run also documents that long term changes in well-being
are strongly related to long term changes in SC. In addition, I replicate the analysis of
Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) in my sample, substantially confirming their results.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses concepts and data, while
section 3 presents the adopted methodology. Section 4 presents the results and section
5 exposes several robustness checks of the main results. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Concepts and data
I use two indexes of SWB. The first is reported happiness, measured by the answer to
the question: “Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy, quite
happy, not very happy, not at all happy?” The second is overall life satisfaction, the
response to the question “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as
a whole these days?”
SC is a vague concept encompassing very different measures, such as trust among
individuals, trust towards institutions, social interactions, civic engagement, electoral
participation, etc. In this paper I focus on social interactions, which several contri-
butions showed to be related with SWB (Helliwell (2006), Bruni and Stanca (2008),
Becchetti, Pelloni, Rossetti (2008), Bartolini, Bilancini and Pugno (2008))1.
In providing a long-term analysis of social interactions one faces a number of severe
limitations in the available data. First of all, there exists only one data-set that provides
comparable data on social interactions for a large number of countries, namely the
1descriptive statistics are available from tab.5.4 to tab.5.10 in the appendix
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World Values Survey (WVS)1. In particular, the WVS provides data on social contacts
(time spent with relatives, friends neighbours, etc.) and membership in groups or
associations for many developed and developing countries. Unfortunately, long time
series are available only for group membership and only for a quite small sample of
countries.
Moreover, time series on membership in groups and associations are limited in time
and space. Data are mainly concentrated in rich countries. Very few countries (8)
provide at least 20-years long time series and they are all developed. In order to obtain
a reasonably large sample of countries (19) which includes at least a few developing
countries (5), the analysis must be extended to countries with time series of 15 years
or more. Moreover, no transition country can be included in the sample.
A further limitation is that WVS data are collected only once every about five years.
Therefore, the risk of biases due to shocks and/or measurement errors in the years in
which the waves take place is relatively high compared to surveys with more frequent
waves of observations. This risk is particularly high when the time series are based
only on the first and last waves of the period considered. In order to reduce this risk, I
included in my sample only those countries for which at least three waves are available.
Furthermore, in order to avoid the risk of over-sampling, I exclude countries with
very low population2.
Summarizing, my sample is defined according to the following three criteria: i) countries
that have a time series at least 15-years long; ii) countries for which at least three waves
are available; iii) countries with a sufficiently large population size.
Finally, I note that, while in the case of the relationship between GDP growth and
SWB the sample is limited by the availability of SWB long time series, in my case
the binding constraint is the lenght of SC time series. Therefore, my sample turns
out to be considerably reduced compared to the one used by Easterlin and Angelescu
(2009). I consider a total of 19 countries (14 developed, 5 developing), while Easterlin
and Angelescu consider 37 countries (17 developed, 11 transition and 9 developing
countries)(see tab. 5.11 in the appendix).
I am not claiming that my data are faultless. However, in spite of its limitations, it
is worth to use the available evidence, since it seems to document that SC trends are
1For more details on World Values Survey, please, refer to section 2.4 in chapter 2.
2In this case I exclude Malta and Iceland.
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a major predictor of the trends of SWB.
5.3 Methods
Generalizations about the relationship between economic growth and SWB over time
have typically been based on bivariate analysis of national measures of SWB and per
capita income (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). A simple
way to test the long run relationship between SC and SWB is to use the same method-
ology, where of course we substitute for income with SC. In particular, I employ a
bivariate analysis considering long run changes of SC and SWB.
In order to easily compare how income and SC are related with SWB, I also repli-
cate on my sample the bivariate regressions of SWB trend and the rate of change of
per-capita GDP1, as provided by Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) and Stevenson and
Wolfers (2008). Furthermore, since SC and GDP may affect each other in several ways,
bringing a high risk of spurious correlation in bivariate analysis, I also provide trivariate
regressions of SWB on both per capita GDP growth and SC. As I will argue in the
following, results of bivariate analysis are substantially confirmed.
I follow a two-steps estimation strategy. First, I regress my proxies of SWB and SC
on time (Happiness, 1 - 4 scale; Life Satisfaction, 1 - 10 scale; Membership: fraction of
population member of at least 1 association). Coefficients of the time variable repre-
sent the estimated average annual growth for a given country, period, and variable of
interest.
Second, the time coefficient of SWB is regressed on the time coefficient of SC.












j · TIMEij + µ
LS
ij (5.2)
where H and LS identifies alternatively happiness and life satisfaction variables,
TIME is the time variable containing the years in which each dependent variable has
been observed, µ is the error term and the indexes j and i stands for countries and
1GDP data are drawn from World Development Indicators 2008 (http://web.worldbank.org) and
are expressed in constant 2000 US$.
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individuals respectively. The coefficient of TIME is estimated with and OLS model with
robust standard errors and represents the average annual growth rate of the dependent
variable. Since my SC variable takes value either 1 or 0 at the individual level, I find
it convenient to estimate its long run average change using a probit model. Formally,
I estimate:




j · TIMEij) (5.3)
where again indexes j and i stands for countries and individuals, respectively. The
coefficients to be used in step two are obtained via marginal effects on eq. 5.3 evaluated
at the middle point of the period considered. Intuitively, this provides an “average” es-
timated change per year in the probability of being member of a group or an association.





j ·MEMBERj + µ
Z˙
j (5.4)
where stands for the estimated growth rate of, alternatively, happiness or life satisfac-
tion and MEMBER is the estimated probability of being member of at least one group
or association as determined by eq.5.3. Again, µ is the error term and index j refers to
the countries.
5.4 Results
Changes over time in happiness and SC are strongly and positively related in all the
samples considered. The estimated coefficient of eq.5.4 turns out to be large and
significant when we consider the 14 developed countries, the 5 developing ones as well
as all countries together (please, refer to fig.5.1, fig.5.2 and fig.5.3 in the appendix).
Changes over time in life satisfaction and SC provide similar results when devel-
oping countries and all countries together are considered (see fig.5.5 and fig.5.6 in the
appendix). However, we find no significant long run relationship between SWB and SC
for developed countries (see fig.5.4 in the appendix).
Taken together these results suggest two important things. First, the long term
trends of SC are strong predictors of the long term trends of SWB. In particular, cross-
country variability observed in SC trends well predicts cross-country variability in SWB
trends. Second, long term changes in SWB seem to be more tightly related to long term
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changes in happiness than to long term changes in life satisfaction. This is consistent
with the idea that measures of happiness and life satisfaction capture different aspects
of SWB and, more precisely, that happiness is more about social aspects of life which
tend to become relatively more important when basic needs are satisfied.
Turning our attention to the relationship between long term changes in SWB and
GDP, we find that the Easterlin paradox holds. Regressing either happiness or life
satisfaction on per capita GDP growth gives significant and close to zero coefficients,
in all samples considered.
We emphasize that the difference between the long-term changes in SC and per
capita GDP as predictors of changes in SWB is striking. The growth of membership in
groups and associations is a major predictor of changes in SWB. Instead, the growth
rate of GDP does not predict any change in SWB.
5.5 Robustness checks
5.5.1 Trivariate analysis
There are several possible relationships between GDP and SC variations over time.
Part of the economic literature focuses on the role of SC for income and economic
growth (Barro, 1996; Knack et al., 1997; Antoci et al., 2002; Rodrik, 1997; Whiteley,
2000). Putnam et al. (1993) clearly show some of the paths through which SC fosters
economic growth. However, a long standing tradition emphasizes that economic growth
may damage SC evolution over time (Polanyi, 1971; Hirsch, 1991; see also Bartolini
and Bonatti, 2008).
Althought I get no evidence of a long term relationship between GDP growth and
SWB, there exists the concrete possibility that co-movements of SC and GDP generate
a spurious correlation between SWB and SC. Bivariate analysis, obviously, cannot
distinguish whether this is the case or not. However, one may suppose that multivariate
regressions of SWB trends on long term changes in both SC and GDP may give some
insight in this regard.
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As mentioned above, Z stands for the proxies of SWB, MEMBER represents SC, is
the growth rate of GDP, µ is the error term and j is an index for the different countries.
Regressions substantially confirm the results of the bivariate analysis. Again, the
hypothesis of the Easterlin paradox is not rejected. The coefficients of are very close
to zero and non significant in both happiness and life satisfaction regressions. Some-
what surprisingly, the coefficient in the happiness regression for developed countries is
slightly negative and significant.
Table 5.1: Trivariate OLS regression with robust standard errors
Similarly, the results concerning SC are substantially confirmed. The trends of
happiness and SC are positively related when either developed countries or all countries
are considered. The only exception is the coefficient for the sample of developing
countries, which remains large and positive but becomes non significant. Happiness
and SC remain positively and significantly correlated when, respectively developed and
all countries are considered. Results on the relationship between the trends in life
satisfaction and SC are confirmed.
5.5.2 Sub-period
In my sample, 8 out of 14 developed countries have at least 20 years of observations
of SC. Therefore, it is possible to check the robustness of the results obtained for
developed countries in the subset of countries with longer time series. Charts from
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fig.5.7 to fig.5.10 show results from bivariate regressions of SWB on GDP or SC. They
show that all results obtained on the whole sample of developed countries are confirmed.
In particular:
i) GDP growth rate and SWB trend are unrelated for both happiness and life satisfac-
tion. The coefficients are close to zero and non significant;
ii) trends in membership and happiness are related. The coefficient is large, positive
and significant;
iii) changes in membership and life satisfaction seem to be unrelated. The coefficient
is positive and large, but non significant.
5.5.3 Changing the specification of the GDP variable
Following Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), I regressed
the estimated average annual growth of SWB on the average growth rate of GDP per
capita. This is in line with the general presumption of decreasing marginal utility of
income and, in particular, of the logarithmic dependency of SWB on income. However,
a linear dependency might be in place with potential serious consequences for the
unbiasedness of my estimates. For instance, I note that passing from growth rate of
GDP to absolute GDP growth implies a radical change of the position of China, which
scores very high in growth rate and low in absolute growth of GDP.
Moreover, the use of the growth rate in place of absolute growth of GDP per capita
is not without drawbacks. More precisely, it imposes to restrict the use of available
information to the extreme points of the period considered. This makes estimates
relatively more exposed to the risk of biases due to shocks and/or measurement errors.
The actual trend of GDP may well differ from the average growth rate calculated
between the two most distant observations.
Therefore, it is interesting to check whether the results on the relationship between
SWB and income are robust to a different specification of GDP changes. I use - both in
bivariate and trivariate regressions - the average annual growth of GDP, estimated by
regressing on time all the GDP observations available in the period. Results obtained
are robust also to this different specification (see tab.5.2 and tab.5.3).
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Table 5.2: Bivariate OLS regressions of SWB trend on annual change in GDP per capita




The coefficients of GDP change remain negative and non significant for developed,
developing and all countries together, in both bivariate and trivariate regressions of
happiness or life satisfaction.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper I investigated the long term relationships among the trends of SC, SWB,
and per capita income, taking a cross-country perspective. In accordance with both the
largely debated Easterlin paradox and the new evidence about the correlation between
social capital and happiness, my findings suggest that SC and per capita income perform
very differently in predicting the evolution of SWB in the long run: whereas SC is a
good predictor, income growth definitely is not. This contrast is quite striking, and not
only in the light of standard economic wisdom.
More precisely, I found that long term changes in SC are strong predictors of long
term changes in SWB. I also showed that this result is robust to a control for long
term GDP growth as well as to the restriction to a sub-sample of countries with longer
time series available. On the other hand, I found that long term growth of GDP does
not predict long term changes in SWB. In this regard, I also showed that Easterlin
and Angelescu (2009)’s result survive to several robustness checks, although in smaller
sample of countries: including a control for SC trends, adopting a different specification
of GDP variations, changing the time span, and changing the measure of SWB variable:
happiness rather than life satisfaction.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics: average happiness per wave
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Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics: average life satisfaction per wave
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Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics: average group membership per wave
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Table 5.7: percentage of people partecipating in associations in developed countries
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Table 5.8: percentage of people partecipating in associations in developing countries
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Table 5.9: percentage of people partecipating in more than 1 group in developed countries
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Table 5.10: percentage of people partecipating in more than 1 group in developing coun-
tries
145
5. SOCIABILITY PREDICTS HAPPINESS IN NATIONS: SOME
WORLD-WIDE EVIDENCE
Figure 5.1: Happiness and social capital in 14 developed countries
Figure 5.2: Happiness and social capital in 5 developing countries
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Figure 5.3: Happiness and social capital in 19 developed and developing countries
Figure 5.4: Life satisfaction and social capital in 14 developed countries
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Figure 5.5: Life satisfaction and social capital in 5 developing countries
Figure 5.6: Life satisfaction and social capital in 19 developed and developing countries
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Figure 5.7: Happiness and GDP in 8 developed countries
Figure 5.8: Happiness and social capital in 8 developed countries
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Figure 5.9: Life satisfaction and GDP in 8 developed countries
Figure 5.10: Life satisfaction and social capital in 8 developed countries
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Present research is set in the wider stream of economic research committed in exploring
and re-considering the meaning of the term “well-being”, which aspects are considered
as important by people for their well-being and how to improve it.
The myth that economic growth is all we need to have a better life is showing its
constraints. More opulence doesn’t necessarily bring more well-being. The empirical
evidence confirms this observation (Easterlin and Angelescu, 2009). But if income is not
all that we need, on what should we focus our efforts to improve the human condition?
Answering this question is a dilemma for economists who are historically interested
in people’s well-being and in its maximization. At the same time, answering this
question also means setting the basis of a different cultural, economic and political
organization of modern societies.
Suggestions proposed so far to explain what is important for people’s well-being
aid a more detailed knowledge of what subjective well-being (SWB) is, but they can
not explain international differences in SWB trends. Why does SWB grow up more in
some countries than in others? Why do individual well-being stagnates in particular
countries? This is the case, for example, of the richest economy in the world: USA.
For those who are used to look at GDP as a good indicator of the level of well-being
of a society this evidence is striking.
In the light of some recent contributions suggesting sociability as an important
correlate of SWB, I tested the hypothesis that social capital (SC), in particular rela-




My contributions confirm previous results on the role of adaptation and social com-
parisons in explaining SWB and they document that SC is an important determinant
of well-being. Above all, my results suggest that SC is largely responsible for the
international differences in the evolution of well-being over the long run.
My research first dealt with the analysis of the relationship among SWB and a wide
range of explanatory variables in two groups of countries: low and high income ones.
The comparison of “happiness equations” in the two contexts suggests that people
have a similar set of determinants for their well-being and, ceteris paribus, SC and
relational goods have a positive and significant relationship with SWB. This means
that what people consider as important for their well-being doesn’t significantly vary
across countries and, in particular, it is independent from the level of development. This
result confirms previous works on the unicity of the happiness equations and suggests
that cross-cultural differences have a minor role in explaining the different trends of
SWB across countries.
Successively, I considered the international differences in SWB and SC trends. The
case of USA, with decreasing trends of SWB and SC despite economic growth, poses
a crucial question: is the erosion of SC a general feature of more modern and richer
societies or is it a key feature of only some of them? Are the trends of SC consistent
with the trends of SWB in different countries? In other words, is there a relationship
between SC and SWB trends? This research was also motivated by the fact that so far
the scarcity of data constrained the availability of empirical evidence on the trends of
SC in countries other than USA. Hence, I focused on eleven western European countries
for which the World Values Survey (WVS) has enough information to draw SC and
SWB trends. Notwithstanding the cross-sectional nature of this data-set, it is one of the
best available sources of information to analyse the evolution of values and well-being
in time. Results point out that the considered European countries are not following
the same American pattern: many western European countries between 1980 and 2000
experienced an improvement in both their SWB and relational SC. Hence, although
some exceptions exist, this result suggests that we can not discard the hypothesis that
the trend of SC can help explaining the trend of SWB.
In order to further explore my hypothesis, I focused on micro data from Germany
to quantify the extent to which the main correlates of SWB predict its variations over
time. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel allowed me to control for a large set
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of independent variables testing and accounting the weight of some of the theories
explaining SWB trends. Hence, the effect of economic growth for SWB has been
considered together with the role of adaptation, social comparisons and social capital.
The quality of the available data allow to quantify the variation that each determinant
had on the overall variation of SWB in time. Results confirm the positive role of
income and the negative impact of adaptation and social comparisons for the trend
of well-being: these three forces act in contrasting directions offsetting their effects.
On the other hand, SC positively and significantly contributed to the German SWB
moderating the negative effects of income variables. This analysis confirms that SC is
important for individual’s well-being and that it has an important role in explaining
the variation of SWB in time.
The last step looks for further evidence to support the explanatory power of SC
for SWB trends in a macro perspective. Easterlin and Angelescu (2009) recently re-
discovered the Easterlin paradox finding out that, in the long run, GDP and SWB
variations are unrelated. Adopting the same bivariate methodology and using data from
WVS and “World Development Indicators” (WDI), I find out that there is a positive
and significant relationship between the trends of SC and SWB. The relevance of this
result stands in the fact that the same methodology suggesting no relationship between
SWB and GDP variations over time, confirms the significant role of SC. Furthermore,
this result holds for both developed and developing countries and is robust to different
specifications of variables, different samples of countries and to the inclusion of changes
in GDP as explanatory variables.
Overall, the role of SC as determinant of SWB is confirmed and the evidence pro-
vided supports the hypothesis that the international differences in SWB are linked to
different trends in SC.
Thus, what message should we draw from these results? Economic growth has an
important role for well-being, but its effects are much more widespread and multifaceted
than what is expected. A large part of the positive effects on well-being due to economic
growth are frustrated by mechanisms of adaptation and social comparison. Moreover
both cross-country and cross-individual comparisons show that the positive impact
of income on well-being is strongly decreasing as income grows. In short, income is
important for poor people and nations, much less so for wealthy ones.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
On the other hand, the evidence I provided confirms that sociability is extremely
relevant for well-being across countries. This means that economic prosperity works
in favor of well-being if it has not been obtained at the price of the destruction of
sociability. What comes out to be important for people’s well-being is not economic
development per se, but its social quality.
In conclusion, these results suggest that rich countries shouldn’t expect substantial
increase in well-being by economic growth and should rather re-orient their efforts
to increase well-being towards some other priority: sociability. On the other hand,
developing countries can expect much more in terms of well-being from economic growth
compared to developed ones, but only if this growth is obtained with a great attention
to the containment of its social costs.
This work gives SC a new role in the economic and policy agenda: it is no more
simply a set of shared values and common rules improving the relationships between
economic agents. My results highlight the important role of social relationships for in-
dividual’s well-being and suggest that current and present development policies should
consider SC as a policy goal per se if they aim at improving SWB. New scenarios are
available for policies aimed at increasing well-being: urban organization, educational
system, labour market, health systems are only some of the fields in which re-considering
the role of SC can significantly improve people’s experience with their lives.
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